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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to discuss the role of external auditing in corporate 
governance and in financial markets by exploring audit regulation in the EU and in 
Turkey. This study contributes to the existing literature by providing a law 
perspective on audit regulation both in the EU and in Turkey. This study also 
contributes to the convergence analysis in EU laws on auditing (and between EU and 
Turkish laws on auditing) through a comparative analysis. 
This thesis has three main themes. The first theme concerns with the role and 
function of external auditing.  In this respect this thesis identifies the role of auditing 
in different corporate governance systems and its function in today’s financial 
markets. The second theme relates to the audit regulation, in particular in the EU. 
This thesis examines the EU audit reform initiatives with respect to preliminary 
issues in the audit market. In addition, it critically analyses whether these reform 
proposals could provide further harmonisation in the EU. The central and the last 
theme of this thesis is convergence. It submits that integration of financial markets 
can lead to a convergence of auditing. Turkey, as a candidate country for the EU, 
seeks to benefit from the integration of financial markets. In the pursuit to be part of 
the international financial markets and to be a member of the EU, Turkey has 
reformed its law in line with EU law. This thesis questions however, whether these 
regulatory attempts have resulted (or can result) in convergence between the EU and 
Turkish laws. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH 
The uncertainty of the quality of products is inherent in the business world.
1
 It is the 
usual scenario where the seller has more knowledge about the quality of the service 
(or good) than the buyer. Limited information about the quality of the service (or 
good) would damage the confidence and trust of the buyer. Auditing, as a form of 
control and verification of the quality of information, has emerged to deal with such 
informational asymmetry.
2
 The purpose of financial audit is, therefore, to provide the 
users with confidence in financial statements.
3
 Beyond financial auditing, the trend 
towards auditing can also be seen in the example of medical audits, environmental 
audits and ethical and social audits.
4
 
Financial auditing (or external auditing) is considered as the template for other types 
of audits since it’s origins go back to the early forms of corporations in the 13th 
century.
5
 From then onwards, external auditing has been used as a control 
mechanism over the agents of the company.
6
 Investors are likely to be misinformed 
about the quality of the information in financial statements due to company 
management’s intentional or wrongful misrepresentation.7 The primary role of 
external auditors is to obtain reasonable assurance on the accuracy of the accounts by 
reporting an opinion to the shareholders as to whether the accounts prepared by the 
management provide a true picture of the company’s financial situation.8  
The role of external auditing and auditors received significant attention from 
regulators when the Enron scandal hit the markets more than a decade ago. Back 
                                                 
1
 George A. Akerlof, ‘The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’ 
(1970) 84(3) Quarterly Journal of Economics 488.   
2
 Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3(4) Journal of Financial Economics 305. 
3
 ISA 200, para. 3. 
4
 Michael Power, The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification (OUP, New York 1997), p. 3.   
5
 Ross L. Watts and Jerold L. Zimmerman, ‘Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: 
Some Evidence’ (1983) 26(3) Journal of Law and Economics 613. 
6
 Ibid.   
7
 Ibid. 
8
 ISA 200, para. 11. 
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then, auditors were blamed for failing to detect and report the fraud in the company.
9
 
More recently, during and after the global financial crisis of 2008, auditors and their 
role in financial markets have again been widely debated. After the collapse of major 
financial institutions, auditors were accused of failing to give warning signals to the 
markets, and not issuing going concern reports before the collapse of the large 
banks.
10
 The expectations of the users of the audit reports are much higher than the 
auditors’ role and responsibilities defined under the professional standards and 
related laws. This situation results in an expectations gap that is widened in a time of 
crisis. Thus, this thesis aims to clarify the role of external auditing and auditors’ 
responsibilities and liabilities according to professional standards and laws, and to 
identify whether they actually failed in their role.  
Similar to the regulatory developments back in the early 2000s, the global financial 
crisis has been a wake-up call for the law reforms in the EU. As a response to the 
crisis, the EU issued a Green Paper on Audit Policy in 2010.
11
 Subsequently, in 
November 2011, the European Commission issued proposals for a Directive 
amending the Directive 2006/43/EC
12
 and a proposal for a new Regulation on the 
specific requirements for statutory audits of PIEs.
13
 The primary objective of these 
reforms is to strengthen the external audit mechanism and to reassure confidence in 
financial markets. According to the Commissioner, Michael Barnier, there were 
weaknesses in the audit market, and the aim of these regulatory initiatives is to 
“change the status quo in the market”.14 The EU lawmakers aimed to change the 
current structure of the audit market and create a more integrated audit market 
through more harmonised rules. In this respect, this paper aims to provide a critical 
analysis both of existing EU laws and proposals on auditing, to question whether 
                                                 
9
 John C. Coffee, Jr., ‘Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid”’ (2002) 57 The 
Business Lawyer 1403. 
10
 Prem Sikka, ‘Financial Crisis and the Silence of Auditors’ (2009) 34 Accounting, Organizations, 
and Society 868. 
11
 European Commission Green Paper Audit Policy: Lessons from the Crisis Brussels, 13.10.2010 
COM(2010) 561 final.  
12
 European Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts 
Brussels, 30.11.2011 COM(2011) 778 final. 
13
 European Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
specific requirements regarding statutory audit of public-interest entities Brussels, 30.11.2011 
COM(2011) 779 final. 
14
 Michael Barnier, European Commission’s Internal Market Commissioner, September 2011. 
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they are sufficient to deal with the issues in the audit market, and establish whether 
they can contribute to the further EU harmonisation in auditing. 
As well as in the other areas of law, globalisation has influenced the regulation of 
auditing. This thesis argues that as today’s financial markets become closer through 
globalisation; such approximation is also possible for auditing regulation. Integration 
of financial markets has helped audit firms to grow globally and provide services all 
around the world. This has resulted in a wider application of uniform standards in 
auditing globally, i.e. ISAs.
15
 Turkey, as a candidate country for the EU, aspires to be 
a part of and to benefit from the integration of financial markets. In this respect, 
Turkey adopted the globally accepted auditing standards and reformed its 
commercial law and capital markets law to harmonise with EU laws on auditing. The 
primary motivation of the law reforms in Turkey is to become a full member of the 
EU alongside the objective of being a part of the global financial markets. This thesis 
will examine further whether approximation of the laws through the EU membership 
process can lead to an actual convergence between the EU and Turkish laws. The 
example of Turkey will help to illustrate how the globalisation and integration of 
financial markets leads to the convergence of audit regulation.  
This thesis takes the EU and Turkish laws and International Standards on Auditing 
(ISAs) as the main source of reference when examining the role, function and 
liabilities of auditors. The laws on auditing will be studied under the theme of 
convergence. In the EU, there are some areas have been left unregulated, for instance 
the auditor liability rules. The EU has left this issue to be regulated by Member 
States. In order to understand the liabilities of auditors for loss caused by their 
wrongful or negligent acts, this thesis particularly examines UK law to provide an 
example of perspectives within the EU, and questions the auditors’ civil liability as 
determined under the law. The examination of the UK law will illustrate that even 
within the EU we do not see convergence on auditor liability rules. This is an 
important indication for the discussions on a possible convergence between EU and 
Turkish laws on auditing. 
                                                 
15
 International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) received a global recognition from 126 jurisdictions, 
including all the EU Member States –except Croatia who joined the EU recently and not included in 
the IFAC’s compliance program- adopted ISAs. See IFAC Member Body Compliance Program Basis 
of ISA Adoption by Jurisdiction, August 2012. See also Chapter III, Section 3.2.2.   
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In the light of these concerns, this thesis determines its main purpose as to provide a 
discussion on the role of external auditing from a law perspective by exploring its 
regulation in the EU and in Turkey in terms of convergence. Thus, it has three 
fundamental themes: it first examines the role of auditing and the preliminary issues 
that have dominated the discussions in the field of auditing. In this respect, Chapters 
I and II are the introductory chapters on the role and function of auditing in corporate 
governance and in financial markets. The second theme is audit regulation. Chapter 
III will provide a discussion on audit regulation theory. Within this context, the 
critical evaluation of audit regulation and reforms in the EU will be detailed in 
Chapter IV. One of the main messages of this thesis is that audit regulation follows 
an international route. In this context, the last theme concerns convergence. As a 
subject study, this thesis questions whether there is convergence between Turkish 
and the EU laws on auditing. Studying the Turkish experience would be helpful to 
test the impact of globalisation on convergence of auditing.  
2. METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH 
The analysis presented in this thesis comes from a wide range of sources, including 
primary and secondary sources, such as laws and regulations, cases, and academic 
literature. Not only legal literature is considered, but reports and studies from the 
European Commission, governmental institutions of the UK and Turkey (namely the 
FRC and SPK), and international independent institutions, such as IFAC are also 
used within the text. The analysis in this thesis also includes political and economic 
factors and their effects in the regulation of auditing and its application.
16
 The 
analysis on regulation theory in Chapter III uses concepts from accounting and 
political sciences. Chapter VI analyses on auditing development in Turkey and on the 
adoption of the EU law benefit from both the perspectives of political economy and 
political science literature.
17
 This thesis therefore adopts an interdisciplinary 
approach to legal analyses. In addition to the analysis of positive legal rules, this 
thesis examines how the law is applied in practice, primarily in Chapter VII.  
                                                 
16
 See Chapter III, Section 3, for the economic and political factors that affect the regulation of 
auditing in the general context. 
17
 See Chapter VI, Section 1, for the financial development and EU membership process of Turkey 
that has influenced the audit regulation in Turkey. 
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Comparative methods are adopted in some parts of this thesis, particularly in Chapter 
VII. Chapter VII examines the possibility of a convergence of auditing between EU 
and Turkish laws. The determinants of convergence are conceptualised in accordance 
to the forces for and obstacles of convergence. Harmonisation with the EU law and 
important economic factors are determined to explore the forces for convergence. 
This will suggest that internationalisation of the economy and adoption of the EU 
law might lead to convergence in auditing as they prompt integration of markets and 
the use of uniform standards.
18
  
With regards to the obstacles, Chapter VII considers Bebchuk and Roe’s19 path 
dependency theory. Within this context, the Turkish situation will be evaluated in 
terms of its institutional structure and capacity to receive the imported law. In 
addition, Berkowitz et al’s20 transplant effect theory is adopted to question the 
reasons for the institutional impediments in Turkey.
21
 
Under this theoretical framework, Chapter VII presents and discusses a conceptual 
framework for the convergence between the EU and Turkish laws on auditing. 
Accordingly, four levels of convergence are taken into consideration, including the 
effects of harmonisation (and globalisation), differences in the law in action, the 
effects of path dependencies (and culture), and functional dissimilarities. These will 
be examined respectively both with respect to the law on the books and law in 
practice. In terms of practice, difficulties of the application of rules will be examined 
with respect to inadequacies in institutional setting (e.g. the capacity of the courts) 
and culture.
22
 
For the purpose of this thesis, the primary source of law is EU law. However, US 
laws are referred to within the text wherever this is thought to be necessary and 
appropriate. UK laws are also examined in detail in this thesis when there is no 
common application of a specific regime at the EU level, in particular in the auditor 
                                                 
18
 See Chapter VII, Section 2.1.  
19
 Lucian A. Bebchuk and Mark J. Roe, ‘A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Governance and 
Ownership’ (1999) 52 Stanford Law Review 127.  
20
 Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor, and Jean-Francois Richard, ‘Economic Development, Legality, 
and the Transplant Effect’ (2003a) 47 European Economic Review 165. See also Daniel Berkowitz, 
Katharina Pistor, and Jean-Francois Richard, ‘The Transplant Effect’ (2003b) 51 The American 
Journal of Comparative Law 163.  
21
 See Chapter VII, Section 2.3. 
22
 See Chapter VII, Section 2.4.  
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liability regime. Turkish laws on auditing are also within the scope of this thesis, 
especially for the purposes of Chapter VI and for the comparative chapter: Chapter 
VII.  
‘External auditing’, or ‘auditing’ refers to statutory auditing conducted by an 
independent certified auditor.
23
 Audits of listed companies are the main concern of 
this thesis. Banking regulation is not included in the scope of this thesis due to the 
word constraints. However, audits of banks are referred in the text a few times, 
especially when examining the role of auditors in the global financial crisis in 
Chapter II and examining the Imar Bank case in Chapter VI.   
3. MOTIVATIONS FOR THE RESEARCH 
Many studies in the field of business have been conducted in the external auditing 
area; however, a more legal approach was necessary to explore deeply the regulation 
of auditing and the primary role and function of auditors and external auditing in 
corporate governance and in financial markets that determined under professional 
standards and laws. This research is motivated by the debates during and after the 
global financial crisis, and therefore partially aims to explore whether auditors failed 
in their role and how the law actually imposes a duty and liability on auditors 
regarding that role.  
External auditing and audit firms benefit from the integration of financial markets, 
e.g. large audit firms take advantage of their global networks.
24
 This research is also 
motived by globalisation and its effects on audit regulation. This being so, this thesis 
aims to explore whether globalisation can lead to a convergence of auditing within 
the EU, as well as between the EU and Turkish laws.  
4. CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE 
This research contributes to corporate governance literature by exploring the role, 
function and the regulation of auditing from the perspective of law. Existing 
                                                 
23
 Statutory audit is defined as an audit -required by law- of annual or consolidated accounts of a 
company by an auditor who is qualified to be an auditor and approved by a professional authority.  
24
 See Chapter II, Section 2.4.  
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literature on auditing has mainly been conducted from a business perspective. 
Although there are many doctoral theses on the subject of auditing in other 
departments, research in law schools largely disregards auditing. The existing studies 
primarily covered the principles,
25
 practices,
26
 and doctrines
27
 of auditing. However, 
the regulation of auditing has only been tangentially addressed by existing 
literature.
28
 The studies on audit regulation only examined political aspects of 
auditing regulation, and therefore failed to cover audit regulation from a wider 
perspective.
29
 
Similarly, the regulation of auditing has not been extensively examined in Turkey. 
Auditing literature in Turkey has only detailed the substance and practices of 
auditing.
30
 Studies were mostly conducted with regards the education of auditors and 
the development of the audit profession.
31
 Recently, there was some literature 
published after the enactment of the new Turkish Commercial Code.
32
 These studies 
only provided an introduction to the issues by explaining the qualification 
                                                 
25
 David Flint, Philosophy and Principles of Auditing: An Introduction (Macmillan, London 1988); 
Graham W. Cosserat, Modern Auditing (John Wiley & Sons, England 2000); P Brenda Porter, Jon 
Simon, and David Hatherly, Principles of External Auditing (2nd, John Wiley & Sons 2003). 
26
 Lawrence Robert Dicksee, Auditing: A Practical Manual for Auditors (Gee & Co., London 1892).   
27
 Robert Kuhn Mautz and Husseun A. Sharaf, The Philosophy of Auditing (American Accounting 
Association, Chicago 1961). 
28
 Ralf Ewert, ‘Audit Regulation, Audit Quality, and Audit Research in the Post-Enron Era: An 
Analysis of Non-audit Services’ in Christian Leuz, Dieter Pfaff, and Anthony Hopwood (eds), The 
Economics and Politics of Accounting (OUP, New York 2004). See also Ian P. Dewing and Peter O. 
Russell, ‘Accounting, Auditing and Corporate Governance of European Listed Countries: EU Policy 
Development Before and After Enron’ (2004) 42(2) Journal of Common Market Studies 289. 
29
 Christopher Humphrey and Peter Moizer, ‘Understanding regulation in its global context’ in Reiner 
Quick, Stuart Turley and Marleen Willekens (eds), Auditing, Trust, and Governance: Regulation in 
Europe (Routledge, London 2008). See also Ian P. Dewing and Peter O. Russell, ‘UK fund managers, 
audit regulation and the new Accountancy Foundation: towards a narrowing of the audit expectations 
gap?’ (2002) 17(9) Managerial Auditing Journal 537. 
30
 Adnan Donmez and Ayten Ersoy, ‘Bagimsiz Denetim Firmalari Bakis Acisiyla Turkiye Bagimsiz 
Dis Denetim Sisteminin Degerlendirilmesi’ (2006) 36 Kis Bilig 69. 
31
 Umit Gucenme and Aylin Arsoy, ‘Turkiye’de Cumhuriyet Doneminde Muhasebe Egitimi’ (2006) 
76 (Ozel Sayi) Mali Cozum Dergisi 308; Serafettin Sevim, Tansel Cetinoglu, and Niyazi Kurnaz, 
‘Avrupa Birliği Müzakereleri Sürecinde AB 8. Yönergesi Kapsaminda Türkiye'de Denetim ve 
Denetçilik Mesleğinin Durumu: AB müzakereleri gelişim için bir firsatmidir?’ (2006) Ocak-Mart 
Mali Cozum; Masum Turker, ‘Turkiye’de Muhasebe Denetim Faaliyetlerinin Gelisimi’ (2006) 89 
Dayanisma Dergisi, Izmir Serbest Muhasebeci Mali Musavirler Odasi Dergisi.  
32
 Mustafa Yavuz, ‘Yeni Turk Ticaret Kanunu’na Gore Bagimsiz Denetcilerin Hukuki Sorumlulugu’ 
(2012) 230 February Yaklasim. See also Umit Gucenme, Gulsun Isseveroglu, and Yasemin Ertan, 
‘Audit and Oversight of Audit in terms of Commerce Law of Turkey’ (2011) 2(1) Business and 
Economics Research Journal 109. 
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requirements for auditors under the new Code.
33
 Hence, the existing literature in 
Turkey fails to provide a deeper analysis on audit regulation. 
Motivated by these gaps in the literature, this thesis aims to provide a legal analysis 
on audit regulation both in the EU
34
 and in Turkey
35
. This thesis therefore contributes 
to existing literature by examining the preliminary issues on auditing: in particular, 
the role and responsibilities of auditors, their liabilities, and the audit market 
structure from a law perspective.
36
 The main contribution of this thesis is the 
comparative analysis of the EU and Turkish laws on auditing in terms of 
convergence.
37
 The results of this analysis contribute to the convergence debates in 
the EU. Also, the results can provide important knowledge for scholars and 
lawmakers with regards audit market structure and its regulation in the EU and in 
Turkey.  
5. STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH 
Chapter I opens with a discussion on the role of external auditing in corporate 
governance. The main objective of this discussion is to question whether the demand 
for auditing differs in different corporate governance systems. The first chapter also 
questions the role of auditing in financial markets in terms of ensuring trust and 
market confidence.  
Chapter II shows how auditing works in today’s financial markets and identifies the 
dual role of auditors as detectives and gatekeepers. This chapter also explores the 
structural and functional problems of auditing with a close examination of the Big 
Four audit firms and their role in the global financial crisis. Analyses in this chapter 
provide material for the discussion on EU laws on auditing in Chapter IV that deals 
with the regulatory remedies for the prevailing problems of auditing.   
                                                 
33
 Erdogan Arslan, ‘Yeni Turk Ticaret Kanunu’na Gore Denetcinin Niteligi’ (2011) March-April Mali 
Cozum 73. 
34
 See Chapter IV for the EU audit policy and laws.   
35
 See Chapter VI for audit regulation in Turkey.  
36
 See Chapter IV for a critical analysis on the regulatory measures for the preliminary issues on 
auditing.  
37
 See Chapter VII.  
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Chapter III questions why we need audit regulation and seeks to explain audit 
regulation by detailing the motivations of and justifications for it. This chapter shows 
the triadic structure of audit regulation that overlaps across financial markets law, 
company law, and competition law. It also shows the role and incentives of state and 
private regulators in audit regulation and how these actors might have influenced 
audit regulation. The findings of this chapter are critical to understanding the EU 
audit policy and laws on auditing as addressed in Chapter IV. 
Chapter IV identifies the factors that have affected EU audit policy and laws from 
Enron to date. In this respect, the chapter provides a critical analysis on the EU 
Directive 2006/43/EC and its effect on harmonisation in auditing in the EU. These 
analyses establish a picture of the current structure of the law on auditing in the EU. 
The other contribution of this chapter is the critical analysis of the EU’s law 
proposals on statutory auditing: the Directive proposing to amend the Directive 
2006/43/EC and the Regulation proposal on statutory audits of PIEs. This chapter 
supplements Chapter II by critically evaluating the regulatory remedies on the 
preliminary issues in auditing, namely the expectations gap, auditor independence, 
and high concentration. 
Chapter V shows to whom and under which conditions auditors are liable. This 
chapter questions auditor liability from the perspectives of ISAs, EU law, and UK 
law. This chapter represents auditors’ legal responsibilities regarding knowingly or 
negligently misstating in or omitting required information from prospectuses. An 
understanding of liability rules is important in comprehending the role of auditors in 
financial markets. On the one hand, increased liability rules are important for the 
protection of investors, and hence it is crucial for efficient functioning of the 
financial markets. On the other hand, unlimited liability to the public at large 
imposes risk, especially on the audit services market of large listed firms, where only 
a few firms operate. Regulators, therefore, must consider the consequences of 
liability rules when they define the scope of liability. The discussions in this chapter 
contribute to the debates begun in Chapter II, especially on the high concentration in 
the audit market and its consequences.   
Chapter VI provides an analysis of the law reforms on auditing in Turkey from 
socio-political and economic perspectives. In this respect, this chapter shows that the 
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main motivations for the law reforms are the objective of achieving EU membership 
(through harmonisation of Turkish law with the EU acquis) and to become a part of 
the global financial market (through strengthened governance structure of firms and 
improved legal environment). This chapter examines whether Turkey has 
successfully harmonised its law on auditing with EU law. The analysis in this chapter 
of Turkey’s legal and financial development and its audit market structure are 
important to understand the convergence analysis in Chapter VII. Therefore, this 
chapter provides the background for the next chapter. 
Chapter VII explores the possibility of convergence of auditing between the EU and 
Turkish law. First, it identifies forces for convergence. In this respect, it suggests 
important economic factors, such as internationalisation of the economy, and legal 
harmonisation as the drivers for convergence. Second, it discusses potential methods 
of convergence. Third, it analyses the feasibility of convergence based on Bebchuk 
and Roe’s38 path dependency theory and Berkowitz et al’s39 transplant effect theory. 
Lastly, it describes a conceptual framework for convergence under the four levels of 
convergence, including the effects of harmonisation (and globalisation), differences 
in the law in action, the effects of path dependencies (and culture), and functional 
dissimilarities. The chapter concludes by examining whether there is convergence in 
form or in function. These results are important in terms of identifying difficulties in 
adoption and application of the rules from a transplant country perspective (i.e. 
Turkey). The results could prove useful for subsequent research on the EU and in 
Turkey in terms of further convergence studies.  
Lastly, Chapter VIII provides a general conclusion of the thesis. This chapter 
presents a review of the thesis as well as concluding on the main findings in respect 
of the initial research questions. 
                                                 
38
 Bebchuk and Roe (n 19) p. 157.  
39
 Berkowitz et al (2003a) (n 20) p. 167. 
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CHAPTER I: THE ROLE OF AUDIT IN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
INTRODUCTION 
In the Cadbury Report, the term ‘corporate governance’ was defined in a narrow 
view, namely as “the system of corporate governance by which companies are 
directed and controlled.”1 As firms have changed to include more participants in 
their activities, the definition of corporate governance is destined to become broader. 
Moreover, definitions might differ with regards the angle from which the problems in 
corporate governance might be viewed. This chapter will try to identify the best 
definition of corporate governance to suit the research subject of this thesis.  
Agency theory submits that a governance mechanism is needed in a company 
because there is a risk that managers of the company might pursue their own interests 
rather than shareholders’.2 External auditing can be used as a monitoring mechanism 
to mitigate the agency cost.
3
 However, what if there is a different agency problem? It 
is argued that external auditing has a central role in dispersed systems;
4
 thus, the 
following will question whether auditing has a governance role in concentrated 
systems.  
This chapter is structured as follows. The first section starts with the definition of 
corporate governance. From the perspective of control and monitoring, some core 
theories, namely agency theory, transaction cost theory, and the stakeholder theory of 
corporate governance will also be explained in the first section. The aim is to 
question the need for corporate governance mechanism in a company and how 
external auditing finds its function in this mechanism. The second section 
                                                 
1
 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Cadbury Report) 1 
December 1992, para. 2.5. 
2
 Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
(Macmillan, New York 1932). 
3
 Ross L. Watts and Jerold L. Zimmerman, ‘Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: 
Some Evidence’ (1983) 26(3) Journal of Law and Economics 613. 
4
 John C. Coffee, Jr., ‘A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the USA and Europe Differ’ (2005) 
21(2) Oxford Review of Economic Policy 198.  
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investigates the relationship between corporate governance and audit and adopts the 
view that the audit process has a close tie with the accountability dimension of 
corporate governance. The third and final section examines insider and outsider 
corporate governance systems and questions whether the demand for audit differs in 
these systems. The principal aims of this chapter are to identify the role of audit in 
corporate governance and determine its role in different systems of corporate 
governance systems (i.e. outsider and insider systems) and in financial markets.  
1. GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
1.1. Definition of Corporate Governance  
The Cadbury Report
5
 defines corporate governance as “(…) the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled.” Yet, this definition is not comprehensive in 
terms of encompassing the role of corporate governance in a company. According to 
the OECD Principles, corporate governance plays a role in the company in terms of 
the “(…) distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants and 
in the corporation, such as the board, managers, shareholders and other 
stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on 
corporate affairs.”6 Although this definition points out every participant in a 
company and their responsibilities and rights, it falls short of explaining company 
objectives and who determines them.  
Sternberg defined corporate governance as the ways of controlling a company to 
ensure that corporate actions, agents and assets are used to achieve the corporate 
objectives set by shareholders.
7
 Tricker, by contrast, emphasized the needs of 
accountability and control mechanisms in a company, in addition to the concerns 
relating to the day-by-day operations.
8
 
Given these different approaches to the definition of corporate governance, this 
chapter suggests that corporate governance can be defined as the system of directing 
                                                 
5
 Cadbury Report (n 1) para 2.5. 
6
 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 1999 (revised in 2004). 
7
 Elaine Sternberg, Corporate Governance: Accountability in the Market Place, (2
nd
 edn, The Institute 
of Economic Affairs 2004). 
8
 Robert Ian Tricker, Corporate Governance: Practices, Procedures and Powers in British Companies 
and Their Boards of Directors (Gower 1984). 
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the company in accordance to the specified objectives by its shareholders alongside 
ensuring accountability of actions and decisions of management, not only to 
shareholders, but also to any other groups who have a stake in the company.  
Although no single corporate governance definition is valid for every country, 
existing definitions are mostly based on some common terms, such as accountability. 
Accountability is referred to as the responsibility of the company management to the 
company’s shareholders (or owners) and other stakeholders for carrying out defined 
objectives and duties and other rules and standards.
9
 The meaning of accountability 
for a company’s directors to its shareholders is that directors should be ready to give 
response to company shareholders with regards achieving company objectives and 
the use of company resources and assets.
10
 
1.2. Theories of Corporate Governance  
The discussion in this thesis will be based on the accountability dimension of 
corporate governance in particular. Thus not all theories, but rather a selection of 
corporate governance theories, will be evaluated here: agency theory, transactions 
cost theory, and the stakeholder theory.  
Agency theory 
Agency theory is based on the assumption that the ownership and control in the 
company is separated.
11
 In other words, owners of the company delegate a 
professional manager to make decisions regarding the operation of the company. 
From the perspective of a neoclassical theory of the firm, no governance structure is 
needed even if there is a separation of ownership and control, because all individuals 
(e.g. shareholders and managers) would pursue the same goals.
12
 For example, 
suppose the main activity of the company is determined as seeking to maximize the 
market value of the company. In this respect all individuals in the company would 
work in accordance with this main activity and, there would therefore be no conflict 
of interest between shareholders and managers.   
                                                 
9
 OECD Glossary http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=4757 accessed 12/03/2012. 
10
 Sternberg (n 7) p. 41.  
11
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12
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However, agency theory argues that managers tend to pursue their own goals whilst 
there is lack of monitoring by shareholders.
13
 Berle and Means firstly introduced this 
problem as the ‘agency problem’, which derived from the ‘separation of ownership 
and control’. 14 Accordingly, agency theory states that in order to control managers 
on the behalf of shareholders, there should be a governance mechanism.  
According to agency theory, the managers of the company are delegated as ‘agents’ 
by the owners (or shareholders) of the company, who are referred to as ‘principals’. 
The characteristic feature of agency theory is that a conflict of interest may arise 
between owners (principals) and the management (agents) caused by the so-called 
‘principal-agent problem’ or ‘agency problem’.15  
In a governance system where the principal-agent problem exists, a conflict of 
interests arises where shareholders seek to maximize the shareholder value whereas 
managers pursue their own personal objectives. For example, managers have a 
tendency to focus on short-term profits instead of long-term shareholder wealth 
maximization.
16
 In addition, managers may over pay themselves,
17
 or use company 
assets for their own benefits, such as treating themselves to holidays through the 
company resources.
18
 Therefore a mechanism is needed within the company to 
monitor the activities of company managers. According to Watts and Zimmerman, 
auditing is designed to fulfill the exactly this role.
19
 They argue that audit is a kind of 
monitoring activity that increases the value of the firm because a successful audit 
would reduce opportunistic behavior costs (e.g. agency costs).
20
  
In the absence of shareholder monitoring via independent auditors,
 
managers tend to 
act in their own interests and exploit company assets. This situation will eventually 
                                                 
13
 Alternatively, the stewardship theory is based on the assumption that the managers of the company 
are motivated to act in the best interest of their principals. Yet, this paper will not include a discussion 
on stewardship theory. For a discussion on the stewardship theory, see James H. Davis, David 
Schoorman, and Lex Donaldson, ‘Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management’ (1997) 22 Academy 
of Management Review 20. 
14
 Berle and Means (n 2) p. 119.  
15
 Jill Solomon, Corporate Governance and Accountability, (3
rd
 edn, John Wiley & Sons 2004) p. 17  
16
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17
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19
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20
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cause the reduction of shareholder value, referred to as ‘residual losses’21. As a 
consequence, there is a need for control over and monitoring of management by 
shareholders - and this can be done via external auditing.  
In today’s world, agency theory is much more valid than the neoclassical theory of 
the firm. The limited liability concept encourages small shareholders to invest in 
companies because they would not be liable for the debts of the company, but only 
for the value of their shares in the company. This opportunity encourages investors to 
buy small shares from companies. As a consequence, the number of companies with 
a large number of owners with small shares has increased. These small shareholders 
have no or little incentive to control the management due to monitoring costs.
22
  
Although the agency problem is likely to occur in today’s modern companies, it can 
appear differently in different systems. The first form occurs between small 
shareholders and managers due to conflicts of interest arising, in particular, as a 
result of information asymmetries. Both in the UK and US, the structure of public 
companies is based on dispersed ownership where there are numerous small 
shareholders.
23
 Even though they have some residual control rights, such as voting 
rights, the day-to-day decision-making process is delegated to a board of directors 
and ultimately to a manager.
24
  In other words, professional managers are appointed 
to manage the company instead of the owners themselves. In companies where the 
ownership is widely dispersed, conflict may arise because managers have direct 
access to information that small shareholders do not. Hence, conflict is likely to arise 
between the managers and shareholders. 
The second type of agency problem exists because of the conflict that can arise 
between small shareholders (the minority) and controlling shareholders (the 
majority). This problem mainly exists in continental European companies. Turkish 
companies also present a typical example of controlling shareholders. In Turkey, 
controlling shareholders are mostly family members, and the manager of the 
company is generally appointed by the controlling shareholders.
25
 In this situation, it 
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22
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is likely that the company manager (appointed by the controlling shareholders) will 
pursue the interest of their ‘owners’ and therefore, exploit the rights of minority 
shareholders. Hence, the second type of agency problem occurs naturally because of 
the potential conflicts between minority shareholders and controlling shareholders. 
Transaction cost theory 
Transactions cost theory argues that the contract between the company management 
and owners of the company is incomplete due to numerous costs involved in writing 
a perfect contract.
26
 These costs can be summarized as search and information costs 
(the cost of thinking what any future possible event might occur during the contract 
period); bargaining and decision costs (the cost of negotiations about the contract); 
policing and enforcement costs (the cost of enforcement by a judge in case of any 
dispute).
27
 Due to these high costs, in practice, contracts are incomplete. In other 
words, not all circumstances could have been specified in a contract.  At this level, 
corporate governance might have a role dealing with the issues that have not been 
specified initially.
28
 
As a matter of fact, both agency theory and transaction cost theory considers that 
managers are opportunistic in a self-interested manner. Likewise, both theories take 
the view that managers should be accountable to the board of directors on the behalf 
of shareholders.
29
 On the one hand, from the perspective of agency theory, corporate 
governance is limited, to the relationship between a company and its shareholders. 
On the other hand, stakeholder theory adapts a broader view on corporate governance 
and sees the relationship between a company and a broad range of other 
stakeholders. This theory will be discussed next. 
Stakeholder theory  
In contrast to agency theory, stakeholder theory suggests that corporate objectives 
should be determined in the interest of a wider stakeholder group in addition to 
shareholders. Most importantly, stakeholder theory is based on accountability to a 
                                                 
26
 Oliver E. Williamson, ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: the Governance of Contractual Relations’ 
(1979) 22(2) Journal of Law and Economics 233. 
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broader stakeholder group rather than focusing solely on shareholders.
30
 Broadly, 
stakeholders can be defined as anybody who has a valid stake in the company, and 
therefore include shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers, creditors and 
communities that associate with company’s operations.31 
Shankman argued that stakeholder theory developed as a result of agency theory, 
which can be seen as a narrow form of stakeholder theory.
32
 Modern corporate 
governance integrates both shareholder value creation and stakeholder value 
protection. In other words, an integrated approach to a corporate governance model 
advocates not only increasing shareholder value, but also protection of the rights and 
interests of all those who have a stake in the company.   
Theories of corporate governance differ in terms of their definitions of problems and 
approaches to them. For example, agency theory might take a narrow view in terms 
of accountability by locating the shareholders’ interests in the center, whereas 
stakeholder theory might take a broader view and advocate wider accountability, 
including to stakeholders. One could take a broader perspective still and advocate not 
only increasing shareholder value, but also protection of the rights and interests of all 
those who have a stake in the company.
33
 Either way, there can still be control 
problems in a company. The next section will question whether auditing has a role in 
corporate governance in terms of accountability. 
2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AUDIT AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
2.1. Accountability through Disclosure  
Accountability in corporate governance means that directors of the company have 
responsibilities including as regards the use of company resources and any other 
concerns, such as the achievement of the company objectives.
34
 Managers are 
                                                 
30
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31
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accountable to shareholders via the board of directors. In this respect, the 
management is obliged to prepare and present financial reports periodically to the 
board of directors. Accountability can thus be ensured via Annual General Meetings 
and votes, takeovers, contractual responsibilities of directors, or the periodical 
reporting of financial statements.
35
  
Although each of these governance functions can be seen as a mechanism ensuring 
accountability, disclosure of annual financial statements is regarded as the most 
appropriate way to ensure such accountability.
36
 The role of external auditing in 
accountability is to assess whether the financial statements prepared by the 
management present true information about the financial situation of the company.
37
 
External auditors
38
 are usually appointed by the board of directors. Hence, an 
external audit can be considered as a part of the control mechanism of corporate 
governance.
39
 As it has been said, external auditing emerged from the needs of 
control and accountability.
40
 In order to ensure the accountability of management to 
shareholders and other stakeholders, a supervision mechanism is required which 
necessarily involves external auditing.
41
 The auditors’ role is to assure the quality 
and reliability of financial reporting. An independent auditor’s role is significant to a 
company in terms of providing an external and objective assurance to the board and 
shareholders regarding the reliability of financial statements.
42
 
A statutory audit is important, especially for public-interest entities (PIEs).
43
 This is 
because PIEs and their investments involve a wider range of investors usually 
including cross-border investors. Also, for the efficiency of financial markets, it 
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should be ensured that investors have reliable information regarding the business 
activities of the PIEs, and this can be done via audited financial statements. In this 
respect, the principle concern of this thesis is the audit of listed companies. 
2.2. The Role of External Auditors  
Financial reporting as a disclosure mechanism can be used as an effective tool for 
investors to evaluate the financial position of a company and to decide whether to 
invest or not. Financial reporting provides ‘a snapshot’ of the company, constituted 
of financial verifications. Nevertheless, it is evident that financial reporting has been 
used to mislead shareholders in a number of cases, such as by Enron
44
 in the US, in 
Parmalat
45
 in Italy, and Imar Bank
46
 in Turkey. In order to fulfill its role, the 
information included in the financial reporting must be accurate. External audit is 
therefore developed to ensure the credibility of financial statements.  
It is required that financial statements (company and consolidated accounts) present a 
true and fair view of accounts.
47
 Some argue that the role of auditors is only to ensure 
that financial statements are fairly presented and include true information.
48
 Others 
also expect auditors to discover and report breaches of contract, such as fraudulent 
practices.
49
 However, such a role is not determined as the principle duty of auditors 
by professional auditing standards, i.e. ISAs.
50
  
Previously, directors, managers, or even shareholders were the ones who were 
accused of being responsible for company failures.
51
 For instance, in 1992, as a 
response to failure of large corporations, such as Polly Peck, British and 
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Commonwealth, Parkfield, and Coloroll the UK Cadbury Report was issued.
52
 At 
that time, the report emphasized the importance of auditing.
53
 Yet, its 
recommendations on board arrangements (e.g. the existence of non-executives) 
received more attention from the public. It was because the directors’ responsibility 
was already accepted as crucial and it was believed the primary focus should be on 
the duties and responsibilities of directors.
54
 It was not until Enron that external 
auditing and auditors received attention. After the collapse of Enron and the 
subsequent failure of its auditor, Arthur Andersen, many developments in corporate 
governance focused on external auditing and audit committees, not only in the US 
but also in the UK.
55
 
2.3. External Auditing and ‘Trust and Market Confidence’ 
The credibility of financial statements is crucial, not only for current shareholders, 
but also for those who have intentions to invest. As submitted, shareholders consider 
financial auditing as criteria by which to assess the performance of managers, 
thereby using it as a control mechanism over management.
56
 Investors also rely on 
audited financial statements when they are about to make investment decisions. 
Without auditing, shareholders and investors would be unaided in seeking to assess 
the credibility of financial statements, and would likely be subject to information 
asymmetries. Moreover, if those financial statements did not provide accurate 
information, investors would not have the confidence to make investments. It is 
stated that auditing in general is prompted by a deficiency of trust.
57
 In other words, 
auditing would not be needed if trust were ensured. Financial auditing is thus needed 
in order to reassure trust in financial markets.  
Therefore, in addition to the monitoring function in corporate governance, external 
auditing also plays an essential role in terms of ensuring confidence and trust in 
financial markets via the verification of financial accounts. It is said that auditors are 
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the guardians of ‘trust’ when they present the public with a true picture of the 
company.
58
 It can be stated that this role of external auditing contributes to their 
public interest role.
59
 
3. THE ROLE OF AUDITING IN DIFFERENT CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS: Insider and Outsider Systems 
There are various factors that may have shaped corporate governance systems, such 
as socio-economic, political, and historical factors. So, it may not be fully accurate to 
seek or make precise categorizations. Yet, categorizations based on differences and 
similarities might be useful to understand components of different systems and to 
clarify the weakness and strengths of a system towards the opponent. This section 
therefore aims to identify whether the role of auditing differs across different 
corporate governance systems, and if so, to evaluate these differences.  
Ownership structures and market capitalization will be taken as the main 
determinants for categorization. Based on the categorization of differences in 
ownership structures, two different categories of corporate governance systems, 
namely the outsider and insider systems of corporate governance, will be identified. 
Thereafter, it will be questioned whether the governance function of auditing differs 
between these different systems.  
3.1. Insider and Outsider Systems 
In insider systems, the majority of the shares are owned and controlled by a small 
group of shareholders.
60
 It is often family members or a lending bank that is the 
controlling shareholder. One of the main characteristics of the insider system is that 
there is a strong and close relationship between the company directors and owners, 
whose relationship is built on trust.
61
 It is sometimes even the case that the directors 
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and owners of the company are the same people.
62
 Therefore, core agency problems 
(conflicts between small shareholders and company managers due to asymmetric 
information) are reduced in concentrated systems.
63
 However, because of the 
influence of dominant shareholders on company directors and the close relations 
between directors and dominant shareholders, the rights of minority shareholders 
may be disregarded. Therefore, an agency problem occurs between minority 
shareholders and controlling shareholders due to the possible exploitation of minority 
shareholders’ rights.64 Low levels of transparency of financial transactions and 
limited access to information regarding a company’s operations are characteristic 
features of insider systems.
65
 France and Germany show the characteristics of insider 
corporate governance system often with higher ownership structures and weak 
investor protection.
66
 
Conversely to the outsider system, the insider system of corporate governance 
focuses on the long-term performance of the company, whereas in outsider systems, 
ownership is highly dispersed and the majority of shares are held by institutional 
shareholders who consider mostly short-term income, known as short-termism.
67
 
Outsider corporate governance systems are affiliated with financial institutions or 
institutional shareholders as outside shareholders.
68
 Because the company shares are 
dispersed, control of the company usually rests with the management, resulting in 
agency problems.
69
 This system is also referred as a market based governance system 
(or the Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-American system) wherein financial organizations 
depend on financial markets for their financing, with an emphasis on the shareholder 
wealth maximisation.
70
 In outsider systems, the influence of institutional 
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shareholders on company management is significantly high.
71
 For instance, the 
majority of shares in UK listed companies, nearly 60%
72
 are held by institutions (i.e. 
pension funds, insurance companies, unit and investment trusts).
73
 Similar to the UK, 
the US also has a dispersed ownership structure, mostly involving institutional 
investors, financial institutions, and individuals.
74
 However, the rise of institutional 
shareholders in outsider corporate governance systems might result in differences in 
ownership structures. In fact, it is said that outsiders (institutional shareholders) in 
the UK are becoming more like insiders (dominant shareholders).
75
 Therefore, there 
is no clear separation of ownership and control, even in outsider systems.  
3.2. Function of Auditing in Different Systems  
As submitted, there is no fine line categorization for corporate governance systems, 
as different systems may come closer as the financial markets get more integrated. 
Nevertheless, auditing might have a different function in different systems due to the 
different characteristics in those systems.  
In market-based systems (outsider systems), companies are more likely to be subject 
to agency costs due to asymmetric information.
76
 In outsider systems, managers’ 
incentives are to overstate the earnings to increase the share prices (e.g. Enron).
77
 
Here, external auditing can function as a monitoring mechanism on the management 
and can help to reduce the agency cost by mitigating information asymmetry.
78
 The 
role of auditing in outsider systems is to more check on managers.  
On the contrary, in banking-governance systems
79
 (insider systems) where the equity 
markets are less developed and the banks are the primary source of capital, auditing 
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is considered less as a monitoring device. In these systems, controlling shareholders 
– whose wealth largely depends on firm performance – are eager to monitor the 
management and have direct monitoring access over it.
80
 This situation enables 
insiders (controlling shareholders) to have enough power and incentives to ensure 
that the management does not exploit the corporate resources.
81
 However, the 
domination of majority shareholders results in another agency problem. In these 
systems, minority investors have limited or no access to the financial information and 
are likely to be subject to expropriation by the controlling shareholders. 
It is said that the incentives to commit fraud are different in insider corporate 
governance systems, where controlling shareholders have a tendency to make use of 
the corporate assets for their personal benefits.
82
 This was notably seen in the Imar 
Bank
83
 scandal in Turkey. Large private benefits of control, for example illegally 
transferring assets to other corporations, can be seen as a proof of weak corporate 
governance. Investors would be reluctant to invest in those companies. Thus, here - 
with greater problems of private benefits of control – companies may have incentives 
to improve their corporate governance to attract outside investors. It can be claimed 
that high-quality audits would tell an outsider investor that the financial reporting is 
credible and the information asymmetry is reduced that will provide less room for 
managers’ opportunistic behaviours.84   
Auditing in concentrated systems 
Coffee claimed that external auditing play a more critical role in dispersed ownership 
structures.
85
 But it can also be shown that external auditing plays a role in insider 
systems wherein the protection of minority shareholders from private benefits 
(financial or non-financial) extraction by majority shareholders is essential. Having 
dominant shareholders holding the majority of the control in their hands could make 
corporate governance less effective. In such companies financial reporting may 
remain vague while controlling shareholders expropriate the corporate resources at 
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the expense of minority shareholders.
86
 The existence of independent directors on the 
board might be a remedy to mitigate the costs of this kind of agency problem. 
However, alternative governance mechanisms may be required, especially where the 
legal environment is weak (e.g. where there is a lack of sufficient legal rules and 
enforcement mechanisms).
87
   
One may argue that, in the expectation of the expropriation remains undiscovered, 
controlling shareholders may choose to appoint a lower-quality auditor for the audit 
of their financial statements.
88
 In the contrary, companies with concentrated 
ownership may believe that they would need high-quality audits in order to convince 
minority shareholders and outside investors that corporate governance and financial 
statements are credible so that they can make investment in the company.
89
 Minority 
shareholders and potential investors would like to see that the ability of controlling 
shareholders to expropriate the corporate assets is limited. Controlling shareholders 
in turn, are well aware of that they should limit their ability of expropriation.
90
 High-
quality audits as an external corporate governance mechanism can be used as a 
solution to this agency problem so that investors can be ensured that their investment 
is secured in the company.
91
 Empirical studies also support this claim as it was found 
that companies who in needs of external capital tend to choose to appoint Big Five
92
 
auditors.
93
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For example, Fan and Wong found a positive relationship between agency problems 
and Big Five auditor choice.
94
 They found that East Asian firms that are subject to 
greater agency problems are more likely to hire Big Five auditors than firms subject 
to smaller agency problems.
95
 Choi and Wong presented similar findings with a more 
international perspective using firm-level data collected from 39 countries.
96
 They 
questioned the strength of legal environments in the governance role of auditors. 
Their study reported that external auditors might serve a more significant governance 
function in weak legal environments compared with strong legal environments.
97
 The 
demand for high-quality audits for bonding effect is more related to weak legal 
environments than in strong legal environments because in the latter there are other 
mechanisms for investor protection.
98
 Therefore, companies with concentrated 
ownership structures, which operate in weaker legal environments (i.e. less 
developed legal institutions), would look for alternative governance mechanisms to 
persuade small equity owners to invest in their companies. At this point, high-quality 
audits could be used as a sign of good corporate governance in concentrated 
ownership structures since it can be a tool to mitigate the agency problem between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.
99
  
In line with the above findings, external auditing plays a similar governance function 
in Turkish listed firms where the governance pattern reflects concentrated ownership 
structures with weak protection of minority shareholders.
100
 A recent study
101
 found 
a positive relation between ownership concentration and the likelihood of Big Four 
audit firm demand amongst Turkish listed firms. In Turkey, firms with a less 
independent board of directors and high ownership concentration demand higher 
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quality auditors to reduce the information asymmetry between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders.
102
  The same study reported that firms might 
demand high quality audits as a substitution for or as complementary to weak 
corporate governance structures.
103
 Based on the substitution analysis, a strong 
corporate governance structure (i.e. effective internal monitoring) might substitute 
for higher quality audits and thus demand lower-quality auditors.
104
 However, a good 
corporate governance structure is not an alternative to quality audits and this should 
and could not eliminate the demand for audit quality. Instead, it is more likely that 
firms demand higher quality audits to complement and support the internal 
governance structure. The needs of insurance and signalling would foster firms to 
demand higher quality audits.
105
 As a result, firms would be able to provide 
insurance to the investors about the credibility of financial reports and to give signal 
that corporate governance system is sound.
106
  
This chapter submitted that external auditing might differ in systems where markets 
have different characteristics and different legal systems. On the one hand, in 
market-based systems where the legal environment is stronger, external auditing is 
only one of the monitoring mechanisms where there are additional monitoring 
devices available. In other words, the need of external auditing in terms of 
monitoring is shared with other controlling mechanisms (e.g. the presence of non-
executive directors in the board). On the other hand, in insider corporate governance 
systems where other monitoring mechanisms and the legal protection of investors are 
weak, the demand for high quality audits is mostly originated from the needs of 
giving insurance and signalling to investors about the accuracy of the information in 
the financial statements. In conclusion, these analyses may imply that although the 
original demand might differ, external auditing does have an important governance 
function in dispersed systems as well as in concentrated systems.  
                                                 
102
 Ibid p. 281.  
103
 Ibid p. 275.  
104
 Ibid pp. 273-4.  
105
 Ibid p. 275.  
106
 Ibid.   
Chapter I: The Role of Audit in Corporate Governance 
28 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter critically questioned the role and function of external auditing both in 
dispersed and in concentrated systems. It noted that the external auditing demand in 
dispersed systems is originated by its monitoring function over management. In 
concentrated systems, firms demand external auditing as a complement and support 
for their internal governance structure because of the needs of giving insurance and 
signalling to investors about the quality of their financial reports and gain public 
confidence.  
The main conclusion of this chapter is that external auditing has a governance 
function both in dispersed and concentrated systems. As a result, there is demand for 
auditing in both systems. It is noteworthy to state that legal systems’ differences are 
not substantial, as shown by La Porta et al.107 It is true that there are distinctive 
components of different legal systems, but they mainly derive from the differences in 
historical development.
108
 Moreover, these models may converge to some extent at 
points.
109
 In this respect, the use of external auditing in different systems should not 
be regarded as a major difference, since external auditing directs international 
markets and thus has highly benefited from globalisation. As a result, an 
approximation is possible for auditing. A discussion on the convergence of auditing 
will be elaborated in Chapter VII. Apart from the approximation of systems, the 
integration of financial markets has increased the demand for external auditing. 
Increased numbers of cross-listings between countries has resulted in a demand for 
financial reports and auditing. Therefore, the demand for auditing in the financial 
markets and its importance in firms’ corporate governance systems has been 
increasing. As this chapter has shown, the demand for auditing might differ in 
different systems; whether there are differences in terms of its function will be 
investigated in the next chapter. The next chapter will investigate how audit works in 
today’s financial markets with a close examination of the role of auditors in the 
global financial crisis. 
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CHAPTER II: HOW DOES EXTERNAL AUDIT WORK 
TODAY? 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1200s, and the early development of firms, auditing has existed.
1
 External 
auditing was first used to check on managers on behalf of shareholders, in the 
manner of detectives.
2
 As a result, auditors used to serve the interest of the 
shareholders only. However, there have been significant changes in terms of 
auditors’ role and their function. Users of audited reports have been extended beyond 
shareholders. Today, external auditing is necessarily important for investors, but also 
depositors, regulators, suppliers, creditors, and anybody who is likely to use audited 
financial reports, thus assigning a public role to auditors as gatekeepers of sorts.
3
  
The previous chapter showed that external auditing is an important component in 
corporate governance. This chapter aims to examine the purpose of external auditing 
in today’s financial markets and to further identify the dual role of auditors as 
detectives and gatekeepers. Moreover, the conceptual and structural problems in 
external auditing (e.g. auditor independence, expectations gap, and the concentration 
in the market) will be examined.  
This chapter will proceed as follows: the first section will start with the general 
framework of external auditing. It will identify the function of auditing in the 
governance structure of a company. In the second section, it will be examined how 
the role of auditors has changed and how this affects todays’ audit profession. In this 
context, the conceptual and structural problems of auditing will be examined. This 
section will also question the concentration in the audit market in the light of the new 
form of external auditing. The third and last section will examine the role of auditors 
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in the global financial crisis. During and after the global financial crisis, auditors, 
namely the Big Four, have been accused of failing in the role of issuing accurate 
going concern opinions. This section will examine whether this accusation was fair. 
In this respect, the Big Four’s audit quality and their going concern reporting 
accuracy will be examined. 
1. GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF EXTERNAL AUDITING 
1.1.The Scope of Audit  
External auditing refers to the relationship where corporate management hires an 
independent external auditor to review and approve annual financial statements. 
Annual financial statements include the balance sheet and the related statement of 
income, retained earnings and cash flow for the completed fiscal year.
4
 Financial 
audit is the process of checking the accuracy of these annual financial statements and 
compliance with the related accounting standards.
5
 
In the EU, it is a legal requirement that listed companies’ financial statements should 
be audited by an independent external auditor.
6
 Member States’ competent 
authorities approve statutory auditors (natural persons) or audit firms (legal persons) 
to perform statutory audits at the national level.
7
 For instance, in the UK, only 
statutory auditors recognized by supervisory bodies, such as the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of England and Wales (ICAEW), are allowed to perform 
statutory audits of public companies.
8
 In general, the statutory audits of PIEs are 
provided by the audit firms rather than individual statutory auditors. Auditors have to 
                                                 
4
 Joshua Ronen, ‘Corporate Audits and How to Fix Them’ (2010) 24(2) Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 189.  
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 Accounting standards refer in the US, to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP), in 
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apply certain standards (e.g. IFRS, ISAs, auditors’ code of ethics9) when they 
perform audits of publicly listed companies. In addition, they are subject to 
regulatory supervision of public oversight authorities, e.g. PCAOB in the US and 
FRC’s Audit Quality Review (the former Audit Inspection Unit) in the UK.  
The audit process is constituted of three main stages. In the first stage, the auditor 
gains understanding of the audited company and its activities through assessment of 
accounting system and internal control mechanism.
10
 This stage involves evaluation 
of internal controls in detail, as to whether the transactions and account balances are 
parallel to company records and whether there are any material misstatements. If the 
auditor is satisfied with the accuracy of internal control records from the evidence 
gathered from stage one, he (or she) continues with the second and final stage, to 
issue the audit report. However, if the auditor finds additional risk factors, such as 
asymmetric records with the transactions and internal control reports, then the scope 
of the audit is reset.
11
 In the third and final stage, the auditor issues an audit report to 
provide information to shareholders and other third parties. The auditor’s opinion on 
the financial statements is meant to provide a reasonable assurance on whether 
financial statements are free from material misstatement caused by fraud or error, 
and whether they are in accordance with the related accounting standards and laws.
12
 
The auditor’s opinion should also note any circumstances that may affect the 
financial stability of the audited entity.  
If the auditor is satisfied with the audit evidence, and that the financial statements 
give a true and fair view, and they are prepared (in compliance with the relevant 
accounting standards and legislation), he (or she) issues an unqualified audit report.
13
 
If unqualified, this audit report is a ‘clean’ audit report. The auditor may also decide 
to issue a qualified audit report due to misstatements in the financial statements or 
because he (or she) was unable to obtain sufficient evidence about the accuracy of 
the financial statements. Before issuing a qualified audit report, the auditor needs to 
modify the opinion in the report.
14
 There are three types of modified opinions: a 
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qualified opinion, an adverse opinion, and a disclaimer of opinion.
15
 If there are 
material misstatements, but there is nothing pervasive to the financial statements, the 
auditor issues a ‘qualified opinion’.16 This is still a clean opinion. If the 
misstatements are material and pervasive to the financial statements, the auditor 
expresses an ‘adverse opinion’17. This is an unclean audit opinion. Lastly, the auditor 
may issue a disclaimer of opinion when he (or she) is unable to obtain sufficient 
appropriate audit evidence regarding the accuracy of financial statements.
18
 The 
auditor disclaims the audit opinion because of the risk that undetected misstatements 
could have a material and pervasive effect on the financial statements.  
1.2.Dual Role of Auditors: Detectives and Gatekeepers  
The history of auditing dates back to the early development of joint stock 
companies.
19
 In the UK, this occurred with the enactment of the first Companies Act 
(Joint Stock Companies Act) of 1844, which recognized audit for English companies 
on a voluntary basis.
20
 The Companies Act of 1900 required audit for the first time; 
however, it did not define any rules to determine an auditor as qualified to perform 
audits.
21
 Thereafter, auditing did not develop as a profession in the UK until 1948.
22
 
Before then, directors or officers appointed by shareholders performed the audits of 
early joint stock companies.
23
 In line with its development, the objective of auditing 
has evolved over time.  
Auditors as Detectives (Public Watchdogs) 
During the late 1890s, in the early days of auditing, the objective of an audit was to 
check the consistency of internal records (book-keeping of company transactions) of 
the company.
24
 This role mainly involves the detection of fraud and material errors in 
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the accounts.
25
 As a result, auditors were only responsible to the company that they 
audited.
26
 The role of the detective-auditor was mainly to serve the owners of the 
company by confirming the consistency of internal records with the company 
transactions and to make sure that the treasurer was not cheating the owners.  
The fraud detection role of auditors was also acknowledged in case law in the UK. 
The two cases of London and General Bank and Kingston Cotton Mill Co Ltd. re-
stated an audit’s objectives of detecting fraud and error.27 However, these cases also 
stated that auditors could not be expected to detect every fraud and error
28
 since they 
are watchdogs but not detectives or bloodhounds; they do have to show reasonable 
skill and care in their work, however.
29
   
Auditors as Certifiers (Gatekeepers)  
In the 1970s, by the time of the development of the securities markets, small 
investors needed more information regarding the fairness of financial information 
included in companies’ statements. Auditors were asked to approve information to be 
disclosed to a third party, namely to shareholders, investors or in general, to the 
public. Correspondingly, the objective of auditing moved from fraud detection 
towards ensuring the credibility of financial statements.
30
 From that time, providing 
assurance services was recognized as the primary role of auditors, while detection 
and prevention of fraud were assigned to the internal control mechanism designated 
by the management.
31
  
By the 1990s, the business risk approach was adopted in auditing.
32
 The business risk 
approach holds that audit failures
33
 are not generated because of undetected fraud or 
error, but because of the uncontrolled operational risks in a company.
34
 Accordingly, 
in order to reduce the business risk, auditors started to focus on the provision of 
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consultancy services
35
 and they acknowledged their responsibility to provide an 
opinion as gatekeepers regarding a firm’s ability to continue as a going concern.  
Modern time Auditors  
Today, auditors are seen as gatekeepers (or certifiers
36
), rather than detectives. From 
a gatekeeper’s perspective, the objectives of modern auditing can be considered to be 
the provision of a review of the company’s accounts, to examine financial statements 
to ensure they are free from material misstatements, omissions and misleading 
information, and to express an audit opinion including any concerns regarding a 
firm’s ability to continue as a going concern.  
Public companies are required to disclose financial information to the public once 
shares are offered, and for as long as they are traded on stock exchanges.
37
 Auditors 
then review and certify the financial information disclosed to third parties. There are 
a number of users of this verified financial information: namely, the existing 
company shareholders, potential shareholders (investors), regulatory agencies, and 
any third party that might be involved in the operations of the company. Investors 
use the audited financial information to decide whether to make an investment in the 
company. Regulatory agencies seek the efficiency of financial markets through 
accessible reliable and sound financial information. All of this has the aim that stock 
prices reflect companies’ present reliable information and that the market determine 
the correct prices of securities.
38
  
However, this dual role of auditors might cause conflicts of interest. On the one 
hand, auditors have to perform an auditor-as-detective role to the company owners 
(existing shareholders). On the other hand, certifier auditors verify disclosed 
financial information and approve financial stability - whether it is financially sound 
to invest in the company. Though detective-auditing has a public watchdog role, 
certifying auditing may give auditors an incentive to please the client instead of 
protecting the interest of the public.  
                                                 
35
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In certification auditing, public companies hire auditors to verify the disclosed 
financial information so that they can induce the potential investors to make 
investments in their companies. Here, there is a risk that the auditor might favor the 
company, even though the user of this information is a third party (potential 
investors). There is a risk that the auditor might become an advocate of the company, 
instead of acting like an impartial detective, and serving their public watchdog role.
39
 
This conflict of interest arises naturally because of the auditor-client relationship. 
There is a client-relationship between the auditor and the audited company, and 
auditors have an incentive to please their clients.
40
 As a result, auditor independence 
may be impaired because auditors are paid by the audited company (the client).   
In addition, conflict may arise because there are two different kinds of users of the 
audited financial reports. On the one hand, there are company owners who ask 
auditors to perform their auditor-detective role. On the other hand, potential 
shareholders rely on auditors as gatekeepers when making investment decisions. It is 
highly difficult for auditors to satisfy both users, given their different interests. As 
UK case law has recognized, it cannot be expected of auditors to detect every fraud 
and error in financial statements.
41
 It is likely there would be undetected material 
misstatements in the financial statements even if the auditor showed reasonable skill 
and care. Moreover, capital markets become more sophisticated and complex every 
day. It is true that neither regulators nor auditors fully understand today’s complex 
financial markets.
42
 It gets more difficult for auditors to audit effectively and provide 
an assurance in such complex markets.
43
 Eventually, one side of users’ expectations 
(either owners of the company or investors) has to be compensated. This conflict is 
referred to the situation named expectations gap.
44
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2. EXTERNAL AUDITORS IN THE WAKE OF MODERN AUDITING 
PROFESSION 
As the previous section showed, auditors are now expected to verify financial 
statements, but at the same time give an assurance regarding the financial 
sustainability of the entity. Regarding the latter role, audit firms provide consulting 
services, including risk assessment and management services. However, the law does 
not assign the latter role to external auditors.
45
 This situation results in an 
expectations gap in relation to both the role of the auditors and the scope of the 
external auditing. In addition, the growing economic importance of consulting is 
likely to impair auditor independence. This section examines the auditing profession 
in light of the two main issues, which are auditor independence and the expectations 
gap.
46
 In addition, the Big Four’s dominance in the audit market will also be 
discussed in this section.  
2.1. Ill-defined Role of Auditors: expectations gap 
The previous section identified how the objective of external auditing has evolved 
through time.
47
 The perception regarding the role of auditing has also changed over 
time. Auditors are not only asked to perform a detective-auditor role, but they are 
also called to consider the business risks which includes the assessment of whether 
an entity will fail to achieve its objectives.
48
 However, there is a lack of clarity 
regarding the scope, role and objective of audit among the stakeholders. This 
situation creates an expectations gap between auditing in practice and stakeholders’ 
expectations of auditing.  
The first kind of expectations gap is derived from the scope of auditing. Although 
statutory audit concerns with the previous period-backward looking element of an 
audit (i.e. the verification of financial statements), it also includes the forward 
looking element of an audit (i.e. an opinion that the company remains going 
                                                 
45
 The UK Companies Act 2006 requires auditors to include in the audit report whether the annual 
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concern).
49
 There is a general perception among stakeholders that financial 
statements with unqualified audit reports guarantee the financial health of the 
entity.
50
 However, audit opinion does not have to give such assurance regarding the 
future sustainability of the entity.
51
 It is argued that this kind of expectations gap was 
at its widest during the global financial crisis.
52
 The unexpected failure of big 
institutions might result in a more risk-oriented approach in auditing.
53
 
With respect of the role of auditors, the expectations gap derived from the expanded 
role of auditors. Arthur Andersen’s financial chicanery brought to notice the 
expanding role of auditors in terms of fraud detection. The number of collapses and 
major fraud incidents called for increased accountability and hence, changes in 
perceptions of auditors’ role.  Nevertheless, auditors are not primarily responsible for 
the prevention and detection of fraud; instead, this role falls to the management.
54
 
Auditors are required to show reasonable skill and care to detect and report fraud.
55
 
The term ‘reasonable’ causes ambiguity, however, and therefore results in a gap 
regarding the stakeholders’ understanding of the duties of auditors.  
The other expectations gap is derived from the natural inconsistency of the auditing 
model, where auditors are appointed and remunerated by the audited client. External 
auditors also have a role as public watchdogs.
56
 In other words, auditors should serve 
the public interest via ensuring investors and public at large that financial statements 
are presented fairly. However, it is difficult to fulfill this role when they are hired and 
paid by the audited company and are therefore dependent upon company managers 
for audit fees. Shapiro explains this situation as “dealing with two masters/wearing 
two hats”.57 She argued that the structure of external auditing requires auditors to be 
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hired and paid by the audited company while laws encumber auditors to serve the 
public’s interests.58 So, as argued, there is a natural inconsistency in the structure of 
auditing and the purpose of the law. In conclusion, it can be submitted that the scope, 
role and objective of auditing are ill-defined and are causing an expectations gap 
between auditors and the stakeholders.  
2.2. Auditor-Client Relationship versus Independence  
In capital markets, investors use a company’s financial statements in determining 
their investments, so as to make the highest return on their investment with the 
lowest risk.
59
 There is a possibility that managers will accidently - or deliberately - 
misrepresent financial statements. Thus, external auditors as are needed as 
independent outsiders to assure investors that financial statements prepared by the 
management are presented accurately.
60
 Investors consider external auditing as an 
assurance regarding the reliability of financial statements only because external 
auditors have professional qualifications and knowledge and they are independent of 
the management. If auditor independence were impaired, their financial statements 
will no longer be trusted.  
The professional qualification of an auditor is important for detection misstatements 
and errors in the financial statements, so that the accuracy of the financial statements 
is ensured. DeAngelo defines audit quality as the auditor’s ability both in discovering 
corruption in financial statements, and in reporting it.
61
 An auditor is only able to 
detect fraud if he (or she) has the professional qualification(s), knowledge, and 
experience to perform an audit.
62
 In other words, the competence of the auditor 
indicates the ability to detect misrepresentation in financial statements. The 
competence of auditors and their independence are closely related, and complement 
each other. Auditors’ ability to report a breach or misrepresentation in financial 
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statements depends on his (or her) independence.
63
 If the auditor is not independent, 
he (or she) will have no incentive to express their competence to detect fraud. In turn, 
if an auditor is competent, they are eligible to be considered as independent.
64
 
Therefore, being a professional auditor requires being independent. In other words, 
in order to fulfill the role, auditor has to be independent.  
Nevertheless, independence is an ambiguous concept; it is not easy to ensure. In the 
existing literature, auditor independence is analysed according to two concepts: 
independence ‘in fact’ and independence ‘in appearance’.65 The former concept 
refers to the attitude of being impartial and objective, while the latter refers to the 
perception of independence by users of financial statements, namely shareholders 
and investors.
66
 Auditor independence can be ensured in a number of ways. First, 
auditors, as certified public accountants, are subject to professional discipline and the 
oversight of national public bodies (e.g. the Conduct Committee,
67
 part of the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in the UK). Second, auditors are required by law 
to be independent meaning that there may not be any close ties to, or financial self-
interests in, the audited company.
68
  
Moreover, certain circumstances derived from the nature of the auditor-client 
relationship are likely to impair auditor independence. To begin with, auditors are 
not independent because they are hired and paid by the audited company (the 
client).
69
 Audit reports should be reported to the shareholders because auditors’ 
actual clients are the users of the audited financial statements. However, the audit 
contract is signed between the auditors and the managers of the audited company 
who actually pay the auditors with the financial resources of the company. Audit 
firms are inherently commercialised institutions that seek to increase their profits and 
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market share
70
 and therefore, they might forget their actual clients and become 
capitalist institutions simply trying to maximize their profits. As a result, there is a 
risk that they are not able to deliver independent audits when they are dependent 
upon company directors for their fees and have an incentive to please the company 
management, in order to secure their non-audit fees.
71
 Ronen described this situation 
as “structural infirmity”.72 Because auditors seek to please their client (i.e. the 
company management), it is possible that they might interpret in the interest of the 
company at every turn - for example, shredding ‘grey area’ judgments.73 This 
situation might suggest that auditors would avoid disputes in order to be reappointed 
(or not to be dismissed).   
Nevertheless, even if the auditor is independent ‘in fact’, they have to show this 
independence to the public. Being independent ‘in fact’ is an ambiguous concept and 
difficult to interpret in practice, because it depends upon auditors’ mentality in their 
audit work.
74
 Even though it might not be possible to prove mental independence to 
the public (i.e. objectivity), there are a number of ways to evaluate the degree of 
independence ‘in appearance’. These are: auditors’ dependence on non-audit fees, 
the length of auditor tenure, and the competitive environment (choice of auditor).
75
 
The provision of consultancy services and dependence on non-audit fees may impair 
independence ‘in appearance’.76  
The other element that has a direct impact on the auditor independence is the 
‘familiarity threat’,77 where the auditors have been involved for many years in audit 
engagements. This was the case with Enron. Arthur Andersen was assigned as the 
auditor of Enron for more than 50 years. The close relationship between the company 
and auditor caused negligence in the audit. It was found that Arthur Andersen 
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shredded significant documents right after the SEC started an investigation in the 
company.
78
 It is claimed that shredding the documents must have indicated either 
being aware of incorrect audit opinions or purposefully not issuing any report about 
wrongdoings or risks detected.
79
 As was the case in the Enron scandal, the long years 
of auditor tenure - the so-called ‘familiarity threat’ - could make auditors less 
skeptical because of an ongoing relationship with the client. Moreover, it is argued 
that the ongoing relationship between the auditor and the client may cause auditors 
failing to spot misrepresentation in financial statements because he (or she) would be 
looking from the perspective of their client.
80
  
The last factor that may limit auditor independence is the executive management’s 
influence on the choice of the auditor. This is often the case where the relationship 
between executive managers and dominant shareholders (namely families, banks, 
and institutional investors) is based on trust and confidence. As a result, important 
decisions, such as the appointment of auditors are discussed with management, and 
influence is therefore the inevitable.
81
  
If auditing has a role in ensuring trust and market confidence, it should see the users 
of audited financial statements as the real clients rather than the company and its 
managers. However, as the next part will discuss, a new form of auditing might 
change the primary focus of the auditing profession as the economic importance of 
consulting has been increasing.  
2.3. The New Form of Auditing: auditing versus consultancy  
Jeppesen argued that auditing is being “reinvented” as it is now extremely focused on 
adding value to the audit.
82
 Value-added services include detecting, understanding, 
and analyzing the business risks that the audited firm is involved in, and building a 
strategy to manage and control those risks.
83
 Value-added auditing is delivered in the 
form of consulting. Today, it is common that audit firms provide advisory services in 
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addition to the traditional form of audit (i.e. the verification of financial statements). 
In fact, it has now become the case that, because the fees generated from the audit 
are lower, auditors are seeking to provide non-audit services to the same client
84
 or to 
non-audit clients. This situation is called ‘lowballing’. Via lowballing, auditors seek 
to compensate for low audit fees through the provision of consultancy services for 
higher fees.  
Offering consulting services to the same audit client (lowballing) was very popular 
back in the days of the Big Five.
85
 For instance, by 2000, fees for advisory services 
constituted 50% of the revenue of the Big Five, whereas it was only 13% of revenue 
in 1981.
86
 Enron’s auditor, Arthur Andersen, was highly dependent on such non-
audit fees. Arthur Andersen received $25 million for audit fees and $27 million for 
non-audit fees in 2000.
87
 The current situation in the EU audit market is not 
dissimilar. As of 2012, 32% of the total revenue ($36.1 billion out of $110.2 billion) 
of the Big Four firms is generated by advisory services.
88
  
Consulting includes strategic management planning, internal audit outsourcing 
services, risk assessment business performance, and e-commerce to name but a few. 
Rather than technical differences, the most important aspect that distinguishes 
consulting from auditing is independence.
89
 The joint provision of audit and non-
audit services to the same audit client might jeopardize the auditor independence ‘in 
appearance’,90 and hence can damage the audit quality.91  
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Figure 2.1: Big Four revenue growth from 2011 to 2012 (Source: data extracted 
from the 2012 Big Four Firms Performance Analysis by Big4.com) 
The provision of non-audit services to an audit client, namely advisory services, 
builds an economic relationship with the client.
92
 When the auditor gives advice on 
the business of the client, the auditor gains an interest in the financial success of the 
client.
93
 There is therefore an economic interest for auditors in the provision of 
consulting services. Moreover, the economic importance of non-audit services has 
grown rapidly. As Figure 2.1 illustrates, revenues generated from advisory services 
grew more than audit-related services revenues in 2012 for all Big Four firms. As a 
result of the growing importance of advisory services, auditors became less 
dependent on reputations for high-quality auditing
94
 and more dependent on their 
relationships with the client for the sake of consulting services.
95
 This dependence is 
in hazardous for auditor independence. 
There are mixed arguments regarding the effect of the provision of non-audit 
services on audit quality. Brown et al argued that the provision of non-audit services 
increases auditor dependence on non-audit fees and hence, undermines the audit 
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quality.
96
 However, Arrunada objected to this statement, arguing that neither audit 
quality nor independence is necessarily damaged by provision of non-audit services, 
since the provision of non-audit services may promote competition in the market.
 97  
Publicly listed firms are now paying attention to the risk management services due to 
increased complexity of financial markets. As a result, external auditors are not only 
expected to verify financial statements but are now also expected to understand the 
client’s business and internal control relative to risk assessment and control. The 
current structure of the audit profession makes audit and non-audit services 
undistinguishable, and therefore makes auditor independence an elusive concept that 
is hard to fully maintain.  
The growing economic importance of consultancy services converts auditing into a 
new form of doing business. This new form of auditing builds a mutual economic 
interest between auditor and client. As results, auditors primarily consider the 
business demands of the clients, and consider less the interests of the users of 
financial statements.
98
 However, this new form of auditing might result in 
independence issues. Auditor independence requires the absence of economic 
interests that could cause a conflict between auditor and client. Economic interest in 
an audited company makes it difficult for auditors to perform independent auditing: 
there is a risk of ‘self-serving’. This framework does not suit the independence 
requirement of external auditing. To put it differently, consulting is not 
complementary to independence.  
2.4. The Big Four Audit Firms 
The market for audits of large and listed companies is dominated by the Big Four 
audit firms: PricewaterhouseCoopers International Limited (PwC), Deloitte Touché 
Tohmatsu Limited (Deloitte), EY (formerly Ernst & Young
99
), and Klynveld Peat 
Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG).  
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The reason for this high concentration is the mergers between the largest audit firms 
that started in the late 1980s. During the 1980s, the audit market was highly 
competitive. In order to gain more market share, audit firms reduced the price for 
audit services (i.e. low-balling).
100
 As a consequence, they focused on the provision 
of consultancy services in order to cover the loss that they incurred because of the 
low priced audit work.
101
 The other way they sought to increase or maintain market 
share was consolidation with peers.
102
 In this respect, the late 1980s and late 1990s 
saw major mergers between the biggest audit firms. The first two mergers in 1989 
reduced the Big Eight to the Big Six.
103
 Later, in 1998, Price Waterhouse and 
Coopers & Lybrand joined together.
104
 Together with Arthur Andersen, KPMG, 
Ernst & Young and PWC formed the Big Five. Since the demise of Arthur Andersen 
in 2002, the concentration in the audit market is the highest ever as there are only 
four big audit firms left.  
The Big Four audit firms are ‘big’ in terms of their revenues and the number of staff 
they employ.
105
 For instance, the Big Four cumulatively employ more than 690,000 
staff including 37,000 partners.
106
 With regards revenue, the combined revenue for 
the four firms in 2012 was $110.3 billion, despite the worldwide recession.
107
 The 
Big Four audit firms are active in almost every country in the world, and audit the 
majority, if not all, of the world’s largest companies.108 As of 2010, they had a 70% 
share of audits globally, while in the EU market they control 83% of the audits of the 
largest listed firms with FTSE 350 equivalent market capitalisation.109 
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A study by ESCP Europe found that at EU level, the domination of the Big Four 
audit firms is apparent but may differ across different segments of the market.
110
 For 
instance, the concentration level on the whole audit market (including audits of listed 
and non-listed companies) is lower than on listed companies. There are no data 
available on the EU average for non-listed companies. However, the UK findings 
represent an example for the EU. For instance, considering the whole audit market 
(audits of listed and non-listed companies) in the UK, the market share by turnover 
of the Big Four was 40% in 2009, while in the same year the concentration level on 
listed companies was 98%.
111
 
Figure 2.2: EU average of the Big Four market shares (by turnover) on the different 
segments of the market (Source: data extracted from ESCP Europe
112
) 
As Figure 2.2 illustrates, the concentration level is the highest for companies listed 
on the main index of national stock exchanges. In turn, the concentration level is 
lowest when the audited listed company sizes are small. To provide an example, 99% 
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of FTSE 100 companies in the UK were audited by the Big Four in 2009.
113
 Thus, 
the dominance of the Big Four for the audits of listed companies is very high. It was 
found that the EU average market share of the Big Four audit firms by turnover, with 
regards all listed firms (including companies listed on main index of national stock 
exchanges and companies listed on regulated market of national stock exchanges), is 
above 90%.
114
  
Overall, all of the European Member States (except Bulgaria
115
 and France
116
) have 
high concentration levels on the audit market of listed companies. As a result, audit 
engagements with the largest listed companies seem a real challenge for non-Big 
Four audit firms. On the other hand, mid-tier audit firms may find themselves a place 
for the audits of smaller listed firms and non-listed firms as the domination of the Big 
Four over audits of these companies seems to be lower. 
Results of the high concentration 
This high concentration results in limited choice for the audits of large listed 
companies. The Oxera Study
117
 listed the barriers preventing new audit firms (e.g. 
mid-tier audit firms) breaking up the audit market for large and listed companies as 
follows. First, the largest listed firms have a tendency to choose Big Four audit firms 
and have no incentive to change their audit firm for long periods.
118
 As a result, 
smaller firms have a reputational disadvantage against the Big Four who have sector 
expertise and advanced technology for the audit process. This argument is valid even 
when professional reputation is lost by a large audit firm (i.e. Arthur Andersen). For 
instance, it was found that after the demise of Arthur Andersen, only 2% of European 
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companies switched from a Big Four firm to a middle-tier firm, while 85% simply 
switched from one Big Four firm to another Big Four firm.
119
  
Second, smaller audit firms have an insufficient capacity to meet the global demand 
compared with the Big Four, who have a huge number of audit partners and a 
geographical advantage.
120
 Third, smaller firms might face barriers entering the 
market because of the costs of potential liability claims.
121
 Auditors are required to 
have a minimum level of insurance coverage that only partially covers the liability 
risk.
122
 Uninsured risk has to be covered by audit firms.
123
 Larger audit firms are 
better able to self-insure the liability risk but this is a problem for smaller audit firms. 
As a result, investors would not be in favour of mid-tier audit firms when considering 
a potential liability claim.
124
 Lastly, current ownership rules create barriers to the 
growth of smaller audit firms.
125
 Article 3 of Directive 2006/43/EC requires that 
auditors hold a majority of the voting rights in an audit firm and that majority of 
auditors control the management board. This provision limits investors’ influence on 
decision making in an audit firm. The reason of this ownership structure is to prevent 
conflicts of interest (in case an audit firm were publicly owned; shareholders could 
include persons affiliated with the audit clients
126
) and hence, to protect the 
independence of audit firms.
127
  
Conclusions  
It follows that auditor independence is compromised because of the potential 
conflicts of interest deriving from the nature of the current structure of the audit 
profession. In addition, the audit market is currently in the hands of the Big Four and 
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their businesses involve the provisions of both audit and non-audit services. There is 
a risk that the audit profession focuses more on consultancy services rather than audit 
work because the increasing revenues coming from consultancy services.   
The audit firms have grown rapidly in the last decade and the concentration in the 
market has reached a peak. Large public companies depend on the services of the Big 
Four because of their reputational advantage. It seems that the audit failures 
witnessed during the global financial crisis have not had affected the reputation of 
these firms. However, this does not suggest that serious litigation costs or 
reputational losses would not affect the Big Four’s business. It is argued that the Big 
Four rely on their relationship with their clients, rather than the quality of their 
works.
128
 The services provided by one Big Four firm cannot be effectively 
differentiated from the services of another Big Four firm.
129
 Large public companies 
tend to choose one of the Big Four firms not because of the quality of audits, but 
because of their reputation for good quality audits. As a result, rather than focusing 
on increasing the quality of their work, the Big Four firms look for other ways to 
compete with each other. They often rely on year-round tenures with the same client 
and aim to retain an existing client for as long as they can. In order to achieve this, 
they seek to please the client at every turn. Therefore, as long as they have a close 
and year-round relationship with their large clients, from whom a significant part of 
their revenue (in particular if mostly advisory related-revenues) is generated, even 
reputational damage might not have a negative effect on their business. However, as 
was evident with Enron, audit failures can lead to criminal sanctions and 
subsequently a loss of reputation and the demise of the firm (e.g. Arthur Andersen). 
Hence, auditors do have to consider potential reputational loss and liability claims at 
some point.
130
 Therefore, it is not legitimate to argue that auditors would have an 
incentive not to report in cases of fraud (or to not issue a modified opinion).
131
  
It is a fact that competition is restricted in the audit market, given the dominance of 
the Big Four audit firms. High competition in a market may promote service 
providers to produce better quality services.
132
 However, it is not certain that the high 
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concentration per se means low- quality auditing. The next section will examine the 
role of auditors in the global financial crisis and the Big Four firms’ audit quality, 
questioning whether they failed in their role.  
3. AUDITORS’ ROLE IN THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008 
The global financial crisis had hazardous consequences not only on US markets, but 
also the European financial markets. The contagious failures of large financial 
institutions on both sides of Atlantic damaged confidence in the global financial 
market and subsequently, caused an economic recession around the world.
133
 The 
crisis was labelled as the largest financial crisis since the 1930s Great Depression.
134
  
One of the issues that have been debated during and since the global financial crisis 
of 2008 is the auditors’ role (or failure) in warning market participants about 
financially distressed institutions and their liquidity and credit problems.
135
 Concerns 
related to those issues were highlighted in a number of high-profile papers, namely 
the European Commission’s Green Paper on Audit Policy,136 the European 
Commission’s Impact Assessment,137 the European Commission’s proposal for a 
regulation on statutory audits of PIEs,
138
 the House of Lords Report on auditors’ role 
and market concentration,
139
 and the Sharman Inquiry
140
. In their report, the House of 
Lords Economic Affairs Committee accused auditors and regulators of not sharing 
enough information with each other before the collapse of the large financial 
institutions, and found auditors guilty of a “dereliction of duty” and 
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“complacency”.141 This section will question the role of auditors in the global 
financial crisis and whether they actually failed in their role, particularly in respect of 
issuing going concern opinions.  
3.1. Going Concern Judgment  
As already stated, the primary objective of external auditing is to report to 
shareholders whether the company’s financial statements are prepared in accordance 
with related law and whether those statements present a true and fair view regarding 
the financial situation of the company.
142
 In addition, ISA 570 requires auditors to 
issue an opinion whether there is “significant doubt” about the company’s ability to 
continue as a going concern. In accounting, financial statements of a company are 
prepared on the ‘going concern assumption’; the assumption that a company will 
continue in operation long enough to achieve its objectives.
143
 Going concern 
assessments are made by the directors of the company; auditors then provide their 
opinions on the entity’s ability to continue in operation. The role of auditors is to 
express their opinion if they have significant doubts about the company’s ability to 
continue in existence in the next fiscal year. 
DeFond et al emphasised the significance of audit report in terms of warning 
shareholders and other stakeholders regarding a firm’s ability to continue as a going 
concern.
144
 Disclosing going concern assessment helps stakeholders assess a 
company’s solvency and liquidity risks145 wherein they are much more likely to 
recognise financial distress in advance.
146
 Providing going concern opinions is 
critical for market participants such as shareholders and other stakeholders to realise 
firms’ financial conditions at a specific time of period. It is stated that auditors’ 
opinion on going concern uncertainty can be used to forecast the company’s 
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failure.
147
 As a result, unacceptable losses derived from the failure of the firm can be 
avoided.  
On the contrary, there are a number of disadvantages to the requirement to issue 
going concern opinion. Firstly, there is no clear definition of the going concern 
concept. Bankruptcy failure is used as a proxy for determining a firm’s going 
concern ability.
148
 Similarly, phrases such as “substantial doubt” as in US auditing 
standards, or “significant doubt” as in ISA, do not have clear meaning. As a result, 
the interpretation of these phrases may differ and can cause a perception that auditors 
are not fulfilling their responsibilities (i.e. the expectations gap).  
Secondly, modifying audit reports to issue going concern uncertainty can be costly 
for the audit client and for the auditor as well.
149
 Auditors issue an unmodified 
(clean) report when they have detected and corrected all material errors and 
omissions so that the financial statements are fairly presented. However, in case they 
have a significant doubt that the company is no longer eligible to pay its debts for a 
period of at least 12 months from a balance sheet,
150
 auditors modify audit report to 
going concern uncertainty.
151
 Issuing a modified
152
 (disclaimer of opinion or adverse 
opinion) going concern opinion can affect the stock value of the company and 
ultimately may cause the failure of the company. Therefore, clients generally prefer 
to receive standard, unmodified (clean) reports rather than modified audit reports.
153
 
Issuing a modified audit report on going concern uncertainty is also costly for 
auditors because after issuing modified going concern report, it is likely that the 
client would switch to another auditor,
154
 which means that the auditor will be left 
without both audit and non-audit fees.
155
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It is said that recent financial audits are more risk-associated compared with the pre-
Enron era.
156
 As a consequence, auditors generally tend to issue going concern 
opinions because of the market and regulatory incentives.
157
 Similarly, Cheffers et al 
found that modified audit opinions on going concern uncertainty has increased from 
14% to 21% for all companies between the years 2002-2009.
158
 Nevertheless, it can 
be questioned why auditors of the Big Four firms did not issue any going concern 
opinions for the firms that failed in the 2008 financial crisis.  
3.2. Big Four Audit Firms’ Audit Quality  
There is no direct way to measure audit quality. Instead, empirical studies use proxy 
factors in order to label audits as being of low or high quality.
159
 For instance, the 
size of the auditor is considered as a proxy for audit quality.
160
 It is risky for larger 
audit firms if they misreport, as they may lose their good reputation. Hence, they are 
less likely to be influenced by management regarding the audit opinion. So, there is 
an assumption that larger auditors provide higher quality audits. However, this is not 
entirely accurate, since there were a number of audit failures that involved the Big 
Four auditors (e.g. Arthur Andersen for Enron, Ernst & Young for Lehman Brothers) 
which illustrate that larger audit firms do not always provide better quality audits.  
Still, there are a number of reasons why the Big Four might be expected to provide 
high-quality audits. First, investment bankers and institutional investors suggest Big 
Four auditors for their own clients and investees.
161
 Second, the Big Four auditors 
have greater a technological edge and experience in comparison with medium- and 
small-size audit firms.
162
 The large size of Big Four audit firms enables them to 
spend more on technological and professional training in the audit profession, which 
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contributes to their competence.
163
 Therefore, it could be expected that they would be 
better able to find misstatements and omissions in financial statements. For example, 
when rotation occurs, the Big Four can use its reserve of audit partners, which allows 
them continuity in their expertise from one period to another without any interruption 
that might cause missing errors in financial statements.
164
 The Big Four audit firms 
are decentralised organisations, and their operations are carried out by nation-based 
offices. They have branches (national partnership offices) globally, giving the 
advantage of global network opportunities. Therefore, it is assumed that the Big Four 
auditors are better at detecting and reporting material errors thanks to their 
professional knowledge/expertise, network/consulting opportunities, decentralised 
office structure
165
 and technological edge. Thus, in appearance, the Big Four have all 
the facilities and resources necessary for a high quality audit. Yet, in reality, they are 
not always successful in detecting and reporting errors, despite this seeming capacity 
to do so.
166
     
Big Four’s Going Concern Reporting Accuracy 
Frances and Yu found that the Big Four auditors are more likely to issue going 
concern audit reports.
167
 In relation to smaller audit firms, the Big Four audit firms 
are more likely to issue going concern opinions because they would not take the risk 
of losing their reputation in case the company fails with an unmodified (clear) audit 
opinion and subsequently suffers the litigation cost.
168
 In other words, they would not 
take the risk of reputation loss for not issuing-going concern report because they 
have more to lose compared with non-Big audit firms. Hence, they are arguably more 
suited to objectively evaluating their clients’ financial situations.  
It has been found that the Big Four’s going concern reporting quality (providing less 
reporting errors, such as issuing going concern modified reports to clients who do not 
subsequently fail, or issuing audit reports without a going concern modification to 
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bankrupt clients) is higher compared with non-Big Four audit firms.
169
 As supporting 
evidence, Frances and Yu found that the reporting accuracy of the Big Four firms is 
higher than smaller audit firms. They examined larger and smaller firms’ going 
concern reports and analysed the accuracy of those reports in predicting next-period 
bankruptcy. They found that of 90 going concern reports issued by the Big Four, 8 
clients failed in the next period, while smaller firms issued 83 going concern reports 
and had only one client failure.
170
  
Thus, it can be seen that both larger and smaller audit firms issued a considerable 
number of going concern opinions where the odds of bankruptcy were very low for 
both. It should be taken into account that it is the auditors’ professional judgment that 
is used to assess the going concern uncertainty of a firm. If the auditor has not 
adequate professional expertise to conclude a professional judgment reporting errors 
are likely to occur. Nevertheless, it is possible that reporting errors might occur 
where a company’s economic status may change as a consequence of market 
dynamics.
171
 Also, it should not be disregarded that the relationship between the 
auditor and the client might also affect the auditor’s willingness to issue going 
concern report and therefore, the accuracy of that report.  
3.3. Where were the Auditors? 
In a published document, the European Commission referred to the role of the 
auditors in the 2008 financial crisis.
172
 The European Commission stated in this 
paper that bank auditors failed to alert their supervisors about the financial situations 
of certain institutions.
173
 The law requires that auditors of credit institutions report to 
competent authorities in case they recognise certain cases that might have important 
effects on the financial situation of the institution.
174
 Although EU law requires 
auditors to assess whether there is a suspicion regarding the audited firm’s financial 
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situation,
175
 auditors did not report to the authorities during or before the crisis. 
Apparently, banks’ auditors failed in their duty to report the component authorities of 
any situation that may affect the functioning of the financial institutions. 
Moreover, many banks collapsed only a few months after receiving a ‘clean’ audit 
opinion without any indication regarding the risks in the financial statements and 
going concern uncertainty. During the global financial crisis of 2008 many large 
financial institutions collapsed, and were nationalized by their governments, or 
rescued by other institutions. These institutions included Lehman Brothers, AIG, 
American Home Mortgage, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, GE Capital, Fortis, Royal 
Bank of Scotland, Lloyds TSB, and HBOS,
176
 to name but a few. None of these 
institutions’ auditors – except Northern Rock’s auditor, PwC177 - issued a modified 
audit opinion on going concern uncertainty. In other words, these institutions’ 
auditors did not have any significant or substantial doubt about the companies’ 
ability to continue as a going concern for a period of at least 12 months or for a 
reasonable period of time. There is an ongoing discussion as to why these 
institutions were not warned before their collapse by their auditors. However, the 
current structure of the financial markets – i.e. wherein the availability of alternative 
financial instruments resulted in more risks factors in the markets – should be 
considered when criticising auditors for not issuing a modified or adverse opinion on 
going concern uncertainty.  
Auditors use operating losses, working capital inadequacy, and deficits in retained 
earnings, short corporate operating history, or increased threats from competitors to 
modify an audit opinion for going concern uncertainty.
178
 Profitability, leverage, 
liquidity, company size, debt defaults, and previous going concern reports are used to 
assess the firm’s ability to continue in the next fiscal year.179 These factors mostly 
concern the past period of a firm, for backward-looking evaluation. In contrast, non-
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financial statements, such as market variables, are used for forward-looking 
evaluation for the going concern assumption.
180
 
Banks are different from other financial institutions in terms of the intensity of the 
going concern risk.
181
 For instance, solvency and liquidity risks are higher for banks 
compared with other financial institutions.
182
 In the credit crisis of 2008, stress 
testing was critical for banks. Stress testing considers a range of scenarios with stress 
level that might cause the entity to fail.
183
  
Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and other collapsed institutions’ auditors issued 
neither modified nor adverse opinion because the financial statements did not meet 
the requirements of accounting standards, or else there were no issues of material 
misstatements or fraud. These institutions collapsed only a few months after 
receiving clean audit opinions. It is worth highlighting that major financial 
institutions received clear audit opinions from the Big Four auditors (in the case of 
Lehman Brothers, Ernst & Young; in the case of JP Morgan Chase and AIG, PwC; in 
the case of Merill Lynch, Deloitte & Touché) just before they collapsed.184 In the 
Lehman Brothers case, it was found that the investment bank had used the so-called 
Repo 105 and Repo 108 transactions in order to hide its assets and auditor Ernst & 
Young approved the audit report by ignoring the mistake and helped the bank to hide 
$50.38 billion (£33.7 billion) of debt.185 Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
in 2008, Ernst & Young were held to private litigation by former Lehman Brothers 
investors
186
 and recently agreed to pay $99 million (£61.2 million) to the plaintiffs.187  
Ernst & Young auditors were accused of keeping silent while Lehman executives 
gave a false picture of the firm’s financial statements and its offerings. In their 
defense, Ernst & Young stated: “the Lehman’s audited financial statements clearly 
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portrayed Lehman as a highly leveraged entity operating in a risky and volatile 
industry, and Lehman’s bankruptcy was not caused by any accounting issues.”188 As 
Ernst & Young’s defense declared, the industry that Lehman operated was highly 
risky, and it is beyond doubt that the fact that auditors helped Lehman Brothers to 
misstate its financial records did not cause the bank to collapse. Nevertheless, it is 
worthwhile questioning any issues that might hinder auditors to issue modified going 
concern opinions on financially distressed banks.     
It is said that issuing modified going concern opinions is closely related to the 
auditor’s independence and competence, and therefore the audit quality.189 In this 
respect, there are some factors (other than the firm’s financially distressed situation) 
that might affect the auditor when assessing the going concern uncertainty. Carson et 
al covered a wide range of factors and their impact on auditors’ reports on going 
concern uncertainty.
190
 Accordingly, an auditor would avoid to issue a going concern 
report if (i) he (or she) is economically depended on a large or important client for 
audit and non-audit fees,
191
 (ii) there is a risk to lose the client after issuing going 
concern report,
192
 and (iii) the audited company is an affiliated company.
193
 
Moreover, disclosing going concern uncertainty might impair the entity’s economic 
situation and investors and other stakeholders may overreact to those reports. 
Ultimately, disclosing such information routinely might jeopardize market 
confidence.
194
 As a result, it is difficult for bank auditors to publicly disclose any 
going concern issues.  
To conclude, there are a number of issues that caused the ineffective function of 
reporting on going concern. First of all, there is a false perception among 
stakeholders that a clean, unmodified audit report guarantees the company will not 
fail in the future. However, a going concern assessment cannot provide such a 
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guarantee (i.e. the expectations gap
195
). Secondly, there is a fear that disclosing going 
concern risks might result in investors withdrawing their money in a hurry and may 
quicken the failure of the entity. Thirdly, due to the increased complexity of the 
capital markets today, it is getting more difficult for auditors to understand and 
evaluate the business risk of the companies. Furthermore, it is believed that 
disclosing such going concern issues and significant doubts about the future of the 
entities might impair confidence in financial markets. The above arguments can be 
cited in determining the failure of auditors in issuing going concern reports before 
and during the financial crisis of 2008.  
CONCLUSION  
This chapter showed how the objective of auditing has evolved from the 1840s to the 
present. It is submitted that the relationship between the auditors, the client (the 
audited firm), and the public (investors) can cause issues, namely the expectations 
gap and impaired auditor independence.  
The role of auditors is primarily backward looking, including the assessment of 
financial statements as to whether they present a true and fair view on the audited 
entity’s financial situation. With regards to going concern judgements, the auditors’ 
role is to provide an opinion whether there are any ‘significant doubts’ over the 
accounts prepared by directors on a going concern basis. It should be taken into 
account that auditors can practice the latter role on a limited basis within the scope of 
the external audit. This creates an expectations gap. The expectations gap is wider for 
the audits of banks because of the complexity of financial institutions. There were 
indeed individual cases that involved audit failures (e.g. Lehman Brothers and Repo 
105 & 108 transactions). Nevertheless, a general conclusion on auditors’ failure over 
going concern judgements would not be justified. The common expectation was that 
the auditor should have foreseen the financial turmoil that financial regulators did not 
predict. This expectation is, however, far more beyond the scope of external auditing. 
As this chapter has submitted, the role of auditors is ill-defined to clarify the 
principle objective of external auditing and the role of auditors, thus results in an 
expectations gap.  
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It should be recognized that issuing accurate going concern judgments is not an easy 
task considering the instability of financial markets and changing market dynamics. 
Moreover, during a time of crisis, substantial uncertainties are more frequent. Going 
concern assessments do not give a hundred per cent guarantee regarding the future of 
an entity. Therefore, these reports should be evaluated alongside other financial 
reports on a company as well as future macro-economic conditions that might affect 
the value of the assets of the company.  
This chapter has shown that external auditing has a similar function globally due to 
the uniform audit standards and the Big Four and their global network. Also, there 
are shared problems as regards the concept (e.g. the appointment and remuneration 
of auditors by the audit client) and market structure (e.g. the domination of the Big 
Four over the audit market). In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, regulators 
at both national and international levels urged for new regulations and greater 
scrutiny over the audit profession. The motives and technical justifications of audit 
regulation will be identified in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER III: THE REGULATION OF AUDITING: 
Why, How, and by Whom? 
INTRODUCTION 
The literature on audit regulation draws upon financial reporting literature. Although 
the latter is vast, accounting studies usually appear in the literature more so than 
auditing studies. In addition, most of the financial reporting literature is in the 
political science or business field, focusing either on the political dimension of 
regulation,
1
 or its organisational concept (e.g. discussions on state or private 
regulation and rule-based versus principle-based standards).
2
  
After the recent global financial crisis audit regulation has received enormous 
attention from governments, the private sector, and academia. However, debate 
mainly focuses on the regulatory role of public oversight boards and private 
international agencies’ public interest notion in standard setting process,3 whereas the 
complex structure of audit regulation has not been discussed in sufficient detail.  
This chapter aims to fill this gap. Both the theory and practice of audit regulation will 
be covered in this chapter. First, audit regulation is considered from a theoretical 
perspective. As a contribution to the literature, theory-based motives and technical 
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justifications of regulation - inspired by Baldwin and Cave
4
 - are applied to audit 
regulation. Second, these motives and technical justifications are applied to audit 
regulation. Accordingly, it is submitted that audit regulation finds its place in the 
overlap of three areas of law: financial markets regulation, competition law, and 
company law and corporate governance principles, defined as a ‘triadic structure of 
audit regulation’.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: The first section starts with a 
discussion on audit regulation as regards its motives and technical justifications. It 
will be questioned whether there is a need for the regulation of external auditing. In 
this respect, the objective of audit regulation will be questioned and will be justified 
with substantial reasons. In the second section the long-standing debate of rule- 
versus principle-based regulation will be discussed. The final and third section 
discusses the role of private and state regulators at national and international level as 
regards their public interest role. In terms of state regulation, the fragmented form of 
the structure of auditing regulation in between the financial services, competition, 
and company law will be presented. In addition, the public interest notion of audit 
regulation will be questioned as regards the role of key private actors in the auditing 
field, in particular in standard setting.  
1. WHY: THE NEED FOR AUDIT REGULATION 
This section will present a theoretical discussion on the need for regulation in 
general, and audit regulation in particular. Motives and technical justifications of 
regulation will be taken to explain the need of regulation and these theories will be 
applied to understand the regulation of audit.  
For the issuers operating in financial markets there are certain governance rules that 
need to be applied.
5
 However, it can be questioned why we need these governance 
rules. The need for regulation can be justified by a number of reasons. To begin with, 
markets are not stable and they need to update their governance mechanisms with the 
latest developments in financial markets. In addition, markets are not capable of 
                                                 
4
 Robert Baldwin and Martin Cave, Understanding Regulation Theory, Strategy, and Practice, (OUP 
1999).  
5
 For instance, in the UK issuers and others have to comply with the FCA Disclosure and 
Transparency Rules.  
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dealing with irregularities on their own. Laws and regulations are issued in order to 
fix problems emerging in the market, or they are actioned in response to financial 
crises to reassure confidence in the market, and sometimes, political intentions 
involve in regulation.
6
 Baldwin and Cave determined two different concepts when 
analysing the need of regulation: motives for regulation and technical justifications 
of regulation.
7
 
1.1. Motives for Regulation 
Baldwin and Cave considered the motives for regulation when explaining the rise, 
development and fall of regulation.
8
 In their explanation of regulatory developments, 
they outline three types of motive for regulation: (i) force of new ideas to change the 
status quo, (ii) force of new conditions to change (economic or technical changes), 
and (iii) pressures of interests (interest theories).
9
 Hood explains these three forms of 
motive as the “force of new ideas” and he believes that they can influence regulatory 
developments.
10
 
According to Baldwin and Cave, regulatory developments can be driven by new 
ideas via logical force or rhetorical power to change the status quo.
11
 In some 
instances, regulatory developments may become inevitable in the face of economic 
changes and technological improvements. Alternatively, regulatory developments 
may be forced by different interest groups (i.e. public, private, or institutional) who 
seek such developments to suit their own benefits.  
In most cases, interest theories embrace the first two types of motives of regulation, 
i.e. (i) and (ii). For instance, public institutions namely the government or 
governmental institutions, pursue (i) to issue reformist regulations, and/or (ii) to 
regulate in their interests in responding to financial crises. Likewise, private 
institutions might pursue regulation with the same intentions and seek to benefit 
                                                 
6
 David Jackman, ‘Does regulation make it worse?’ (2004) 12(2) Journal of Financial Regulation and 
Compliance 106. 
7
 Baldwin and Cave (1999) (n 4). See also Morgan Bronwen and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to 
Law and Regulation (Cambridge University Press 2007).  
8
 Baldwin and Cave (1999) (n 4) p. 18.  
9
 These three types of motives are seen as external influences on regimes and they can contribute 
regulatory developments unless there is an internal problem, such as bureaucratic failing occurs.  See 
ibid pp. 18-9.  
10
 Christopher Hood, Explaining Economic Policy Reversals (Open University Press, Buckingham 
1994). 
11
 Baldwin and Cave (1999) (n 4) p. 18.  
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private interests. It may be useful to further explain the intentions of these interest 
groups because there may be a distinction between public, private or institutional 
arrangements and social processes. 
Public interest theory holds that regulatory attempts are developed in accordance to 
the public interest-related objectives rather than group, sector, or self-interests.
12
 It 
also assumes that expert regulators are disinterested so the public can have trust in 
them. However, it is acknowledged that it is difficult to reach an agreement on public 
interest because the concept might be hard to identify.
13
 As a drawback, this theory 
does not take into account that politicians are not always disinterested e.g. there 
might be individual interest involved in the process that could overtake the public 
interest. Another issue is that this theory disregards political and economic influences 
on regulation. Regulatory attempts are likely to be influenced by powerful political 
parties (or politicians and sectors) that want to use regulation to strengthen their 
position within their environment.
14
 
At its core, private interest theory is based on the economic theory of regulation 
viewing regulation as emerging from the attempts of individuals or groups who are 
willing to optimize their self-interests.
15
 This theory also finds its grounds when 
‘regulatory failure’16 or ‘regulatory capture’17 occurs.  
According to institutional interest theory, institutional structure and arrangements 
have a significant role in shaping regulation.
18
 It is argued that institutional-interest-
designed regulation is a political choice in order to gain the ability to monitor 
information asymmetry. It is also argued that, via institutional-designed regulation, 
politicians may be able to shift the blame to institutions when things go wrong.
19
 
                                                 
12
 Robert Baldwin and Martin Cave, Understanding Regulation Theory, Strategy, and Practice, (2
nd
 
edn, OUP 2012) p.41.  
13
 For a further discussion on the public interest concept, see Section 3.2.1 below.  
14
 Baldwin and Cave (2012) (n 12) p. 41.  
15
 Carlos M. Pelàez and Carlos A. Pelàez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2009) p. 15. 
16
 Regulatory failure is described as the situation where the cost of regulation is greater than its 
benefits. See Bronwen and Yeung (n 7) p. 43.  
17
 Regulatory capture occurs where regulatory institutions disregard the broader welfare of society and 
promote the interests of those who have political or economic power. See Pelàez and Pelàez (n 15) p. 
15. 
18
 Baldwin and Cave (2012) (n 12) p. 41.  
19
 Ibid p. 57.   
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1.2.Technical Justifications for Regulation 
The other explanatory concept of regulation is the technical justifications for 
regulation in the interest of public.
20
 In other words, regulation is justified where the 
uncontrolled market fails to function in accordance with public interest. This concept 
sits opposite to self-regulation theory. Self-regulation theory states that regulation of 
markets is not necessary as market forces alone can lead market participants to act 
with diligence.
21
 
Nevertheless, today’s financial markets are not able to function without regulatory 
intervention because of the various participants and many complexities involved in 
markets. As highlighted by the recent global financial crisis, markets are not always 
able to respond to rapid changes and can ultimately fail. Thus, regulation can be used 
to enable a response to market failures, as a rationale.
22
 
Baldwin and Cave considered a number of situations where markets fail due to 
mainly economic inadequacies and they highlighted these situations as technical 
reasons for regulation.
23
 Accordingly, they cited fighting with monopolies, making 
the market more transparent via effective disclosure mechanisms, and protecting the 
market from insufficient competition conditions as technical justifications for 
regulation. Unstable market conditions and asymmetric information are shared 
problems of market failures. As a result, an expectations gap is likely to occur where 
the market fails to deliver correct information to issuers. The mutual objective of 
regulation in these economic conditions is to create a business environment where 
sources are allocated adequately, services are available to everyone who desires to 
receive them, access to accurate information is easy and affordable, and consumers 
are protected by the dominant players in the market via effective competition.
24
 
Ultimately, the expectations gap would then be narrowed, in accordance with the 
interests of the public.  
                                                 
20
 Baldwin and Cave (1999) (n 4) p. 9. 
21
 Reiner H. Kraakman, ‘Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy’ (1986) 2 
Journal of Law Economics and Organization 53. See also Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature 
and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (first published in 1776, Electronic Book Company, London 
2001).   
22
 This chapter considers financial crises as market failures and looks at the rationale for regulation. 
The reasons for such crises are beyond the scope of this chapter and this thesis. 
23
 For the full list of technical justifications for regulation, see Baldwin and Cave (1999) (n 4) pp. 9-
16.  
24
 Ibid.   
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So far, the core justifications of regulation have been discussed at a general level. 
Next, the main principles of regulation (i.e. the motives and technical justifications 
for regulation) will be applied to justify audit regulation.  
1.3. Audit Regulation 
The need for audit regulation can be derived from a number of rationales, including 
the economic and political intentions of regulatory authorities. Also, the issues that 
derive from the audit framework’s own natural inconsistencies, such as the 
expectations gap and auditor independence, are other rationales for regulation.
25
 This 
part will adopt Baldwin and Cave’s26 regulatory concept to identify the need for audit 
regulation. In this respect, this chapter finds the motives of audit regulation to be 
changing corporate forms and serving the public interest; technical justifications for 
audit regulation are noted as information inadequacies, deficient competition, 
coordination of rules and procedures, dealing with audit failures, and the limitations 
of self-regulation. These concepts will be explained in turn. 
1.3.1. Motives for Audit Regulation 
The motives for audit regulation are explained here according to two areas of 
rationales: the force of new conditions to change, and the public interest theory. The 
motive of ‘changing the status quo’ is suggested to be covered by the motive of force 
of new conditions to change.  
(i) Force of new conditions to change 
It is true that corporate structures of today’s financial environment have been 
changing from the classic form of firms to multi-national large corporations. The rise 
in cross-border investments has urged the need of international standards of auditing. 
For instance, the International Auditing and Assurance Board (IAASB) - the 
regulatory body of the IFAC - created the International Standards on Auditing 
(ISAs). The creation of ISAs aimed to reduce the transaction costs and to provide 
comparability for cross-border investors.
27
 
 
                                                 
25
 For the discussion on auditor independence and expectations gap see Chapter II.  
26
 Baldwin and Cave (n 4).  
27
 See also Section 3.2.2 below.  
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(ii) Serving the public interest  
The auditor has a public interest role that requires ensuring the credibility of financial 
statements and thus promoting market confidence and trust. However, a conflict of 
interest is likely to arise due to the relationship with the audited company. 
Companies ‘hire’ auditors and they have an interest in the audited financial 
statements and this interest may conflict with the users (particularly investors) and 
the general public.
28
 At this level, audit regulation is used to protect the investors and 
their interests. 
1.3.2. Technical Justifications of Audit Regulation 
(i) Limitations of self-regulation 
Self-regulation can be defined as the system where the private organisations and 
members of the professions set the standards and apply them.
29
 In other words, under 
a self-regulation regime, both regulation and control are in the hands of the members 
of the profession. There are advantages to self-regulation in terms of flexibility, 
expertise, low application costs, and cross-border application.
30
 In addition, self-
regulation might be attractive for market participants because its legal force is 
relatively limited. 
Unfortunately, self-regulation may not be sufficient to operate the audit market 
efficiently because of imperfections in the market - e.g., the lack of perfect economic 
competition
31
 and information asymmetries
32
. Moreover, the role of self-regulators 
might be restricted. For instance, self-regulators create the rules but enforcement and 
                                                 
28
 William R. Kinney, Jr., ‘Twenty-Five Years of Audit Deregulation and Re-Regulation: What does it 
mean for 2005 and beyond?’ (2005) 24(Supplement) Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 89. 
See also Chapter II, Section 2.2 for the auditor-client relationship.  
29
 Hupkes (n 2) p. 429.   
30
 Ibid.  
31
 Perfect competition requires that (i) no participants (firms) have the market power to influence the 
product price (ii) products must be substitutable (homogeneity), and (iii) low costs of entry to and exit 
from the market. See Robert S. Pindyck and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Microeconomics, (7
th
 edn, Pearson 
Prentice Hall 2009).  
32
 It is possible that investors are not able to qualify the quality of services they receive and therefore, 
verify the accuracy of the information because in general (i) the service provider has more knowledge 
than its recipient; (ii) investors do not have the expertise to read the disclosed information and apply 
them to their investment decisions; and (iii) investors cannot verify the accuracy of the published 
information as there might be omissions, or misrepresentations in the statements. See Carsten Gerner-
Beuerle, ‘The Market for Securities and Its Regulation Through Gatekeepers’ (2009) 23 Temple 
International and Comparative Law Journal pp. 324, 326, 328. 
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monitoring can be carried out by a public agency.
33
 Also, the degree of binding legal 
force of self-regulated rules may vary. Self-regulated rules can be adopted 
voluntarily and no binding force or legal force is involved in the enforcement of self-
regulated rules.
34
 Hence, self-regulators are often less effective in enforcement of 
rules compared with government enforcement. 
Given these conditions, it might not be the best choice to leave the audit market to be 
self-regulated since it is highly concentrated
35
 and asymmetric information output is 
likely.
36
 Furthermore, self-regulation may not always reflect the best interests of the 
public and this could harm the public-interest role of auditing. For instance, in a self-
regulation set-up where rules are prepared by former practitioners in the industry, it 
is likely that they may pursue financial interest outcomes in self-regulatory rules
37
 or 
other powerful actors may impact self-regulators to issue favourable rules for 
themselves.
38 
 (ii) Dealing with audit failures  
An audit failure occurs when material misstatements were not detected,
39
 when there 
are information asymmetries between the users of the audit report (shareholders) and 
the sellers (auditors)
40
 or when auditor independence is damaged. 
Enron is a good example of an audit failure where the auditor (Arthur Andersen) 
failed to detect and report material misstatements in financial statements and helped 
the company to present a false picture of the financial situation of the company to the 
public.
41
 Kaplan et al applied Akerlof’s theory of the market for lemons42 to the 
                                                 
33
 Baldwin and Cave (1999) (n 4) p. 126.  
34
 Ibid.  
35
 For the concentration in the audit market see Chapter II, Section 2.4.   
36
 See Chapter I, Section 2.2. 
37
 Hupkes (n 2) pp. 429-30. 
38
 See also Section 3.2 below.  
39
 Audit failure also occurs when the auditor issues a clean audit report when material misstatement 
existed or the auditor fails to warn the public that the financial statements are not being fairly 
presented by the management. See Alvin A. Arens, Randal J. Elder, and Mark S. Beasley, Auditing 
and Assurance Services (15
th
 edn, Pearson, Boston 2014). 
40
 Steven E. Kaplan, Pamela B. Roush, and Linda Thorne, ‘Andersen and the Market for Lemons in 
Audit Reports’ (2007) 70(4) Journal for Business Ethics 363. 
41
 John C. Coffee, Jr., ‘Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid”’ (2002) 57 
Business Lawyer 1403. 
42
 Akerlof’s theory of the market for lemons is used to explain the information asymmetry in the 
market. The market for second-hand cars is used as an example in this theory to indicate the problem 
of quality uncertainty. The buyer of the used car would not know that he (or she) bought a defective 
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market for the audit reports in Enron case.
43
 Their explanation was that Andersen 
repeatedly issued ‘lemon’ audit reports (i.e. low quality audit reports) due to the 
structure of the audit report market where it generally takes some time for buyers to 
realize the quality of service that they received. Financial auditing as a control 
mechanism is used to reduce such information asymmetry.  
It is said that the audit failures that occurred during the global financial crisis 
revealed the deficiencies in self-regulation.
44
 Audit regulation previously, and now, 
has been used to deal with aftermath of audit failures.
45
 Via regulation, it is intended 
to reduce information inadequacies in the market, and thus the users of the audited 
financial statements can be provided with accurate information. 
(iii) Narrowing the expectations gap  
The other rationale for audit regulation is narrowing the expectations gap. The 
expectations gap is defined as the situation where the auditors are expected to offer 
more than they can actually perform.
46
  
The expectations gap is widest during the time of audit failures, when the profession 
fails to react to meet the expectations of society.
47
 The question of “where were the 
auditors?” is asked each time these failures occur. Market failures are thus seen as 
good opportunities to fix inefficiencies and narrow the expectations gap by issuing 
new regulations.
48
 Regulatory remedies aiming at increased audit quality and re-
assured the auditor independence can be used to meet with society’s expectations as 
to the role of auditors and hence, narrow the expectations gap.
49
  
                                                                                                                                          
used car (i.e. “lemons”) because the inspection on the car is restricted and access to important 
information is not fully granted. See George A. Akerlof, ‘The Market for “Lemons”: Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’ (1970) 84(3) Quarterly Journal of Economics 488. 
43
 Kaplan et al (n 40) p. 430. 
44
 Ibid. 
45
 See Chapter IV for the regulatory responses to Enron and the global financial crisis of 2008.  
46
 John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance (OUP, 2006) p.141. 
See also Chapter II, Section 2.1 for a discussion on the expectations gap.  
47
 For the link between the expectation gap and audit regulation, see Ian P. Dewing and Peter O. 
Russell, ‘UK fund managers, audit regulation and the new Accountancy Foundation: towards a 
narrowing of the audit expectations gap?’ (2002) 17(9) Managerial Auditing Journal 537. See also 
Christopher Humphrey, ’Debating audit expectations’ in Michael Sherer and Stuart Turley (eds), 
Current Issues in Auditing (3
rd
 edn, first printed in 1997, Paul Chapman Publishing, London 2005). 
48
 Kinney (n 28).    
49
 Regulatory remedies on auditor independence and audit quality will be dealt with in greater detail in 
Chapter IV.  
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 (v) Dealing with deficient competition  
Monopolies
50
 are considered as market failures because they create high prices, 
reduce output and transfer income from consumers to producers.
51
 Regulation of 
competition in the market is aimed to mitigate anti-competitive behaviours, and fight 
against monopolies.
52
 Although, at present, the Big Four audit firms dominate the 
audit market, the current structure of the audit market is not a monopoly.
53
  Via audit 
regulation, the concentration in the audit market is intended to be reduced (i.e. the 
rotation of the key audit partner rule in the EU).
54
  
(vi) Coordination of rules and procedures 
Coordination is one of the justifications for audit regulation. Audit regulation 
determines the substance of the audit process and auditing standards in order to 
coordinate the audit market. Through this coordination, the intention is to set a 
rationale benchmark for auditing practices (i.e. ISAs) and auditors’ behaviours (e.g. 
code of ethics for auditors) in order to avoid undesirable applications and behaviours. 
At present, standard-setting for audit practices and auditors’ behaviours are carried 
out by independent institutions at the Member State level, such as the FRC in the 
UK, and by private organisations at the international level, namely the IFAC.
55
  
1.3.3. Timeline of Audit Regulation  
The possible theoretical motives and justification for audit regulation, explained in 
the previous section, will now be applied to the development of audit regulation. For 
this purpose, Figure 3.1 below illustrates the formation of audit regulation in the US 
and in Europe between the 1970s and 2010s. Accordingly, the journey of audit 
                                                 
50
 A monopoly is a market structure wherein one firm controls 100% of the number of clients or fees. 
See Kevin P. McMeeking, ‘Competition in the UK accounting services market’ (2007) 22(2) 
Managerial Auditing Journal 197. 
51
 Baldwin and Cave (1999) (n 4) p. 10.  
52
 See Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union - Part Three: 
Union Policies and Internal Actions - Title VII: Common Rules on Competition, Taxation and 
Approximation of Laws - Chapter 1: Rules on competition - Section 1: Rules applying to 
undertakings, (The Lisbon Treaty), Article 102 (ex Article 82 TEC). Also see Section 3.1.3 below for 
further explanation regarding competition rules and regulation. 
53
 See Section 3.1.3 of this chapter. See also Chapter II, Section 2.4 for the audit market structure.   
54
 Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2006 on statutory 
audits and annual consolidated accounts, amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC 
and repealing Council Directive 84/253/EEC OJ L 157/87, Article 42. See also Chapter IV, Section 
3.3.   
55
 For the role of IFAC in the audit standard setting, see Section 3.2.1 below.  
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regulation starts with the de-regulation trend in the 1970s, followed by a self-
regulation period between the 1980s-1990s, then moving to private regulation with 
statutory adoption in the 2000s, and reaching a re-regulation period in the last 
decade. 
 
Figure 3.1: The Audit Regulation Timeline for the period 1970s-2010s 
To elaborate, in the late 1970s, there was a de-regulation trend in the US. Airlines, 
energy companies, and financial institutions were affected by this trend.
56
 From the 
1980s-1990s the accounting profession was left to self-regulation in the US until 
2004.
57
 The self-regulation regime in auditing included mandatory reviews by other 
auditors (peer review program).
58
 In other words, under the self-regulated peer 
review program, auditors were controlled by other auditors’ reviews. During the 
1990s, changes in the industry called for uniform standards in accounting and 
auditing. In 1991, the IAASB regulatory body of the IFAC created the International 
Standards on Auditing (ISAs). Nevertheless, confidence in the market could not be 
maintained because of the limits of self-regulation particularly in terms of monitoring 
and control.
59
  
Following the Enron scandal and other corporate scandals around the world, self-
regulation was recognised as inefficient. It was observed that financial markets could 
                                                 
56
 Kinney (n 28) p. 94.  
57
 A self-regulation regime was introduced in 1988 after the financial crisis in the mid-1980s. In that 
time, the financial crisis caused a large number of collapses in multiple markets, including in the 
banking sector. In addition, these collapses involved a number of audit failures. See ibid p. 95.  
58
 Gilles Hillary and Clive Lennox, ‘The credibility of self-regulation: Evidence from the accounting 
profession's peer review program’ (2005) 40(1-3) Journal of Accounting and Economics 211. 
59
 Ibid p. 228 
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not be left to pure-self regulation.
60
 In the early 2000s, state regulation was opted 
generally as the public expectations increased on political actions. Correspondingly, 
the SOX
61
 was enacted in 2002 issuing stricter rules for the audit profession, 
including its public oversight.  
The Enron scandal was the catalyst for initiatives in audit regulation at EU level. In 
2003, the European Commission published a Communication entitled ‘Reinforcing 
the Statutory Audit in the EU’ to accept ISAs for the EU.62 Following this 
Communication, the Statutory Audit Directive 2006/43/EC regulated statutory audit 
practices in the EU.
63
 Through this Directive, the application of ISAs was introduced 
to all statutory audits in the EU. This means the EU adopted a harmonised regulatory 
framework for auditing, constituted of the adoption of private-initiated (or 
independent) standards enforced by law.
64
 The new form of self-regulation included 
both public and private authorities in regulation, in addition to the enforcement 
power of the law. This process is called ‘autonomous self-regulation’.65 More 
recently, the global financial crisis highlighted certain issues in auditing and urged 
reform. As a response to audit failures in the global financial crisis in the early 
2010s, audit regulation was also part of re-regulation attempts in the EU.
66
  
Audit regulation has been subject to change through time in accordance with 
developments in financial markets. There is no straightforward answer as to which 
form of regulation is more favourable for auditing because each has its own problems 
and drawbacks at the time of application.
67
  
This section submitted that regulation is needed in the audit market; firstly, because 
adjustments are needed subsequent to financial crisis that involved audit failures; 
                                                 
60
 A pure form of self-regulation is based on voluntary initiatives by private actors from the industry. 
See Hupkes (n 2) p. 428.  
61
 US Congress (2002) An act to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of 
corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes. The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, 107th Congress, H.R. 3763 (The SOX). 
62
 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament ‘Reinforcing the 
statutory audit in the EU’ Brussels, 21.05.2003 COM (2003) 286 final.  
63
 Directive 2006/43/EC (n 54).  
64
 The EU audit policy and laws will be examined in more detail in Chapter IV.  
65
 The shadow of the law involves in the process of regulating by both private actors and public 
authorities. See Hupkes (n 2) p. 428.   
66
 For critical analysis of the EU audit reform in see Chapter IV, Section 3.  
67
 For discussion on the Directive 2006/43/EC and the adoption of ISAs, see Chapter IV, Section 2.2; 
for a general critique on ISAs, see Section 3.2.  
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secondly, financial reporting and auditing has to be modernized in accordance to the 
rising numbers of multinational corporations as a result of globalisation; and lastly, 
there are limitations to self-regulation. The next section will explore the appropriate 
degree of regulation by questioning whether rule- or principle-based regulation is 
preferable in auditing.    
2. HOW: RULES versus PRINCIPLES 
Rules can be formed as general principles or prescriptive provisions (rules). In 
accounting and law literature, the rule- or principle-based debate on standard setting 
has been running for more than 20 years.
68
 The US adopts more rule-based standards, 
with detailed and complex rules, while the UK takes a principle-based approach to 
standard setting.
69
 Debates on this issue sometimes favour the principle-based and 
sometimes the rule-based approach to standard setting. However, it is not entirely 
straightforward to favour one approach over another. The following analysis will 
explain differences between them. Before that it is useful to identify the levels of 
regulation in order to distinguish rules from principles.  
2.1. Levels of Regulation                                                                             
The level of rules ranges from very simple to highly complex. These levels can be 
categorised in three ways.
70
 The simplest level of regulation constitutes of the first 
level that is bright-line rules. Level three is comprised of detailed or complex rules. 
In the middle, principles appear in the form of more general rules.  
1) Bright-line rules: bright-line rules provide clear rules and their application is 
straightforward. 
2) General rules: principles emphasise the general objective. However, the use of 
vague terms makes application more obscure. 
                                                 
68
 David Satava, Cam Caldwell, and Linda Richards ‘Ethics and the Auditing Culture: Rethinking the 
Foundation of Accounting and Auditing’ (2006) 64(3) Journal of Business Ethics 271. See also David 
Alexander and Eva Jermakowicz, ‘A True and Fair View of the Principles/Rules Debate’ (2006) 42(2) 
Abacus 132. 
69
 For a comparison between rules-based and principle-based standards, see Section 2.3 below.  
70
 Black (2008) (n 2) p. 437.  
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3) Detailed/complex rules: Detailed rules provide more certainty than principles 
because they list a number of conditions that needed to be considered for its 
application.  
Table 3.1 illustrates examples of these three types of rules from the traffic and audit 
regulation sectors. 
Regulations Examples 
T
ra
ff
ic
 R
eg
u
la
ti
o
n
 
Bright-line rules The minimum driving age is 17. 
Principles Drive carefully. 
Detailed rules 
You must use headlights when visibility is seriously 
reduced, or when you cannot see for more than 100 
metres (328 feet). You may also use front or rear fog 
lights but you must switch them off when visibility 
improves.71 
A
u
d
it
 R
eg
u
la
ti
o
n
 
Bright-line rules 
All statutory auditors and audit firms shall be subject to 
public oversight.72 
Principles 
The overall objective of the auditor is to obtain 
reasonable assurance about whether the financial 
statements as a whole are free from material 
misstatement.73 
Detailed rules 
Member States shall ensure that the key audit partner(s) 
responsible for carrying out a statutory audit rotate(s) 
from the audit engagement within a maximum period of 
seven years from the date of appointment and is/are 
allowed to participate in the audit of the audited entity 
again after a period of at least two years.74 
Table 3.1: Levels of regulation and examples 
As Table 3.1 shows, there is a positive correlation between the levels of rules and 
their complexity.
75
 In other words, rules become more complex as they become more 
precise. Detailed rules also tend to be more costly since an increased level of 
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 Road Vehicles Lighting Regulations 1989 RVLR No. 1796 (amended in 2005), Regulations 25 and 
27. 
72
 Directive 2006/43/EC (n 54), Article 32(2). 
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 ISA 200, para. 11(a). 
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 Directive 2006/43/EC (n 54), Article 42(2). 
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regulation causes an increase in the cost of regulation.
76
 For instance, the list of 
conditions provided in terms of detailed rules may create more complexity in 
practice because the practitioner would be dependent on rules in every situation. 
Although the flexibility of general rules makes their application more favourable, 
vague terms, such as ‘carefully’ and ‘reasonable assurance’ create ambiguity. 
General rules may become more detailed over time, however, as a result of 
incompliance.  
The next part will examine the characteristics of rules and principles in detail. After 
that, how rules and principles are applied in audit regulation will be explained. 
2.2. Rule-based versus Principle-based Regulation  
Rule-based regulation adopts more detailed and complex rules for every possible 
circumstance. In this respect, such rules provide certainty and predictability. 
However, they are likely to create gaps in application because it is not possible to 
include every possible circumstance in the rulebook. Thus, a new rule is required 
when there is no specific rule for a given situation. This may cause a rapid growth in 
publishing new rules and laws.
77
 Such process in establishing new rules on a 
continuous basis, however, would ultimately cause over-regulation. Moreover, 
detailed rules may result in ‘creative compliance’.78 In other words, they may create 
a system wherein ‘box-ticking’ has become the norm but the objective of the rule is 
disregarded.
79
 
Furthermore, rule-based regulation is likely to be more costly compared with 
principle-based regulation. The various costs of regulation are described as follows: 
formulating legal rules (formulating costs), litigation costs (application of these rules 
in courts), compliance costs (and interpretation of those rules by the public).
80
 
Because rule-based regulation would indicate rules about each specific situation, it 
                                                 
76
 Jackman (n 6) p. 110.  
77
 Surendra Arjoon, ‘Striking a Balance between Rules and Principles-Based Approaches for Effective 
Governance: a Risks-Based Approach’ (2006) 68(1) Journal of Business Ethics 53. 
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 Creative compliance of rules is seen when a person applies a rule regarding to its formal approach 
but violating its purpose. See Julia Black, ‘Using Rules Effectively’ in Christopher McCrudden (ed), 
Regulation and Deregulation: policy and practice in the utilities and financial services industries 
(OUP, Oxford 1999) p. 106.  
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 Louis Kaplow, ‘General Characteristics of Rules’ in John M. Olin (ed), Encyclopaedia of Law and 
Economics (Edward Elgar 2000) 502. 
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should be expected that these costs, especially formulating costs, would be higher 
than for principle-based regulation.  
Principles outline general regulatory objectives and codes of conduct. Principle-
based regulation can be seen as a guide for practitioners to find appropriate moral 
aspects of their decisions on a specific matter.
81
 In other words, while rule-based 
standards set instructions ‘like a computer program’,82 principle-based standards 
intend to provide a code of conduct (e.g. ethical conduct for accountants and 
auditors
83
).   
Despite its simplified definition in the literature, principles-based regulation is 
actually a complex form of regulation because it can take different regulatory forms. 
For instance, although principles are mostly considered as having no legal status or 
no sanction attached to them, they can be legally binding, or disciplinary sanctions 
can be attached to their breach.
84
 As Black states, principles can be incorporated in 
the rulebook (formal principles-based regulation, e.g. the UK Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance
85
), or the principles in the rulebook put into practice by 
regulators (substantive principles-based regulation, e.g. the EU Directive 
2006/43/EC).
86
 The ‘full principles-based regulation’ is the form where the both 
situations exist.
87
 
For an effective application of principle-based regulation, it is necessary that both the 
regulators and the regulated engage in a regulatory conversation determining the 
meaning and application of principles and setting their objectives.
88
 Establishing 
such communication is essential, especially for vague terms used in principles. 
Because the use of vague terms makes application obscure, practitioners may require 
guidance on application. If there is a shared understanding of the meaning of such 
terms between the regulators and the regulated, ambiguity may be reduced.
89
 This is 
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only possible with “responsive regulation”,90 based on constant dialogue between the 
regulators and the regulated.  
Principles are suggested as more suitable in a constantly-changing marketplace.  
While principles can adapt to changes and respond in developing new rules, 
prescriptive rules are difficult to adjust according to changing market 
circumstances.
91
 In addition, principle-based regulation can be regarded as user-
friendly for market practitioners, whereas prescriptive and detailed rules can be 
confusing, particularly for smaller firms because they generally do not have legal 
expertise.
92
  
Criticisms of principle-based regulation focus on content and language. Principles 
are more akin to recommendations on specific circumstances. Often, these 
recommendations include vague terms such as ‘fair’, ‘assurance’, or ‘due care’. 
However, the principle itself does not explain any of these terms. Thus, principles 
arguably cause uncertainty and are not clear.
93
 However, this statement is not entirely 
accurate, because certainty is a relative assessment. As Black pointed out, the 
certainty of principles depends on “who reads it”.94 In other words, ‘providing 
reasonable assurance’ might be unclear for lawyers or others, but it has a meaning 
for accountants. Thus, the use of such terms in principles does automatically not 
make them unclear or uncertain.  
A relatively flexible provision of principle-based regulations can be advantageous 
both for regulators and regulated but can create problems at the same time. As 
argued, flexibility allows firms to comply with a minimum level of conduct where 
investors would be left unprotected, as the enforcement of the general rules is poor.
95
  
2.3. Rule-based versus Principle-based Standards in Auditing 
It is evident from the Enron scandal that rule-based accounting standards can be 
manipulated. Enron’s market value was not based on real values but it was invented 
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using altered accounts.
96
 Enron used special-purpose-entities in order to hide its 
debts and misrepresent their financial situation.
97
 Enron’s accounting chicanery has 
shown that prescriptive accounting rules do not preclude accounting misconduct.  
Principle-based regulation is seen as an alternative to rule-based regulation since 
aggressive reporting is less likely under principle-based accounting standards.
98
 Also, 
it is argued that it is impossible to cover all possible misconduct in the financial 
reports unless there is a discretion power.
99
  
Table 3.2 is inspired by Polacek et al’s100 comparison of IFRS and GAAS. In 
addition to IFRS and GAAS, the US GAAP, UK FRS, UK ISA, and ISA are added 
to the comparison by the author of this thesis.  
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Characte
ristics 
Rule-based Principle-based 
US GAAP 
 
US GAAS 
SAS
101 
UK FRS UK 
ISAs 
IFRS ISA 
Issuer FASB  ASB
102 ASB APB103 IASB IAPC104 
Date 1978 1976 1971 1978 2001 1991 
Quantity 
Large number of rules Small number of principles 
7 concept 
statements 
1-121
105 30 
standards 
in total 
36 
standard
s in total 
1-13 36 
standards 
in total 
Content 
Specific application 
guidance 
Limited application guidance 
What is 
reported 
and how 
the 
accounting 
is 
performed 
Audit 
quality and 
the 
objectives 
to be 
achieved in 
an audit 
Guidance 
statements 
and 
indicators 
of best 
practice 
Explana
tion and 
guidanc
e on 
auditing 
General 
purpose of 
financial 
statements 
Helping 
the auditor 
to perform 
audit work 
in 
reasonable 
assurance 
Purpose 
Prescribe actions of 
individuals 
Guide thinking of individuals 
 
Growth 
+6,100 
words per 
year 
average 
More than 
30 new 
SAS 
issued
106 
Unchange
d 
2 new 
ISAs
107 
Unchanged
108 
Unchange
d
109 
Focus Short-term Long-term 
Table 3.2: Comparison of rule- and principle-based accounting and auditing 
standards 
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In accounting and auditing principle-based standards, e.g. international financial 
reporting standards (IFRS) and international standards on auditing (ISAs) are 
accepted globally. The UK’s standards on auditing are based on ISAs (i.e. ISAs UK 
and Ireland). The EU also follows the UK tradition in accounting and auditing 
regulation. IFRS and ISAs are adopted in the EU by the EU Regulations
110
 and 
Directives
111
. 
One of the justifications of the global trend towards principle-based regulation is the 
UK’s well-functioning financial market regulation formed as principles with a 
“lighter touch” of regulation.112 The other justification is that rule-based standards 
were not able to prevent misconducted statements as even prescriptive rules leave 
gaps that allow for the possibility of such misconduct. It is said there is no major 
difference between the UK and US accounting standards, and that in fact they were 
“almost identical”113. However, principle-based standards are more concerned with 
forming a code of behaviour according to its objectives.
114
 Resultantly, when they 
are applied in practice, applicants showed different behaviours, despite their similar 
structures. It is said that employees of Enron were morally corrupt, but they were 
doing everything in accordance with the rule-based accounting standards of the 
US.
115
 Nonetheless, their amoral business behaviours caused the dramatic collapse of 
the institution. Principles at this level are suggested as guidance for accountants and 
auditors in terms of the development of their ethical behaviours.
116
 As was submitted 
earlier, one of the core incentives of regulation is meeting society’s expectations in 
terms of developing ethical standards.
117
 However, stand-alone rules are not 
sufficient for maintaining professional ethical behaviour of auditors.  
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In today’s financial markets wherein irregularity and continuous change is the norm, 
it might be preferable to regulate the market with more general and flexible standards 
rather than precise rules.
118
 Despite its superior aspects, principle-based regulation 
has its flaws. Regulatory approaches can change direction from lax regulation to 
tougher regulation, and principles can become more detailed and specific as a result 
of non-compliance.
119
 For instance, the US GAAP was drafted from principles but it 
has become more detailed and rule-based over time.
120
 
Conclusion  
On the one hand, principle-based regulation is argued to be superior to rule-based 
regulation because it helps in the adoption of best practice conduct rather than the 
mechanical application of rules. On the other hand, it is said that principles are not as 
effective as rules since their enforcement power is poor. However, it is not possible 
to universally favour one approach over another; rule- or principle-based approaches 
may work better in some countries but not suit others. Countries should be able to 
determine the best approach that suits their market structures.  
In addition, rules and principles are not alternatives to each other but should instead 
be applied as supplementary to the other. In this respect, regulations that constitute 
solely rules or principles are not the solutions; rather, regulations combined with both 
with rules and principles would be optimal for audit regulation. In other words, a 
“tiered approach”121 to audit regulation can be suggested. Accordingly, principles 
and rules should be incorporated in standard settings. In some areas, tougher 
enforcement mechanisms are needed that can be enhanced by rules (e.g. auditor 
liability
122
). Principles can cover gaps and inconsistencies that prescriptive rules 
might create.  
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3. WHO REGULATES AUDIT? 
Audit regulation has a complex structure. Not only state-regulators but also private 
independent regulators are involved in its regulation both at the national and 
international level. First, it will be shown how audit regulation has been integrated 
with the other areas of law, in particular financial markets law, competition law, and 
company law. In this respect, these three areas of law and their relation to audit 
regulation will be identified. State regulation is mostly involved at this level. Second, 
the role of private actors in audit regulation (as self-regulators) will be discussed. 
This part supplements the first section of this chapter, which discussed self-
regulation and its limits from a more theoretical perspective. In the conclusion, this 
section critically questions the role of private actors in audit regulation and how the 
state may influence self-regulators.  
3.1. State Regulation 
Audit regulation cannot be independent of other areas of regulation. From the 
appointment of auditors through to issuing the audit report, there are various parties 
and issues involved in the audit process. These issues include auditors’ relationship 
with the audited company, the regulation of audit conduct, the protection of 
investors, and the liability of auditors to name but a few.  
External auditing is primarily related to the audited company itself and its 
shareholders. Therefore, audit regulation in general is a concern of company law and 
corporate governance principles. In addition, third parties become users of the 
audited financial reports when a public company issues its securities in the securities 
markets and they are involved in this. The relationship between investors and 
auditors is regulated by financial markets laws. The other area of law that overlaps 
with the audit regulation is competition law. Competition law may involve audit 
regulation if competition in the market is distorted by (one of) the dominant big audit 
firms.  
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Figure 3.1: Triadic Structure of Audit Regulation 
As Figure 3.2 illustrates, audit regulation is situated where three areas of law overlap: 
financial market law, company law & corporate governance principles, and 
competition law. As a result of this location, audit regulation is subject to a form of 
regulatory pluralism that involves multiple regulatory bodies. A number of 
governmental and non-governmental organisations regulate and set rules and 
standards that the audit profession will follow. This structure makes audit regulation 
complex. The following sub-sections will identify the regulators in these three fields 
and their role in audit regulation.  
3.1.1. Financial Markets Law  
(i) The need of financial services regulation in general 
The regulation of financial auditing is a part of financial services regulation. 
ESMA
123
 in Europe, FCA
124
 in the UK, and SPK
125
 in Turkey are the responsible 
authorities for the regulation of financial markets. Regulation by these authorities has 
force of law and considers both participants and consumers in financial markets. The 
ultimate objective of financial services regulation is to ensure that financial markets 
operate efficiently with maximum capacity. It is another goal of financial services 
                                                 
123
 The role of ESMA in audit profession supervision will be discussed in limited basis in Chapter IV, 
Section 3.4.  
124
 In April 2013, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulation Authority 
(PRA) have overtaken the responsibilities of the Financial Services Authority (FSA).  
125
 For the roles and responsibilities of the Capital Markets Board of Turkey (SPK), see Chapter VI, 
Section 2.  
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regulation that market confidence is maintained, investor protection is secured, and 
financial crime is reduced. In other words, financial markets regulation is intended to 
protect the market and its participants from unexpected circumstances and 
exploitation.  
(ii) How does this apply to auditing? 
Many countries provide self-regulatory arrangements for their stock exchanges.
126
 
National securities exchanges create and enforce rules for their members based on 
national securities law. For instance, the London Stock Exchange (LSE) has its own 
rules and regulations for all members (i.e. Rules of the LSE) alongside with the 
FSMA 2000
127
. Likewise, Borsa Istanbul in Turkey has its own regulations
128
 
including governance rules, conduct codes, and processes for disciplinary and 
enforcement actions for their members alongside Capital Markets Law.
129
  
Financial markets law regulates the effective operations of the market and ensures 
that investors are protected against false and misleading financial information in 
published accounts and prospectuses. Within this context, regulators impose 
responsibility on auditors under financial markets regulations. The law requires the 
disclosure of periodic financial information for listed companies and to issue 
prospectuses for companies whose securities are offered in the primary market; these 
documents must also be audited.
130
 Under the financial markets regulations,
131
 
auditors could be held liable for the false and misleading information in the periodic 
financial accounts and misstatements in or omissions from prospectuses.
132
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3.1.2. Company Law and Corporate Governance Principles  
(i) The need for company law in general  
The primary function of company law is forming a corporate structure under five 
corporate attributes: legal personality, limited liability, transferable shares, and 
delegated management with a board structure.
133
 By setting the corporate structure, 
company law aims to regulate and facilitate the operations of business firms in a 
more efficient way.  
Beside this objective, the main role of company law is to minimize conflicts of 
interest between participants (e.g. principal and agents; controlling and minority 
shareholders; directors and creditors
134
) and to serve the interests of all those who are 
affected by a firm’s activities including the shareholders, employees, suppliers, and 
customers.
135
 
(ii) How does this apply to auditing? 
Conflicts between auditors and the audited company (i.e. the company management) 
are a form of agency problem.
136
 Company law uses regulatory and governance 
strategies to minimise the conflict between auditors and the audited company.
137
  
The regulatory strategies of company law are mandatory (i) ex ante rules that govern 
the agent’s behaviours to ensure investor and creditor protection and (ii) ex post rules 
that govern the mechanisms for penalizing offenders.
138
 
Ex ante and ex post rules are governed by the Companies Act 2006 in the UK. For an 
example of ex post rules, the Companies Act 2006 imposes liability on auditors if the 
auditor fails to meet their duty of care in the completion of their duties.
139
 To give an 
                                                 
133
 Reiner Kraakman et al, The Anatomy of Corporate Law (2
nd
 edn, OUP, Oxford 2009).  
134
 John Armour, ‘Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC Legislation versus Regulatory Competition’ 
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example for ex ante rules, auditors are required to be independent from the audited 
company in order to avoid any conflict.
140
 
In addition to regulatory strategies, governance strategies are used to facilitate a 
control mechanism over the agent’s behaviour via principles and default rules.141 
Good governance strategies are associated with best practices that mainly lay out 
board and committee structures.
142
 Governance strategies are mainly carried out by 
corporate governance principles and codes of ethics. For example, the UK Combined 
Code is applied as default rules. There is no legal obligation for listed companies to 
adopt the provisions of the corporate governance principles, but listed companies are 
obliged to report annually whether they comply with code provisions or explain the 
reasons for noncompliance.
143
 
For example, in terms of auditing, the UK Corporate Governance Code recommends 
that listed firms establish an audit committee formed of independent directors.
144
 
Additional recommendations can also be attached to corporate governance 
principles. For example, the objectivity rule of the International Code of Ethics does 
not tolerate any relationship that might influence the professional judgement of 
auditors.
145
 Governance strategies of company law are important because they can 
apply reputational sanctions to auditors.
146
 For instance, auditors face reputational 
sanctions if their independence is compromised. Thus, corporate governance 
principles and codes of ethics for auditors are good strategies to be attached to 
statutory company law rules as additional governance mechanisms.  
3.1.3. Competition Law  
(i) The need for competition law in general 
Competition is a market structure that enables a number of firms to operate in a 
market and ensures that none of these firms have excessive market power that may 
                                                 
140
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damage the effective function of the market.
147
 Competition law, in this respect, aims 
to prompt effective competition via the prevention of anti-competitive practices, such 
as predatory pricing, territory division, and any other business practices that may 
create competitive disadvantage for other participants.
148
   
An effective competition policy is considered the most essential factor in terms of the 
creation of a single market within the EU. The Treaty of Lisbon
 
prohibits “any 
abuse
149
 by one or more undertakings of a dominant position.”150 It means that whilst 
a dominant position in a market does not solely constitute a breach of competition, 
any abuse of that position (e.g. price fixing) would. According to the Lisbon Treaty 
Protocol on the internal market and competition, the European Union will take 
necessary action in order to ensure competition is not distorted.
151
 The European 
Commission has the authority to develop legal rules and procedures in accordance 
with the EU’s competition policy.  
(ii) How does this apply to auditing?  
Currently, the EU audit market structure is characterised as an oligopoly where there 
are only a few main service providers: the Big Four audit firms.
152
 The current 
market structure may not constitute a risk for competition; however, competition in 
the market is likely to be distorted if one of the main players withdraws from the 
market. It is the responsibility of the European Commission and the competition 
authorities to prompt the competition and take regulatory measures regarding risks to 
a distortion of competition.   
In 1997, the European Commission carried out a number of investigations into the 
proposed merger between Pricewaterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand. Despite 
                                                 
147
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concerns, the European Commission approved the merger,
153
 stating there was no 
proof the merger would create or strengthen a position of dominance.
154
 Moreover, 
none of the Member States’ competition authorities issued any objections to the 
proposed merger at that time.
155
 
Even though the audit market has gradually become more concentrated and this has 
created some concerns, competition authorities have not issued concerns until 
recently.
156
 Therefore, it is not certain whether the European Commission or 
competition authorities will take action and issue any regulatory steps to change the 
market structure.
157
  
3.1.4. Conclusion 
It is submitted that audit regulation is situated wherein the three areas of law, namely 
the financial markets law, company law and competition law overlap. Firstly, 
financial markets law governs auditor liability rules regarding third parties. The 
purpose is to eliminate exploitation and fraud and ensure trust is maintained in 
markets. Secondly, company law governs the mandatory rules and practice 
guidelines for auditors. Default and mandatory rules of company law specify how a 
firm will operate in the best way. Default rules of company law, such as corporate 
governance principles and codes of ethics for auditors can be used as effective 
governance strategies. Thirdly, competition law seeks to facilitate the maximum 
level of competitive conditions in the markets. As regards auditing, the main 
objectives of competition law would be eliminating barriers to entry to the market 
and reducing the concentration level.
158
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market. See Richard Crump, ‘Competition Commission aims to break Big Four dominance’ 
Accountancy Age 22 February 2013.   
157
 Regulatory measures on the concentration in the audit market will be discussed further in Chapter 
IV, Section 3.3 below.  
158
 See also Chapter IV, Section 3.3.  
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Audit regulation has a complex structure at both national and international levels. In 
addition to state actors, private actors also play a role in audit regulation. The next 
part will analyse the role of private actors in audit regulation. 
3.2. Industry Self-Regulation  
Private actors, alongside state actors, play a role in audit regulation. Private 
regulation, or in other words, industry self-regulation, co-exists with state regulation. 
In auditing, associations of audit profession set up voluntary codes of conducts, e.g. 
ASB in the UK and IAASB at international level. The influence of state and private 
regulators might vary at national, regional and international level in terms of their 
political power and legislative influence. This is illustrated in Table 3.3 and will be 
explained in more detail below.   
Levels 
Private State 
Regulation Power Regulation Power 
National 
Possible 
(e.g. the ASB in the 
UK) 
Possible 
(e.g.UK corporate 
governance 
principles created 
by a  private 
sector initiative) 
Yes 
(e.g. UK 
Companies Act 
2006, Chapter 2 
appointment of 
auditors) 
Yes 
Regional  
(here: EU) 
Not directly but 
through the 
endorsement of 
international 
private regulation 
(e.g.; ISAs) 
Some 
(e.g. the Big Four) 
Yes  
(e.g. Directive 
2006/43/EC) -
though no 
comprehensive 
harmonisation 
in EU 
Yes 
International  
Yes (through ISAs 
by IAASB) 
Yes 
(e.g. the Big Four) 
No 
Yes (political 
influence; 
World Bank and 
IMF members 
of IFAC’s 
advisory 
committee) 
Table 1.3: Private and state regulation of auditing at national, regional, and 
international levels 
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Table 3.3 summarises the political (or social) influence and regulatory powers of 
state regulators and private actors involved in auditing regulation. As Table 3.3 
illustrates, state actors are more active in national-level regulation. Private actors in 
turn, are more active at the international level, in particular in terms of standard 
setting. Industry self-regulation may provide some benefits for participants in the 
industry who are willing to improve their own conduct. For instance, industry self-
regulation might be able to identify weaknesses in a given industry where the state 
regulators may not have sufficient expertise and information on the subject matter. 
Nevertheless, unlike state regulators, private regulators might not always pursue 
public interest.
159
 Industry self-regulators may have an incentive to favour one 
particular group when setting standards (i.e. a self-serving bias).
160
 In addition, 
private regulators are likely to be motivated by gaining financial benefits.
161
 
Moreover, enforcement of private-initiated standards is weak. At this level, state 
regulators step up the regulatory process. For instance, the European Commission is 
engaged with the regulatory process through the endorsement of ISAs.
162
 Moreover, 
the state may be involved in the international regulatory process through its political 
influence. These issues will be discussed further in the following. 
3.2.1. IFAC and Its Standard Setting Bodies: the IASB and the IAASB 
IFAC is an international private organisation that plays an active role in audit 
standard setting and governance of ethics and practice of auditors. IFAC is based in 
New York City and its board members include European countries (UK; France; 
Germany), Asian countries (India; Japan; China), and other important countries (US; 
Brazil).
163
 The IFAC Council is responsible for the governance of IFAC and it 
involves representatives from each member country and the IFAC board.
164
 The 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the International Auditing and 
Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) are the key standard setting bodies that operate 
                                                 
159
 Baldwin and Cave argue that state regulators often pursue the best interests of the public when 
creating new regulations. See Baldwin and Cave (1999) (n 4) p. 9. 
160
 Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton, and Ailsa Röell, ‘Corporate Law and Governance’ in A. M. Polinsky 
and S. Shavell (eds), Handbooks of Law and Economics (Volume 2, Elsevier 2007) p. 829.  
161
 Michael Clarke, Regulation: The Social Control of Business Between Law and Politics 
(Macmillan, New York 1999) p. 49.  
162
 For the discussion on ISAs, see Section 3.2.2 below.  
163
 Turkey is also a member of IFAC and the relevant associations are the Expert Accountants' 
Association of Turkey and the Union of Chambers of Certified Public Accountants of Turkey 
(TÜRMOB). 
164
 Facts about IFAC are available at http://www.ifac.org/  accessed 27/11/2013. 
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under IFAC. Standards set by these private organisations are accepted and adopted 
globally.
165
 As of November 2013, IFAC has 179 members and associations in 130 
countries and jurisdictions.
166
  
The members of these private organisations are mainly from Anglo-Saxon countries. 
This means that these international private organisations are dominated by the US 
and UK. IFAC’s board is constituted of 22 members mainly from the Anglo-Saxon 
countries. Moreover, members are current and former practitioners in the accounting 
or auditing fields.
167
 For instance, 16 board members are from auditing profession: as 
of November 2012, 7 members are former audit partners of the Big Four, 1 member 
is a partner of the world’s fifth biggest accounting firm (BDO) and 2 members used 
to be partners of Arthur Andersen.
168
 
The audit profession, in particular the largest audit firms (i.e. the Big Four), also has 
a great influence on these standard-setting bodies.
169
 Their influence on audit 
regulation has become more apparent as they become important institutionalized 
global actors in financial markets.
170
 Their powerful lobbies help them get involved 
in audit regulation or at least leave an impact on the process. For instance, the Big 
Four firms are widely represented in the auditing standard setter’s board, in that the 
majority of the IAASB’s board members are from the Big Four firms.171 This 
domination is likely to create conflict between the profession and the regulators. The 
Big Four firms are commercialised institutions that seek to maximize their profits.
172
 
However, as said, private regulators of the audit profession have a public interest 
role. The public interest role of standard-setting bodies will be critically discussed 
next.  
 
                                                 
165
 Although the US is a member of the IFAC, US GAAS is applied in the US. In 2012, the Auditing 
Standards Board of the US declared plans to harmonise GAAS with ISAs. See IFAC Member Body 
Compliance Program Basis of ISA Adoption by Jurisdiction, August 2012 p. 26.  
166
 See IFAC’s website http://www.ifac.org/about-ifac/membership accessed 25/11/2013.  
167
 Dewing and Russell (n 2).  
168
 See IFAC’s website http://www.ifac.org/about-ifac/structure-governance/board accessed 
25/11/2013. 
169
 Tom Lee, ‘The professionalization of accountancy: A history of protecting the public interest in a 
self-interested way’ (1995) 8(4) Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal 48.  
170
 Loft et al (n 3) p. 438. 
171
 Ibid.  
172
 Prem Sikka, ‘Enterprise culture and accountancy firms: new masters of the universe’ (2008) 21(2) 
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal 268.   
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The Public Interest Roles of the IFAC and Its Standards-Setting Bodies 
IFAC has maintained its goal to promote high-quality standards in accounting and 
auditing and to speak for issues in the public interest.
173
  It should be discussed what 
kind of public interest is intended to be served by the IFAC and its boards, however. 
The public interest role of the audit profession can be understood as the profession’s 
commitment to fulfil its responsibilities in a way that its actions, decisions and 
policies serve the best interest of the public in terms of the availability of transparent 
and reliable financial reports, and efficiency and economic certainty for markets.
174
 
Each of the standard-setting bodies of IFAC has an advisory committee, named the 
Consultative Advisory Groups, and constituted of international organisations and 
trade associations, including the World Bank, IMF, Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) and European Commission.
175
 These institutions govern 
monetary and political policies globally. Their influence on the standard bodies of 
IFAC is inevitable. This might therefore create conflict between these institutions 
and IFAC’s bodies. There is a potential risk that these organisations might use 
private actors and standard-setting bodies in pursuit of their political goals. For 
instance, in the EU, IFAC’s international auditing standards (ISAs) do not apply 
automatically but have to be implemented by the European Commission.
176
 
Accordingly, the European Commission adopts standards by Commission 
Regulation, and standards become binding in all Member States. As argued, this 
endorsement mechanism is likely to create opportunities to influence standard-setting 
bodies.
177
 For instance, Member States may object to some rules if said rules do not 
reflect the business conduct in their national environment.
178
 Thus, the European 
Commission would have to negotiate with standard-setters or would have to carve 
out some provision in order to adapt the rules for all Member States. In fact, the EU 
has strong negotiation power with regards standard-setting bodies. For instance, the 
EU is highly represented in the boards of these private bodies: 6 out of 22 members 
                                                 
173
 IFAC, ‘Facts about IFAC’ April 2011, New York. 
174
 See IFAC, ‘A Definition of the Public Interest’ Policy Position 5, June 2012.  
175
 Dewing and Russell (n 2) p. 12.  
176
 Directive 2006/43/EC (n 54), Article 26. 
177
 Andreas M. Fleckner, ‘FASB and IASB: Dependence Despite Independence’ (2008) 3 Virginia 
Law and Business Review 275.  
178
 In 2003, France objected to the adoption of the accounting rule for derivatives (IAS 39), stating 
that this rule would have harmful effects on financial stability deriving from France’s cultural 
differences in accounting. See ibid pp. 288-9.    
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represent the EU on the IFAC board, and 5 out of 10 members represent the EU on 
the IAASB board.
179
 Therefore, the EU is likely to have an influence on IFAC’s 
standard-setting bodies. 
In 2005, the Public Interest Oversight Board (PIOB) was created by the International 
Federation of Accountants (IFAC). The PIOB is committed to the role of monitoring 
the IFAC and it aims to function in the best interest of the public and ensure they are 
not exploited by these institutions. The objective of the PIOB is determined as to 
produce high-quality auditing standards in the public interest.
180
 The establishment of 
the PIOB and the involvement of advisory mechanisms from out of the profession 
were intended to eliminate any self-serving bias so that IFAC’s standard-setting 
bodies would no longer serve the dominant players in the audit industry. In other 
words, the influence of the profession on standard-setting was intended to be 
eliminated via the PIOB’s overseeing of the standard-setting process.  
However, the current board structure of the PIOB does not seem to satisfy its public 
interest notion. The members of the PIOB are chosen by a monitoring group whose 
members are drawn from the same financial market regulatory organisations that also 
have representatives in the advisory groups of IFAC. These organisations are the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the World Bank, the Financial 
Stability Forum, and the International Organizations of Securities Commission. 
These are the most influential “likeminded” organisations representing the financial 
market regulatory community.
181
 
In principle, IFAC and its standard-setting bodies are independent. However, in 
practice, in addition to political influence, financial influence is also pervasive. 
IFAC’s budget is funded by its member bodies,182 mainly by the members of the 
Forum of Firms (FOF)
183. Also, in 2011, PIOB received a grant of €286,000 from the 
                                                 
179
 Ibid.    
180
 See PIOB’s website http://www.ipiob.org/index.php/how-the-piob-operates accessed 25/11/2013.  
181
 Loft et al (n 3) p.435.   
182
 The top 42 member bodies of the IFAC raised a $1.7 million for IFAC’s budget. See IFAC, Annual 
Report, 2011 p. 70.  
183
 FOF is an organisation established under IFAC especially for accounting firms that perform 
transnational audit. Its founder members are BDO, Deloitte, EY, Grant Thornton, KPMG, and PwC. 
Members of the FOF are obliged to make a financial contribution to the organisation. See Forum of 
Firms, Constitution, Article 5(b).  
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European Commission.
184
 Private regulators’ economic dependence on audit 
profession is also the case in the UK. Accountancy firms, namely the Big Four, have 
been active in the audit regulation field since the establishment of the Accounting 
Standards Board (ASB, formerly APC) in 1976.
185
 Sikka argues that ASB is 
controlled by ‘capital’ (i.e. the Big Four) when explaining the economic influence of 
the major audit firms on the UK standard-setting body.
186
  
In conclusion, it is questionable as to what extent private standard-setting bodies 
fulfil their public interest notion since there is a high influence of political and 
commercialised institutions on auditing standard setting. The next part will continue 
with a short history of the creation and adoption of international standards on 
auditing (ISAs).  
3.2.2. International Standards on Auditing (ISAs)  
IFAC has the aim of creating high-quality audit standards and promoting their global 
adoption.
187
 As a private international regulator, the creation of the international 
standards on auditing (ISA) is a success for IFAC when considering its world-wide 
application.  
The first international guidelines on auditing were issued by the International 
Auditing Practices Committee (the predecessor of the IAASB) in 1977.
188
 
Ultimately, in October 1992, ISA was accepted on capital markets as a reference for 
international auditing standards by the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO).
189
 
From 2004 to 2008, ISAs were subject to a number of modifications, called as the 
‘Clarity Project’, under the supervision of the IAASB.190 This clarity project was 
carried out under the oversight of the PIOB and aimed to improve the clarity of the 
                                                 
184
 IFAC Annual Report, 2011 p. 71.  
185
 Sikka (2002) (n 1) p. 98.  
186
 Ibid p. 104.  
187
 See Section 3.2.1 above.  
188
 In 2001, IAPC was reformed by IFAC and became the International Auditing and Assurance 
Standard Board (IAASB). 
189
 Hanno Merkt, ‘International Standards on Auditing and Their Adoption in the EU: legal aspects 
and unsettled questions’ in Michael Tison et al (eds) Perspectives in Company Law and Financial 
Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 2009) p.246. 
190
 For the chronological modification and final clarity project of ISAs, see Daries Schockaert and 
Nathalie Houyoux, ‘International Standards on Auditing within the European Union’ Forum 
Financier/Revue Bancaire et Financiére 2007/8 515. 
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standards.
191
 Although ISAs were redrafted in the favour of public interest
192
, it was 
claimed IFAC’s public interest approach is encapsulated in oversight or supervision 
mechanisms (i.e. through the PIOB) rather than representation and participation in 
standard-setting activities.
193
  
The IAASB completed the Clarity Project in March 2009. The final set of clarified 
standards consisted of 36 ISAs and International Standard on Quality Control (ISQC) 
1.
194
 Current ISAs are numbered per topic, from series 200 on the responsibility of 
the auditor until series 700 and 800 on reporting. Each clarified ISA is set by a 
uniform structure that consists of an objective, a requirements section, and finally the 
application material.
195
 Accordingly, ISAs require that the independent auditor 
achieves the objectives that are specified under each ISA and exercises their own 
professional judgement alongside their professional scepticism.
196
 Furthermore, the 
auditor would be expected to identify and assess risks that might derive from fraud or 
error and obtain adequate evidence in the case of any misstatements. The overall 
objective of the auditor is defined as concluding an opinion about whether the 
financial statements are free from misstatement and this opinion should be obtained 
in accordance with the auditor’s findings.197   
These requirements reflect the principle-based origins of ISAs, as the standards do 
not cover all issues and circumstances. Instead, they authorize the auditor to perform 
any necessary procedure in the light of their professional judgement.
198
 However, 
auditors should place particular emphasis on obtaining sufficient evidence about the 
reliability of financial statements rather than performing procedures. In other words, 
the main objective of the auditors should be to present an opinion drawn from the 
audit evidence obtained, with all necessary steps taken for the sake of this objective.  
                                                 
191
 IAASB Exposure Draft, Improving the Clarity of IAASB Standards, October 2005. 
192
 Speech by Aulana L. Peters, ‘The Value of Public Oversight of International Standard Setting For 
Audits’ Gabarone, Botswana, 29 April 2011.  
193
 Loft et al (n 3) p.430.  
194
 The complete listing for ISAs and ISQC 1 see the IASSB website at http://web.ifac.org/clarity-
center/the-clarified-standards accessed 26/11/2013.  
195
 IAASB Exposure Draft (n 191) 
196
 IFAC, Handbook of International Quality Control, Auditing, Review, Other Assurance, and 
Related Services Pronouncements, Edition Part I, New York April 2010 p.73.  
197
 ISA 200, para. 11.  
198
 Merkt (n 189) p.259.  
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According to IFAC’s Compliance Programme,199 as of August 2012, 126 
jurisdictions around the world (including all 27
200
 Member States of the EU) adopted 
ISAs.
201
 The countries that did not adopt ISAs are mainly developing African (e.g. 
Angola, Chad, Congo, Ethiopia, Niger, Somalia, Sudan, and Suriname) and Arabic 
countries (e.g. Syria, Oman, Sudan, and Algeria). The only European countries to 
have not adopted ISAs are Macedonia and Liechtenstein.  
32 countries, including the UK adopted ISAs without any modifications.
202
 In these 
countries, there are no other national auditing standards, so they adopted ISAs 
without any modifications or any other additional requirements. In the UK, the 
Auditing Practices Board (APB)
203
 has adopted the clarified ISAs as ISAs (UK and 
Ireland).
204
 The UK issued revised ISAs in October 2009 and required their 
application to all audits of financial statements for periods ending on or after 
December 2010.
205
 29 countries, including France Germany, China, and India 
adopted ISAs with some national modifications. 11 countries, mostly including 
European countries, such as Bulgaria, Estonia, and Latvia, have required the 
application of ISAs by national law or regulation.
206
 
The UK adopted ISAs without any national modifications, whereas other European 
countries, such as France and Germany, issued a number of additional requirements. 
The reason of this may be the Anglo-Saxon domination on IFAC and its auditing 
standard-setting bodies. It is known that the UK’s auditing standard-setter body 
(ASB) was directly involved in redrafting ISAs in the Clarity Project. ASB’s 
involvement in redrafting procedure was advantageous for the UK in terms of 
standards’ suitability to the UK accounting system and business conduct. Thus, the 
UK’s adoption of ISAs into its national law might have been easier than for other 
European countries’.  
                                                 
199
 IFAC Compliance Program (n 165).  
200
 Croatia joined the EU in July 2013 thus it was not included in IFAC’s Compliance Program of 
2012.  
201
 At EU level, the implementation of ISAs is carried out by the European Commission through its 
endorsement mechanism. National lawmakers need to transform ISAs into national legislations and 
laws under the supervision of the European Commission. See also Chapter IV, Section 2.2.  
202
 IFAC Compliance Program (n 165) p. 8.  
203
 As of July 2012, the role of setting auditing standards is assigned to the Auditing and Assurance 
Council.  
204
 Companies Act 2006, s. 504.  
205
 APB Staff Paper, Summary of the Main Changes in the New ISAs (UK and Ireland), October 2009  
206
 IFAC Compliance Program (n 165). 
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According to IFAC, 54 other countries are either in the process of the translation of 
ISAs, or have already declared the adoption of ISAs, but are still in the adoption 
process. For instance, the Greek Accounting and Auditing Oversight Board 
established an objective to adopt ISAs, yet they are currently in the process of 
translation.
207
 Some jurisdictions indicated that their national standards are based on 
ISAs, as is the case in Turkey.
208
 However, the degree of consistence of these 
standards with ISAs is not clear.
209
 In other words, it is subjective as to what extent 
Turkey’s national standards coincide with ISAs.  
Overall, the adoption process of clarified ISAs is underway globally. It can be said 
that the adoption process of the revised ISAs has concluded with success to some 
degree. Although there have been some modifications and additional requirements 
involved, the adoption of the revised ISAs reached 126 jurisdictions worldwide, to 
serve the goal of the integration of markets and increase comparability.  
Despite the problems regarding the adoption problems and selective adoption of 
ISAs which means some countries agreed to adopt only specific provisions,
210
 there 
are overall some specific positive outcomes of these uniform auditing standards. To 
begin with, it is accepted that harmonised auditing standards across the EU ensures 
comparability and reduces the complexity of auditing as it makes application 
easier.
211
 Also, complex cross border transactions are, in general, subject to the 
audits of large corporate clients and their affiliations. With harmonised auditing 
standards, mistakes previously derived from the complexity of cross-border auditing 
can be avoided.
212
 Finally, it can be accepted uniform standards may encourage 
investors to go cross-border and hence, may stimulate the global economy.  
3.3. Conclusion 
This section had the aim of answering the question of who regulates auditing. It has 
been shown that, in addition to state regulation, the profession is given a role in 
setting its own standards. State regulators are involved in audit regulation through 
                                                 
207
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208
 For the adoption of ISAs by Turkey, see Chapter VI, Section 2.3.  
209
 IFAC Compliance Program (n 165) p.19. 
210
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212
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financial services law, competition law, and company law. The state is not directly 
involved in auditing standard-setting. The auditing standard-setting role is delegated 
to the profession itself. However, this is not a traditional form of self-regulation.  
It has been shown that current audit regulations do not represent a traditional form of 
self-regulation. In appearance, audit regulation looks like professionally enforced 
self-regulation wherein the state allowed the profession to set its own standards. 
However, it is often a government body (e.g. FRC in the UK) that supervises the 
accounting profession. Moreover, private independent regulators (i.e. IFAC) have 
close links with inter-governmental actors that are active in financial markets era, 
such as the IMF, World Bank, and European Commission. These influential and 
powerful regulatory organisations undertake the role to ‘advise’ and ‘monitor’ the 
IFAC standard setting bodies. Thus, it is difficult to expect these standard-setting 
bodies to be independent of the political influence of states. It is likely that conflict 
between the regulatory approaches of different participants would appear because of 
the political pressures and lobbying activities of powerful actors
213
 - be it dominant 
accountancy firms (e.g. the Big Four) or inter-governmental organisations (e.g. the 
IMF; the World Bank). 
To conclude, industry self-regulation of auditing operates in the shadow of the state 
at two levels: First, states control the audit profession indirectly via national private 
supervisory authorities given statutory powers, such as FRC in the UK. Second, the 
public-interest role of IFAC and its standard-setting bodies is restricted via the 
political influence of advisory and monitoring groups. Moreover, IFAC’s public-
interest notion is likely to be hindered due to its economic reliance on accountancy 
firms.  
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has made a number of contributions to the literature. The first section 
theoretically explored the need for audit regulation and the motives and justifications 
for regulation. In this respect, it is submitted that audit regulation is needed, dealing 
with the expectations gap, the aftermath of audit failures, information asymmetries, 
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and the risk of competition distortion in the market. The second section sought to 
show the appropriate degree of audit regulation and contributed to the debate on rules 
versus principles. It is not suggested that one approach is per se preferable. Rules 
have the advantage of clarity. Yet, principles in audit regulation are often more 
effective in terms of maintaining a set of ethical standards and helping the audit 
profession in the development of their professional behaviour. The triadic structure 
of audit regulation was presented in the third section. It was shown that both private 
and state regulators have a role to play in audit regulation. In this respect, it was 
illustrated that state and private regulators influence audit regulation at national, 
regional (i.e. EU) and international level. Although the main role of the state appears 
in law-making, the state is also indirectly involved in the standard-setting process, 
through political and commercial benefit seeking. The contributions of this chapter 
help to explain the audit regulation better.  
This chapter concludes as follows. The triad-structure of auditing makes auditing 
different from the traditional form of industry self-regulation. In principle, private 
regulators set standards for the profession; however, their powers are limited by the 
state through financial markets regulation (i.e. oversight by financial services 
authorities regarding the conduct of the audit profession and compliance with 
standards). State and private actors might have different motives and intentions 
regarding regulation. In addition, the dominant accountancy firms have a great 
influence on the private standard-setting bodies of IFAC. The political desires of the 
state regulators and the economic interests of ‘commercialised firms’214 in standard-
setting might hinder the primary role of IFAC, which is to serve the public interest.   
IFAC and its standard-setting bodies have become important organisations in terms 
of private regulation of auditing as ISAs have been adopted globally. The EU has 
contributed to the global adoption of international auditing standards by recognising 
ISAs as the basis for audits across the EU.
215
 The next chapter will explore EU audit 
policy under its long-standing single market objective and discuss laws on auditing, 
particularly the Audit Directive 2006/43/EC. The EU audit reform as a response to 
the global financial crisis will also be critically discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF EU AUDIT 
POLICY AND LAWS IN TERMS OF CONVERGENCE 
INTRODUCTION  
The previous chapter presented the forms of regulation and discussed how national, 
regional (i.e. the EU), and international actors are involved in the law making of 
auditing.
1
 This chapter will focus on EU laws on auditing and identify its policy 
factors. Issues like the expectations gap, auditor independence, and concentration in 
the audit market have been already discussed.
2
 This chapter will supplement previous 
chapters by providing a legal perspective and will critically discuss regulatory 
remedies for these issues.  
The aim of this chapter is to question the regulatory responses of the EU to audit 
failures both in Enron and in the global financial crisis and how the regulatory 
approach of the European Commission will evolve for future law reforms. The 
analysis of this chapter contributes to existing literature by examining preliminary 
audit issues while discussing possible solutions within the context of the reform 
proposals in the EU.  
This chapter starts by identifying the policy objectives of the EU in terms of audit 
regulation. The first section will submit that EU law on auditing has been determined 
by two concepts: the harmonisation of accounting and auditing rules under the single 
market objective, and dealing with audit failures after corporate scandals and 
financial crises. In this respect, the second section will provide a critical analysis of 
existing Audit Directive 2006/43/EC
3
 and the reform proposals of the European 
Commission.
4
 There are specific audit issues that have been subject to a number of 
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 See Chapter III.  
2
 See Chapter II.  
3
 Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2006 on statutory 
audits and annual consolidated accounts, amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC 
and repealing Council Directive 84/253/EEC OJ L 157/87. 
4
 For EU proposals for a Directive amending the Directive 2006/43/EC and the Regulation proposal 
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debates since Enron, such as the expectations gap, auditor independence, and the 
domination of large audit firms in the market. After the global financial crisis, these 
issues received attention from the EU regulators once again.
5
 The third and final 
section of this chapter will closely examine regulatory proposals
 
for these prevailing 
audit issues.  
This chapter concludes with the following: the existing Directive 2006/43/EC has 
partly helped the long-standing single market objective of the EU. The current law 
proposals of the Commission aim to increase the level of harmonisation by forming a 
single market for auditing in the EU. However, there is still room for debate until the 
regulators have reached a conclusion. 
1. THE DETERMINANTS OF EU AUDIT POLICY AND LAWS 
This chapter determines two aspects of EU audit policy and laws: internal and 
external perspectives. Internal perspective views that EU audit policy and laws are 
determined by the EU’s long-standing single market objective. According to the 
external perspective, the effects of audit failures are the main determinants of EU 
audit policy and laws. This chapter suggests that the law on auditing in the EU has 
mainly been structured to date according to these two factors, which will be 
explained respectively.  
1.1. Internal Perspective: the single market objective  
The audit policy of the EU has followed the form of integration of markets under the 
single market
6
 aim, including the harmonisation of accounting and auditing rules.
 
The harmonisation of accounting standards and increased transparency requirements 
are considered integral parts of the single market objective by the Commission.
7
  In 
1999, the European Commission published a Communication launching the 
Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) that consists of a number of measures applied 
                                                 
5
 European Commission Green Paper Audit Policy: Lessons from the Crisis Brussels, 13.10.2010 
COM(2010) 561 final (Audit Green Paper). 
6
 A single market ensures the removal of barriers in financial markets wherein the same service would 
be available throughout the EU and the legal environment is consistent. See The EU Financial 
Services Action Plan: A Guide Prepared by HM Treasury, FSA and the Bank of England, 31 July 
2003. 
7
 International Finance Corporation, The EU approach to Corporate Governance, Washington D.C. 
International Finance Corporation/Global Corporate Governance Forum, p. 3.  
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by 2005 serving the objective of achieving a single market across the EU.
8
 As 
outcomes, a number of directives and regulations were enacted under FSAP 
measures, including the Fair Value Accounting Directive
9
 and the Transparency 
Directive
10
. Following the Fair Value Accounting Directive, international accounting 
standards apply to all listed companies across the EU for each financial year starting 
on or after 1 January 2005.
11
 The Transparency Directive provided enhanced 
minimum disclosure standards for European public companies, such as the 
requirement for audited annual financial statements.
12
 Accordingly, listed companies 
must prepare their consolidated accounts in accordance with IFRS and have their 
accounts audited in accordance with the EU Statutory Audit Directive 2006/43/EC.
13
   
FSAP had an important role in ensuring the integration of markets across the EU via 
harmonisation.
14
 According to FSAP measures, the EU followed a strategy based on 
the adoption of uniform standards for an effective harmonisation.
15
 Auditing 
harmonisation is carried out by post-FSAP directives under the Action Plan on 
Modernising Company Law
16
 and the Statutory Audit Directive 2006/43/EC.
17
   
                                                 
8
 Communication from the Commission of 11 May 1999 Implementing the framework for financial 
markets: Action Plan [COM(1999) 232 final - Not published in the Official Journal]. 
9
 Directive 2001/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 
amending Directives 78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC and 86/635/EEC as regards the valuation rules for the 
annual and consolidated accounts of certain types of companies as well as of banks and other financial 
institutions OJ L 283/28. Accounting directive has been revised in 2013. See Directive 2013/34/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, 
consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending 
Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council 
Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC OJ L 182/19. 
10
 Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the 
harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities 
are admitted to trading on a regulated market (as amended by Directive 2013/50/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013). 
11
 Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 July 2002 on 
the application of international accounting standards. The application of standards is carried out by the 
Commission’s endorsement mechanism. 
12
 Directive 2004/109/EC (as amended) (n 10), Article 4.  
13
 Ibid.  
14
 FSAP measures were adopted with a 98% success rate by 2005.  See European Commission, FSAP 
Evaluation Part I: Process and Implementation p. 3.  
15
 Ian Dewing and Peter O. Russell, ‘Financial Integration in the EU: the First Phase of EU 
Endorsement of International Accounting Standards’ (2008) 46(2) Journal of Common Market Studies 
243. 
16
 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Modernising 
Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union - A Plan to Move 
Forward, Brussels, 21.05.2003 COM (2003) 284 final. 
17
 See Section 2.1 below.  
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1.2. External Perspective: effects of corporate scandals and financial crises  
Subsequent to the Enron scandal, SOX came into force in 2002 in the US.
18
 The 
enactment of SOX had a direct effect on EU law in accounting and auditing.
19
 This is 
because SOX brought restrictive regulations, such as the prohibition of non-audit 
services
20
 and public oversight over profession
21
 for not only the audits of US listed 
companies but also non-US companies and its auditors with a US market listing.
22
 It 
means that SOX provisions also apply to foreign public accounting firms preparing 
an audit report for US companies and to foreign companies reporting under US 
securities law and their auditors.  
Although SOX had some new provisions aimed at mitigating the effects of the Enron 
scandal, it was not without critics. As argued, SOX was an outcome of a “partisan 
battle” and therefore, its corporate governance provisions did not coincide with the 
reasons for Enron’s failure.23 Romano emphasised that SOX provisions launched 
under political pressure while the current literature was unnoticed.
24
 Moreover, it is 
claimed that negotiations that normally take place in such a regulation making 
process did not take place for SOX. Accounting committees were not involved in the 
negotiations because of the damaged reputation of the accounting profession.
25
  
Despite the critics, the far-reaching effects of SOX and the Parmalat case in Europe 
forced the EU to revise laws in auditing even closer to the US’ SOX regime.26 As a 
response to audit failures and SOX, the EU issued reforms under the Action Plan of 
2003. It was aimed at creating a common European model for auditing and corporate 
governance. In this respect, two important Communications were issued: Reinforcing 
Statutory Audit in the EU
27
 and Modernising Company Law and Enhancing 
                                                 
18
 US Congress (2002) An act to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of 
corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes. The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX), 107
th
 Congress, H.R. 3763.  
19
 Dewing and Russell (2008) (n 15). 
20
 SOX (n 18), s. 201. 
21
 Ibid, ss. 103-105. 
22
 Ibid, s. 106. 
23
 Roberta Romano, ‘The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance’ 
(2005) 114 The Yale Law Journal 1521. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Ibid p.1528.  
26
 For the EU responses to the audit failures, see Section 2.2 below.  
27
 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Reinforcing the 
statutory audit in the EU Brussels, 21.05.2003 COM (2003) 286 final. 
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Corporate Governance.
28
 In addition, the Statutory Audit Directive of 2006 
(amending the 8
th
 Company Law Directive) was considered an important legislative 
response enacted five years after the Enron scandal.
29
 
As seen, the EU configured its laws on auditing in accordance with the effects of 
major corporate scandals. The global financial crisis of 2008 also urged the EU to 
reform its law on auditing.
30
 The next section will examine EU audit policy and laws 
in light of internal and external perspectives, harmonising auditing under the single 
market objective and dealing with the aftermath of failures through reforming the 
law.  
2. EU AUDIT POLICY AND LAWS IN THE LIGHT OF THE INTERNAL 
AND EXTERNAL PERSPECTIVES 
2.1. Harmonising Auditing  
There is a strong link between the harmonisation of accounting and auditing 
standards.
31
 Hence, EU harmonisation in accounting and auditing should be 
considered jointly, as they are indispensable to the creation of a common market.
32
 
This section will provide an overview of accounting harmonisation, with a more 
detailed treatment of auditing harmonisation.   
EU laws on accounting and auditing are based on company law directives. 
Accounting Directives of the EU are constituted of the Fourth
33
 and Seventh
34
 
Company Law Directives. The Fourth Directive of 1978 for the first time required 
companies to have their annual accounts audited by one or more persons authorised 
by national law.
35
 The Seventh Directive later extended the audit requirement to 
consolidated accounts. The Accounting Directives apply to all limited liability 
                                                 
28
 See Communication from the Commission COM(2003) 284 final (n 16).  
29
 Directive 2006/43/EC (n 3).   
30
 For the regulatory responses to the global financial crisis of the EU, see Section 2.3 below.  
31
 Peter Wong, ‘Challenges and Success in Implementing International Standards: Achieving 
International Convergence to IFRSs and ISAs’, September 2004.   
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 based on the Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty 
on the annual accounts of certain types of companies OJ No L 222/11. 
34
 Seventh Council Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983 based on the Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty 
on consolidated accounts OJ No L 193/1. 
35
 Directive 78/660/EEC (n 33), Article 51.1(a). 
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companies whether listed or not. These directives did not provide extensive coverage 
of all regulatory issues, but rather issued basic standards in accounting. As a 
consequence, the level of harmonisation in accounting was limited.  
In 2002, the EU issued a Regulation
36
 requiring all listed companies’ financial 
statements to be prepared in accordance with International Accounting Standards 
(IAS)
37
 by 2005. Before the adoption of uniform accounting rules, each EU Member 
State had its own accounting standards. The adoption of uniform standards was a 
significant step in terms of achieving the single market objective.
38
  
In terms of auditing harmonisation in the EU, in 1984, the European Commission 
issued the Eighth Company Law Directive that addressed statutory audit for the first 
time, though only very briefly.
39
 A more extensive process of harmonisation started 
with the Green Paper entitled ‘The Role, Position, and the Liability of the Statutory 
Auditor in the EU’ in 1996.40 The Green Paper of 1996 questioned the need for a 
common European framework on the independence of the statutory auditor and the 
role of auditors in corporate governance. It was followed by the Commission’s 
Communication entitled ‘Statutory Audit in the EU: the way forward’.41 It aspired to 
increase audit quality by improved cooperation between the accounting profession 
and Member States. This was followed by the Commission’s Recommendation on 
quality assurance systems for statutory auditors in the EU.
42
  
In 2002, following the Enron scandal – and the collapse of the one of the Big Five 
(as they were then) audit firms, Arthur Andersen - the Commission issued a 
Recommendation on statutory auditors’ independence in the EU discussing various 
issues, including the provision of non-audit services, the rotation of key audit 
                                                 
36
 See Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 (n 11).   
37
 The IASs were renamed by the IASB as International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) in 
2001.  
38
 Dewing and Russell (2008) (n 15). 
39
 Eight Council Directive 84/253/EEC of 10 April 1984 on the approval of persons responsible for 
carrying out the statutory audits of accounting documents OJ No L 126/10.  
40
 European Commission Green Paper of 24 July 1996 The role, the position and the liability of the 
statutory auditor within the European Union COM(96) 338 OJ C 321/1. 
41
 Communication from the Commission of May 1998 on the statutory audit in the European Union: 
the way forward, OJ 98/C143/03.  
42
 Commission Recommendation of 15 November 2000 on quality assurance for statutory audit in the 
EU: minimum requirements 2001/256/EC OJ L 91/91. 
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partners, and the disclosure of audit and non-audit fees.
43
 This Recommendation can 
be considered the very first phase in the regulatory responses of the Commission to 
the Enron scandal. In 2003, the Commission issued a Communication: ‘Reinforcing 
the statutory audit in the European Union.
44
 Subsequently, the Company Law Action 
Plan and the Statutory Audit Action Plan were launched, providing a reform package 
to tackle the increased number of cross-border operations within European countries 
in the internal market, and the effects of corporate failures.
45
  
The Company Law Action Plan and Statutory Audit Action Plan had the aim of 
tackling the effects of corporate and audit failures through a harmonised accounting 
and auditing framework in the EU.
46
 In other words, the EU intended to restore 
investor confidence in capital markets through endorsing globally accepted and 
strengthened accounting and auditing standards on the grounds of contribution of 
integrated audit markets in the EU. It was aimed at maintaining confidence across the 
EU by strengthening shareholders’ rights and protection of stakeholder groups.47  
Consequently, the EU issued Statutory Audit Directive 2006/43/EC. The Directive 
2006/43/EC broadened the scope of statutory audits in the EU and replaced the 
Eighth Directive of 1984, which dealt only with the qualification of statutory 
auditors. Moreover, as the most remarkable development in terms of harmonisation 
in auditing standards, it has brought the enforcement of the application of ISAs for 
all statutory audits to be conducted in the EU.
48
 The next part will critically evaluate 
the Directive 2006/43/EC and its enforcement of the application of ISAs in the EU.  
2.2. Statutory Audit Directive 2006/43/EC 
The EU Directive 2006/43/EC was part of the post-FSAP directives in terms of 
providing rules to ensure integration in financial markets across Europe. After the 
Enron scandal in the US and the other failures of the European companies, such as 
                                                 
43
 Commission Recommendation of 16 May 2002 Statutory Auditors' Independence in the EU: A Set 
of Fundamental Principles 2002/590/EC OJ L 191/22.  
44
 See Communication from the Commission COM(2003) 286 final (n 27). 
45
 Thomas Clarke and Jean-Francois Chanlat, European Corporate Governance Readings and 
Perspectives (Routledge New York, 2009) p.31. 
46
 Anita Anand and Niamh Moloney, ‘Reform of the Audit Process and the Role of Shareholder 
Voice: Transatlantic Perspectives’ (2004) 2 European Business Organization Law Review 223.   
47
 Klaus J. Hopt, ‘European Company Law and Corporate Governance: Where Does the Action Plan 
of the European Commission Lead?’ European Corporate Governance Institute Law Working Paper 
No.52/2005, Brussels October 2005 p. 3.  
48
 Directive 2006/43/EC (n 3), Article 26. 
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Parmalat (Italy), Ahold (Netherlands) and Nordisk Fjer (Denmark), the EU felt 
compelled to revise the Eighth Directive 84/253/EEC. All of these failures, including 
Enron, shared some important common features, such as corrupt accounting records, 
weak corporate governance structures, and auditors’ failures in detecting fraud and, 
moreover, helping to hiding that fraud.
49
 
As a response to these audit failures, the European Commission issued a new 
directive that replaced the Eighth Company Law Directive of 1984: Directive 
2006/43/EC.
50
 It was aimed at strengthening the statutory audit quality and 
enhancing auditor independence. Accordingly, the Directive 2006/43/EC included a 
comprehensive set of rules in terms of public oversight, supervision, and quality 
assurance systems, and allowed for regulatory cooperation between Member States 
and third countries whereas Directive 84/253/EEC has failed to provide it.
51
 The 
influence of SOX can be seen on the provisions of Directive 2006/43/EC, especially 
the measures on registration, oversight and third country cooperation.
52
 Directive 
2006/43/EC was recognised as one of the most remarkable reforms regarding 
auditing harmonisation at that time.
53
  
With regards binding force, EU directives have force of law in Member States. EU 
directives are considered legislative procedures in order to achieve a particular result. 
EU directives oblige each Member State to achieve the stated results, but leave 
national authorities to choose their methods in doing so. Moreover, the Commission 
has the right to complain to the European Court of Justice in case of any failure of 
implementation or wrong implementation of the directives by Member States.
54
 
Therefore, Member States had to transpose Directive 2006/43/EC into their own 
national law.  
                                                 
49
 John C. Coffee, Jr., ‘Understanding Enron: It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid’ (2002) 57 The 
Business Lawyer 1403; Guido Ferrarini and Paolo Giudici, ‘Financial Scandals and the Role of 
Private Enforcement: the Parmalat Case’ European Corporate Governance Institute Law Working 
Paper No. 40/2005, May 2005; Michael C. Knaap and Carol A. Knaap ‘Europe's Enron: Royal Ahold, 
N.V.’ (2007) 22(4) Issues in Accounting Education 641. 
50
 Directive 2006/43/EC (n 3). 
51
 Ibid, Recital 34.  
52
 Dagmar Eberle and Dorothee Lauter, ‘Private interests and the EU-US dispute on audit regulation: 
The role of the European accounting profession’ (2011) 18(4) Review of International Political 
Economy 436.  
53
 Ian P. Dewing and Peter O. Russell, ‘Accounting, Auditing and Corporate Governance of European 
Listed Countries: EU Policy Development Before and After Enron’ (2004) 42(2) Journal of Common 
Market Studies 289.  
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Transposition scores of the Member States 
According to the scoreboard on the transposition, most Member States missed the 
transposition deadline of 29.06.2008.
55
 Member States’ progressive adoption of the 
Directive 2006/43/EC was comparatively slow. For example, some Member States, 
including the Czech Republic and Ireland, had more than 31 non-transposed articles. 
These non-transposed articles were mostly on the establishment of a public oversight 
body. Only 12 out of 27 Member States fully completed the transposition by 2008. 
According to the scoreboard published on February 2010, Member States had made 
further progress on the transposition, especially by making their public oversight 
systems operational.
56
 The number of Member States who fully completed 
transposition was 25 by February 2010.
57
 As of 1 September 2010, all Member States 
had completed the transposition of Statutory Audit Directive 2006. Yet, some 
Member States, including Cyprus, Lithuania, and Poland have not yet fully 
implemented the requirement to establish a public oversight body.58 
Objective of the Statutory Audit Directive 2006/43/EC 
In addition to the aim of harmonising statutory audits in the EU, the purpose of the 
Directive 2006/43/EC is to restore and strengthen investor confidence in the financial 
markets. In order to achieve this, the Directive dealt mainly with the following 
topics: auditor independence,
59
 professional ethics,
60
 ISA application,
61
 external 
quality assurance requirements,
62
 public oversight of the audit profession,
63
 and 
improved cooperation between supervisory authorities in the EU.
64
 More 
importantly, Directive 2006/43/EC deals with statutory audits of public-interest 
                                                 
55
 Scoreboard on the transposition of the Directive on Statutory Audit Directive (2006/43/EC), 
Brussels 31 July 2008. 
56
 Scoreboard on the transposition of the Directive on Statutory Audit Directive (2006/43/EC), 
Brussels 1 February 2010.  
57
 The other Member States who remained slow on the transposition were Spain and Ireland. These 
countries’ adoption process was uncompleted because of the non-transposed articles.  
58
 See the Scoreboard on the transposition of the Directive 2006/43/EC (n 56).  
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 Directive 2006/43/EC (n 3), Article 22. 
60
 Ibid, Article 21. 
61
 Ibid, Article 26.  
62
 Ibid, Article 29.  
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 Ibid, Article 32. 
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entities (PIEs)
65
 in a separate section.
66
 The reason for this is explained in that PIEs 
are economically more important and, therefore, laws for statutory audits of these 
entities should be stricter.
67
 According to Directive 2006/43/EC, the statutory 
auditors or audit firm of PIEs shall publish a transparency report on their website 
covering the following: legal structure and ownership, a list of PIEs that they have 
carried out the statutory audit, and financial information regarding partners’ 
remuneration.
68
 It is also required that each PIE has an audit committee comprised of 
non-executive members of the administrative body.
69
 Regarding the independence of 
statutory auditors or the audit firm of a PIE, it is required that key audit partner(s) 
rotate every seven years and that the statutory auditor or audit firm is obliged to 
confirm to the audit committee that their independence from the audited entity is 
secure.
70
  
The adoption of ISAs in the EU 
Directive 2006/43/EC requires all statutory audits to be conducted on the basis of 
ISAs.
71
 Yet, it allows some flexibility for Member States to adopt and modify (carve-
out) ISAs.
72
 Accordingly, Member States may impose procedures and requirements 
in addition to ISAs if certain procedures and requirements have not been covered by 
adopted ISA.
73
 If adopted standards contain audit procedures that could create a 
specific legal conflict with national law, Member States may carve-out the 
conflicting part of ISAs as long as the conflict exists.
74
 Member States are allowed to 
impose procedures and requirements in addition to ISAs or carve-out some parts 
from the adopted ISA but only (i) if these procedures and requirements comply with 
a high level of credibility and quality of the true and fair view of the annual and 
consolidated accounts and with the European public good, and (ii) these procedures 
                                                 
65
 PIEs includes listed entities, credit institutions, insurance undertakings and other entities which are 
of significant public interest because of their business, their size, their number of employees or their 
corporate status is such that they have a wide range of stakeholders. See ibid, Article 2(13).   
66
 Ibid, Chapter V. 
67
 Ibid, Recital 23.  
68
 Ibid, Article 40.  
69
 Ibid, Article 41. 
70
 Ibid, Article 42.  
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and requirements are communicated to the European Commission and Member 
States before their adoption.
75
  
ISAs are transformed into national laws of Member States through the endorsement 
mechanism of the European Commission.
76
 In this respect, Directive 2006/43/EC 
grants implementing powers to the European Commission.
77
 The Commission is 
responsible for ensuring that i) ISAs have been developed with proper due process, 
public oversight and transparency, and are generally accepted internationally, ii) they 
contribute to a high level of credibility and quality of the true and fair view of the 
annual and consolidated accounts, iii) they are conducive to the European public 
good.
78
 So far, the Commission has not taken any steps regarding the implementation 
of ISAs under its implementation powers. Therefore, most Member States apply 
national auditing standards ‘based on’ ISAs. It means that national standards and 
ISAs are not identical, but do share fundamental principles. According to one study, 
11 out of 30 countries imposed one or more significant additional requirements to 
ISAs, such as additional exception reporting requirements.
79
  
The problems regarding the adoption of ISAs in the EU are derived from the 
regulatory structure of the standards and their adoption method. The regulatory 
structure of ISAs is problematic because they are principle-based
80
 and are not 
drafted as legislation, but will become part of a legal system through adoption.
81
 In 
other words, switching from voluntary standards to mandatory regulation is not 
consistent with ISAs’ content and style because ISAs do not cover a wide range of 
issues as regulations. Member States first have to translate standards into their 
national language and then integrate them into national law. Furthermore, it should 
be taken into account that changes in international standards would require reform of 
related legislation. Therefore, national law has to be revised every time international 
                                                 
75
 Ibid, Article 26(3).  
76
 Ibid, Article 26(2).  
77
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78
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79
 See Wong (n 31) p.8. See also Chapter III, Section 3.2.2 for the selective adoption of ISAs.  
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81
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standards are revised. As a consequence, it is suggested that transforming ISAs to 
national legislation may impose upon countries a significant compliance cost.
82
  
The adoption of ISAs in the EU is also problematic due to bureaucratic burdens in 
the endorsement mechanism of the European Commission. In addition, Member 
States who vary legislatively and culturally may find it difficult to adopt a certain 
type of standards. For instance, the UK adopted ISAs without any modifications, 
whereas France and Germany adopted ISAs with some national modifications.
83
 
Because the UK auditing standards board (APB) was involved in redrafting ISAs, 
this may have helped the UK adopt ISAs without modifications. However, other 
countries, especially continental European countries, may find it difficult to adopt 
ISAs into their national law due to differences in business and accounting systems. 
When taking into consideration these issues, the Directive’s flexibility in terms of 
allowing Member States to include add-ons and carve-outs has its merits. However, 
although the adoption of ISAs has resulted in some level of comparability, additional 
national requirements into ISAs are likely to increase existing differences and might 
impair the harmonisation of audit standards in the EU. 
A critical evaluation of the Statutory Audit Directive 2006/43/EC 
Like the US SOX, EU Directive 2006/43/EC is also a regulatory response to audit 
failures and corporate scandals that occurred both in the US and in Europe. Similar to 
SOX, Directive 2006/43/EC aimed to strengthen control mechanisms over statutory 
audits through public oversight supervision,
84
 and to increase auditor independence 
by prohibiting any direct or indirect financial relationship between the auditor and 
the audited company.
85
 
In order to increase auditor independence, the Directive introduced a maximum 7-
year audit engagement for key audit partners.
86
 In addition, the provision of non-
audit services to the audit client was restricted to some degree.
87
 However, the 
Directive does not provide a clear rule regarding the provision of non-audit services 
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83
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but leaves this to the discretion of Member States. Thus, Article 22 of the Directive 
has been interpreted differently by Member States.
88
 The public oversight and 
independence requirements may enhance audit quality and increase control over the 
audit process. However, these requirements come with costs. For instance, the 
establishment of a public oversight body and the continuing education of statutory 
auditors would be costly to Member States.  
Directive 2006/43/EC was an outcome of the EU’s post-FSAP regulations.89 It 
intended to provide full harmonisation of corporate audits in Europe and serve the 
EU’s single market objective. Nevertheless, the level of convergence in terms of 
statutory audits across the EU has been limited because Directive 2006/43/EC 
affords Member States discretion with regards some specific issues (i.e. auditor 
independence requirements; the adoption of ISAs).
90
 In addition, Directive 
2006/43/EC grants Member States discretionary powers in terms of training, 
education, and approval of statutory auditors, since the competent authorities of the 
Member States will be responsible on these issues.
91
 As a result, the level of 
harmonisation reached by the adoption of Directive 2006/43/EC is questionable. 
To conclude, although Directive 2006/43/EC was a late response to audit failures that 
started with Enron, it was essential in setting the grounds for the adoption of 
international auditing standards, quality assurance systems, and oversight 
mechanisms over statutory auditors and audit firms in the EU. However, the impact 
of Directive 2006/43/EC on the national laws of Member States has stayed limited in 
terms of establishing uniform laws and practices for statutory audits.  
The global financial crisis occurred at the time Directive 2006/43/EC was in the 
implementation process. The debate on the role of external auditing (and auditors) 
has been sparked by audit failures during the crisis.
92
 Directive 2006/43/EC was 
ineffective in responding to the issues raised by the crisis. Hence, it was judged 
                                                 
88
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necessary to re-regulate external auditing to reassure market confidence. The EU’s 
regulatory responses to the global financial crisis will be addressed next. 
2.3. Regulatory Responses to the Global Financial Crisis in terms of Auditing  
The global effects of the 2008 financial crisis showed that there was a need for a 
common international policy to deal with the international regulation of financial 
markets and this should be done by way of supranational co-ordination. In this 
regard, there were a number of meetings held by the group of twenty (G-20), in 
addition to the finance ministers and Central Bank Governors of EU member 
countries.
93
 In these meetings, the aim was to deal effectively with the financial crisis 
by strengthening international co-operation. Accordingly, policy co-ordination 
among G-20 members has been improved while the scope of financial regulation and 
supervision has been strengthened.
94
 At the G-20 summit of 2009, the European 
Commission highlighted the need for global financial regulatory system with 
“improved transparency and accountability alongside with enhanced regulation and 
supervision”.95 
At the EU level, the European Commission issued a number of communications 
immediately as a response to the crisis.
96
 Strengthening investor confidence, 
improving risk management in financial firms, and increasing protection against 
market misconduct through improved supervisory mechanism were the focus of 
these responses.
97
  
It is argued that the failure of auditors during the global financial crisis has damaged 
the reliability of financial statements and statutory auditors.
98
 In the same manner, 
the Commission stated that bank auditors failed to alert supervisors as to the situation 
                                                 
93
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94
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96
 Communication from the Commission, From financial crisis to recovery: A European framework 
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of the banks before they collapsed.
99
 Correspondingly, in October 2010, the 
Commission issued a Green Paper entitled ‘Audit Policy: Lessons from the Crisis’ 
that emphasised the role of the auditors in financial markets and their relation to the 
financial crisis.
100
 Following the Audit Green Paper, in November 2011, the 
European Commission issued two law proposals: a Directive to enhance the single 
market for statutory audits
101
 (amending existing Directive 2006/43/EC) and a 
Regulation to increase the quality of audits of financial statements of PIEs.
102
 These 
reform proposals highlight the need for a single market for auditing in the EU that 
encompasses the EU’s long-standing single market objective in general.  
Reforming the Audit: Overview of the Proposal for a Directive amending directive 
2006/43/EC and Proposal for a Regulation of the Audit of PIEs  
The Audit Green Paper was issued by the European Commission, in order to assess 
the aftermath of the global financial crisis and to reassure market stabilisation.
103
 The 
Commission’ Green Paper received a significant number of responses (almost 700) 
from a wide range of stakeholders after consultation between 13 October to 8 
December 2010.
104
 Having such wide-range of responses may suggest it was the 
right time for the EU to issue the Audit Green Paper since, overall, responses were in 
favour of a change the status quo in the EU audit market.
105
  
The main concerns issued in the Audit Green Paper can be summarised as follows: 
the expectations gap related to the role of the auditor, the governance and 
                                                 
99
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100
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 Summary of Responses Green Paper Audit Policy: Lessons from the Crisis, Brussels, 4 February 
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independence of auditors, market concentration and lack of choice, a lack of 
effective national and EU-wide supervision over auditors, and the need for a 
simplified audit standards for the SMEs.
106
 With respect of these findings, the 
Commission issued a Working Document Impact Assessment to analyse problems in 
the audit market and the potential impact of the intended measures.
107
 It was 
highlighted in the Commission’s Impact Assessment that the combination of these 
problems impaired trust in the quality of the audit opinion.
108
 It also revealed that 
neither audit practices nor auditor oversight were sufficiently harmonised in the EU, 
even after the adoption of Directive 2006/43/EC. Member States have discretionary 
powers, limited to ISAs framework, concerning the qualifications and supervisory 
arrangements for statutory auditors. The EU audit market is diverse where 
differences exist in legislative and regulatory frameworks (i.e. the thresholds for 
statutory audit exemption, auditors’ liability and audit standard setting vary 
significantly) and the qualification of auditors (i.e. education and professional 
training of auditors).
109
 This fragmented national regulation in the Member States 
entails significant compliance costs.
110
 Furthermore, the current legal framework 
does not address concentration in the audit market. In light of all of these problems, a 
regulatory change was judged necessary in order to address all of these issues under 
a single market for audit services to also be in line with the Europe 2020 Strategy.
111
  
As a result, in November 2011, the European Commission issued the proposal for a 
statutory audit Directive in Europe.
112
 PIEs often involve cross-border activities 
across the EU. Audit practices and regulation in Member States, however, are not 
homogenous, but have different auditing standards and different approval/registration 
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rules for auditors and audit firms. This situation creates a high administrative burden 
on the audit of PIEs. Therefore, regarding the audit of PIEs, a separate legal 
requirement was suggested.
113
 In this respect, on the same date as the directive 
proposal in November 2011, the European Commission issued a proposal for the 
Regulation of statutory audits of PIEs.
114
 Although the general requirements for a 
statutory audit of PIEs (i.e. the requirements for the registration/approval of auditors) 
dealt with existing Directive 2006/43/EC,
115
 the specific additional requirements 
regarding the conduct of statutory audits of PIEs were set by this Regulation. To be 
sure, the enactment of a separate detailed Regulation of the audit of PIEs will 
increase the regulatory burden. However, since regulations become binding as soon 
as they are passed,
116
 regarding this Regulation, the audit of PIEs will be carried out 
with the same rules applicable in all Member States at the same time. While the 
proposal for Regulation concerns in particular the audit of PIEs, the scope of the 
statutory audit directive remains a general one. Hence, the revised Directive and 
forthcoming Regulation must be read together. 
The financial stability of banks and other PIEs (e.g. listed companies) is particularly 
important for public confidence in the markets. The role of auditing is to enable trust 
in markets by verifying the accuracy of the financial statements. Hence, for the sake 
of market confidence and stability, the audits of PIEs have a special importance. For 
this reason, as the global financial crisis highlighted, the main issues in the audit 
market of the PIEs have to be addressed. The prevailing issues in the audit market 
are as follows:  the expectations gap regarding the role of statutory auditors, conflict 
of interest driven by the relationship between the auditor and audited entity (namely 
auditor independence), the high concentration and limited choice in the audit market, 
and the lack of EU-wide effective supervision over auditors. These issues will be 
critically discussed respectively, in line with the European Commission’s law 
proposals.  
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3. CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF THE PREVAILING PROBLEMS IN THE EU 
AUDIT MARKET 
The prevailing problems in the audit market, such as the expectations gap, auditor 
independence, and high concentration, have long been a subject of debate since 
Enron and have received significant attention since the global financial crisis of 
2008. These issues were explained in the previous chapters.
117
 This section primarily 
concerns itself with possible regulatory remedies for those issues. In addition to those 
three, the need for EU-wide supervision over the audit profession will be added to 
the discussion. Legal analysis of those issues will include the recent law proposals of 
the Commission.
118
 The aim of this section is to discuss the Commission’s law 
proposals and to provide some suggestions as to the best regulatory suggestions for 
these issues.  
3.1. Filling the Expectations Gap 
The collapse of major financial institutions caused a global financial crisis, and also 
resulted in a crisis in auditing. The role of auditors in the crisis has been one of the 
big debates since the crisis first occurred in 2008.
119
  
It is felt that external auditing adds credibility to financial statements by providing an 
objective assurance that financial statements are fairly represented.
120
 Furthermore, 
external auditing is an important tool in ensuring trust in financial markets.
121
 
Nevertheless, it is argued that external auditors (namely the largest audit firms) failed 
to ensure the trust in financial markets since they failed to assure the market through 
clean audit opinions.
122
 For example, major financial institutions filed for bankruptcy 
after they received clean audit opinions by their auditors. It is argued that the 
financial crisis showed that the safety of markets was not assured by clean audit 
                                                 
117
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reports, and therefore the credibility afforded to the financial statements of external 
auditors is questionable.
123
  
Nevertheless, concluding in such strong terms raises doubts. It is true that a number 
of audit failures (mostly related to the going concern opinion) occurred during the 
financial crisis.
124
 However, this does not suggest that external auditing does not add 
credibility to financial statements. Such cases tend to occur more in the time of crisis 
due to uncertainties in the market.
125
 These cases can be considered as audit failures - 
but this fact does not suggest that the credibility of financial statements can no longer 
be assured by external auditors.  
It is true that the quality of audits is questioned by investors in financial markets 
because auditors failed to detect and report the misstatements in financial statements 
and give warning to the market about financially distressed institutions. However, it 
should also be taken into account that the financial markets did not fail because of 
failed audits per se. Similarly, neither trust nor confidence was lost only because of 
misreported financial statements or not issuing going concern opinions. There is a 
wrong assumption amongst users of audited financial statements that a clean audit 
opinion means that an audited firm will not fail in the near future.
126
 It is possible 
that major financial institutions that collapsed during the crisis could have failed 
even if there were no misstatements and fraud in the financial statements. These 
perceptive (or dogmatic) problems derive mainly from the expectations gap: a lack of 
awareness amongst the users of the audited financial statements regarding the scope 
of external audits.
127
 
There are two possible solutions to narrow the audit expectations gap.
128
 The first is 
to improve audit reports to provide more information to the public. The second is to 
improve communication between auditors (or audit committees) and company 
managers. These two remedies will be discussed respectively.  
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Improved audit reports 
Previously, shareholders were considered to be the main target group of audit 
reports. In other words, an audit report was supposed to fulfil shareholders’ needs 
only.
129
 Since capital markets have become more interdependent, audit reports have 
been subject to wider interest groups, in addition to shareholders.
130
 Hence, it is 
necessary that audit reports should be enhanced and the complexity of these reports 
should be reduced for the effective use of these reports by a wider range of 
stakeholders. 
It has long been the subject of a number of discussions as to what sort of information 
auditors should be providing to stakeholders.
131
 It is highlighted that users cannot 
find what they are looking for in auditor reports since the most common audit 
opinion is a “template”,132 providing a standard content. Similarly, it is quoted in the 
House of Lords Report that “…audit reports… are very, very standardised in their 
context (…)”.133  
A recent study showed that auditors’ reports should include more specific 
information about the audit process itself (i.e. how materiality test is determined, an 
outline of the risk factors underlined within the audit, and time spent on audit by 
auditors) and matters related to the audited financial statements (i.e. any areas of 
weakness found in the audit and any disagreement with management regarding 
material misstatements).
134
 The same study also revealed that auditors’ reports need 
to contain additional information that normally was not included. For example, users 
of audit reports would like to see additional information about the audit materiality 
and any relationship that might impair auditor independence, e.g. the consecutive 
years of the auditors’ engagement with the audited company.135 Similarly, another 
study found that more specific information was needed in the auditors’ report about 
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how auditors reached their opinion on whether a company has fairly presented its 
financial statements in accordance with the related reporting standards.
136
 To 
conclude, it was found necessary to include more information in the audit reports for 
stakeholders and for the public in general. 
In line with the suggestions of the above studies, the European Commission aims to 
reduce the audit expectations gap by improving audit reports. It has proposed to 
expand audit reports to provide more information to stakeholders and to the public.
137
 
The Regulation proposal of the Commission suggests a number of provisions on 
what needs to be included in the audit report, in particular the following: the audit 
reports shall indicate that the statutory audit was conducted in accordance with ISA, 
identify key areas of risk of material misstatement in the financial statements, 
provide a statement on the situation of the entity especially on assessment of the 
entity’s ability to continue as a going concern, explain to what extent the statutory 
audit was designed to detect irregularities (i.e. the fraud), declare the prohibited non-
audit provisions were not provided, and that the statutory auditor(s) or the audit 
firm(s) remained completely independent.
138
   
Expanding audit reports that include more information may indeed be helpful to the 
users of the audit reports in understanding the work of the auditor and the business of 
the audited entity. Hence, the expectations gap is likely to be reduced by the 
expanded content of public audit reports. Nevertheless, the long list of additional 
information to be included in audit reports (almost 30 provisions with seven clauses 
as indicated in the Draft Regulation) may give rise to unintended costs for auditors 
and audit firms. 
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Improved communication  
In the EU, existing regulations on financial market instruments
139
 and banking
140
 
already require auditors of financial institutions to report to the relevant 
authorities.
141
 The Commission has proposed that not only the auditors of financial 
institutions, but also other auditors of PIEs, should be obliged to report to the 
supervisory authorities in case of any material breach of laws, any decision that 
might affect the ability of the company to continue as a going concern, or any other 
situation that lead to refusal to certify the financial statements.
142
 Such dialogue 
could be useful for the regulatory authorities to identify risks in advance and enable 
them to take appropriate action before serious risks spread to the markets.
143
 
In addition to the audit report as an output of the audit, the Commission has proposed 
that the auditors of PIEs should provide a separate report to the audit committee,
144
 
stating that this report should be longer and should include more details.
145
 
Accordingly, the information in this report should include explicit and detailed 
results of the conducted audit, such as explanations as to the auditor’s judgement on 
the going concern opinion and the appropriateness of the consultancy services.
146
 
Producing such a report to the audit committee is likely to enable a communication 
between the statutory auditors and the audit committee. However, it can also be 
considered that the current audit committee frameworks are not the best structure for 
such an effective communication.
147
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3.2. Reinforcing Auditor Independence  
In order to ensure trust in financial markets, audited financial statements should be 
reliable. Auditor independence is one of the key elements reflecting the reliability of 
financial statements. An auditor’s ability to reflect his (or her) professional 
judgement freely on the audit report is also necessary for audit quality. However, 
some auditors might be involved in certain situations where independence is 
impaired due to a conflict of interest. The provision of certain types of consultancy 
services, auditors’ dependency upon company management over audit fees, and the 
long auditor engagement periods (threat of familiarity) could impair auditor 
independence.
148
 There are some possible remedies that can be suggested in order to 
avoid this, and ultimately reinforce auditor independence, such as strengthened audit 
committees, the prohibition of provision of specific non-audit services, and reducing 
the threat of familiarity. These regulatory remedy proposals will be discussed 
respectively.  
Strengthened audit committees 
Performing an audit with professional scepticism can be challenging for auditors who 
are dependent upon company management for audit and non-audit fees.
149
 In such 
cases, the audit client may have influence on the auditor’s professional judgement by 
threatening their dismissal.  
A number of remedies are suggested in order to eliminate the influence of the 
company management on auditor independence. For example, it is suggested that the 
appointment of auditors should be carried out by a third party, such as a regulator or 
a supervisory body, rather than the company itself.
150
 Alternatively, it is suggested 
that a fixed period should be applied in auditor appointment.
151
 This alternative 
system requires that auditors should be appointed for a fixed period of time, namely 
4 years, and the termination of the engagement is not possible unless in exceptional 
conditions (e.g. change of control in the audited company after merger or 
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acquisition). This might reduce the conflict of interest as the auditor would know that 
the audit engagement is fixed for a certain period (so he/she is secured from 
dismissal), and also that indefinite reappointment is not possible (so he/she does not 
have to please the company management for reappointment).
152
  
None of these suggestions is favoured by the European Commission. Instead, in their 
proposed Regulation, the European Commission aimed to eliminate the influence of 
company management on the auditor by strengthening the role of audit 
committees.
153
 The role of independent audit committees (comprised of non-
executive members) in terms of their supervisory function over external auditors was 
first addressed in a Recommendation by the European Commission.
154
 The existing 
Directive 2006/43/EC requires the formation of an audit committee constituted of 
non-executive members but it does not impose any role on audit committees with 
respect of the appointment of auditors only stating this as an alternative system.
155
 
In the Regulation proposal, the Commission has suggested that the appointment of 
auditors should be based on audit committees’ recommendations followed by a 
justification on the recommendation.
156
 The Commission’s suggestion to increase the 
role of audit committees seems to be more reasonable than third party auditor 
appointments. The proposals for auditor appointment or engagement by a third party 
may lead to inappropriate auditor selection, since companies may have different 
choices in auditor selection.
157
 Audit committees, in turn, would be far more 
effective,
158
 since they are more likely to understand the audited entity’s business 
model than a third party, and can therefore make a better auditor choice.  
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Nevertheless, audit committees do not always serve their intended objectives, and in 
most cases are found to be ineffective.
159
 The main role of audit committees is to 
ensure that external auditors receive no pressure from the company management, 
namely the threat of dismissal.
160
 However, in practice, audit committees operate as a 
proxy mechanism of the company management. In other words, these committees are 
not truly independent from the management. Controlling shareholders are likely to 
dominate the audit committee,
161
 as it has been found that the influence of the 
shareholders in the selection of auditors is minor or absent.
162
  
The practical independence of audit committees can be obtained via the appointment 
of non-executive directors who are not involved in company operations and who do 
not have a direct business relationship with the audited company.
163
 The existing 
Directive 2006/43/EC allows Member States to decide whether audit committee 
members are to be non-executive members.
164
 As a result, the independence of audit 
committees is interpreted differently by Member States. For example, in the UK, it is 
required that at least three, or in the case of smaller companies, two members of the 
audit committee should be independent non-executives,
165
 while the German 
Corporate Governance Code 2013 only states that the chairman of the audit 
committee should be independent, and not be a former member of the management 
board.
166
   
Moreover, non-executive audit committee members only work part-time; hence, they 
often lack of information regarding the business operations of the company. As a 
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result, they often rely on management for that information. Non-executive audit 
committee members can serve better if they are given a full-time role on the audit 
committees similar to the Japanese Kansayaku Boards.
167
 Full-time non-executives 
on audit committees can gather related information regarding the business practices 
of the company and can therefore minimize its dependency on management and be 
more effective on auditor appointment.  
Prohibition of provision of specific non-audit services 
The provision of non-audit services, such as bookkeeping and tax consultancy, are 
likely to compromise auditor independence because there is a risk in this situation 
that auditors become more dependent on non-audit fees.
168
 
Directive 2006/43/EC states that the auditor shall not carry out a statutory audit if 
there is any direct or indirect financial, business, employment or any other 
relationship between the auditor (or audit firm) and the audited company.
169
 
Directive 2006/43/EC granted Member States discretionary powers to take necessary 
steps to ensure the appropriate safeguard on the auditors’ independence. As a result, 
Member States take different approaches in terms of the provision of non-audit 
services. For instance, the French Code of Ethics banned the provision of non-audit 
services,
170
 while the UK’s approach is less restrictive since there is no such ban with 
respect to the provision of non-audit services to the audit client.
171
 Therefore, it is 
common in the UK that audit firms, including the Big Four, offer consultancy 
services to their audit clients,
172
 and listed companies disclose fees paid to auditors 
for those services.
173
 There is no homogeny regarding the provision of non-audit 
services to the audit client in the EU, since Article 22 of Directive 2006/43/EC has 
been interpreted differently by Member States.  
                                                 
167
 Asian Corporate Governance Association, ‘The Roles and Functions of Kansayaku Boards 
Compared to Audit Committees’ Hong Kong, October 2013.   
168
 Abraham J. Briloff, “Accountancy and society a covenant desecrated’ (1990) 1(1) Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting 5. See also Chapter II, Section 2.3.  
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 Directive 2006/43/EC (n 3), Article 22(2).  
170
 See French Code of Ethics, Articles 10, 23, and 24. See also Study by ESCP Europe (n 90) p.154.  
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 Auditing Practices Board (APB) Ethical Standards state that audit firms should consider any 
possible threat to independence when accepting a proposed engagement with non-audit services. See 
APB Ethical Standard 5 (Revised) para. 14.  
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 For instance in 2006, PwC received £700.000 fees not related to audit from Northern Rock. See 
House of Lords Report (n 133) p. 24. 
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 The Companies (Disclosure of Auditor Remuneration and Liability Limitation Agreements) 
Regulations 2008 No. 489.  
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On the one hand, provision of non-audit services can improve auditors’ skills and 
knowledge, and this may enhance their audit quality in general.
174
 On the other hand, 
certain types of non-audit services not related to the audit work can impair auditor 
independence. It could be suggested that auditors should not be forbidden to provide 
all consultancy services to the audit clients. However, it might be necessary to divide 
non-audit services into categories with respect to their degree of threat to auditor 
independence. 
The first category is the type of non-audit services that have a direct impact on the 
accounts, which should be banned, as they will have a direct impact on auditor 
independence.
175
 These services are consultancy services that are not related to audit. 
The Commission has proposed to specify this kind of service, which would impair 
auditor independence and prohibit the provision for the auditors of PIEs.
176
 
The Commission, on the other hand, shed a green light on the provision of the second 
type of non-audit services with subject to prior approval either by component 
authorities
177
 or by audit committees.
178
 Non-audit services as outlined in Article 
10(3) of the Draft Regulation can be necessary for auditors to perform the audit work 
more effectively and should therefore not be banned completely from provision, but 
could be provided with a prior approval.  
The third category includes services that are termed audit-related financial services, 
encompassing services required by legislation or contract to be undertaken by 
auditors.
179
 The Commission’s proposal does not bring a prohibition clause on these 
non-audit services to the non-audit client (except for large audit firms).
180
 The 
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 Clive S. Lennox, ‘Non-audit fees, disclosure and audit quality’ (1999) 8(2) The European 
Accounting Review 239.  
175
 Max Planck Research Paper (n 151). 
176
 Services completely banned from provision are expert services unrelated to audit, bookkeeping, 
designing and implementing internal control and risk management systems, and investment banking 
services. See Draft Regulation (n 102), Article 10(3)(a).  
177
 Services including designing financial technology systems and providing due diligence services on 
potential mergers and acquisitions may be provided subject to prior approval by the component 
authorities. See ibid, Article 10(3) b(iii) and b(iv). 
178
 Services including human resource services and provision of comfort letters for investors for 
issuing of an undertaking’s security. See ibid, Article 10(3) b(i) and b(ii).  
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 Audit related services include services such as reporting required by law or regulation to be 
provided by the auditor, reviews of interim financial information, and reporting on regulatory returns. 
See APB Ethical Standard 5 (Revised) para. 54. 
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separated. See Draft Regulation (n 102), Article 10(5). See also next section: Section 3.3.  
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provision of non-audit services is necessarily problematic when non-audit fees are 
higher than audit fees. This situation can increase auditor dependency on non-audit 
fees and hence, mitigate independence (e.g. Enron).
181
 The Commission addressed 
this threat and has proposed that the total amount of fees generated from consultancy 
services that fall into the third category should be limited. Accordingly, related 
financial audit services referred to in Article 10(2) of the Draft Regulation may be 
provided only if they do not exceed 10% of the total audit fees.
182
 Furthermore, when 
a substantial part of an audit firms’ revenues originate from a single audited entity, 
this should be published in the annual accounts of the auditing company.  
The Commission’s proposal on the prohibition of provision of non-audit services has 
its remits because auditor dependency on non-audit fees is likely to impair auditor 
independence. However, the Commission’s proposal for large audit firms to limit the 
provision of related non-audit services to the audit client is rather restrictive. These 
services are closely related to audit work and therefore are less likely to have a 
negative impact on independence. It is clear that the business of the large audit firms 
is likely to be affected by this restriction.  
Reducing the threat of familiarity   
Another problem for auditor independence is the risk of getting overfamiliar with the 
audited company due to long audit tenures. Currently, Directive 2006/43/EC requires 
the key audit partner to be rotated every seven years.
183
 However, the existing law 
does not state any rotation rules for audit firms. In fact, Directive 2006/43/EC falls 
short in addressing the so-called ‘familiarity threat’184 that is likely to be created 
because of long and close auditor engagements with the same audit firm. Thus, it is 
common across EU listed companies to have the same audit firm for many years. For 
example, according to a survey, it is common in the EU (except in Italy)
185
 to have 
                                                 
181
 See Chapter II, Section 2.3. 
182
 Draft Regulation (n 102), Article 9(2).  
183
 Directive 2006/43/EC (n 3), Article 42. 
184
 The familiarity threat may occur because of a long or close relationship between the auditor and the 
audited company wherein the professional accountant may become too sympathetic to the interests of 
others. See IFAC, Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants, 2012 Edition para.100.12. See also 
Chapter II, Section 2.2.   
185
 In Italy, there is a regulatory requirement for mandatory rotation for audit firms every 9 years. See 
Commission’s Impact Assessment (n 107) p.170.  
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the same audit firm for more than 7 years.
186
  Having the same audit partner for many 
years is also evident in the UK financial markets where the average tenure rate for 
FTSE 100 companies is 48 years on average.
187
  
The trend to have the same audit firm for many years is hazardous for auditor 
independence in a number of ways. First, this situation might impose pressure on 
auditors not to lose the client, say in the UK market, for another 48 years on average. 
Because of this pressure, it would be difficult for auditors to carry out statutory 
audits with a questioning mind (i.e. professional scepticism), which involves critical 
evaluation and questioning existing information in the financial statements provided 
by the management. Therefore, they would be reluctant to detect and report errors in 
the financial statements.
188
  
Because of these reasons, key audit partner rotation by itself is not enough to 
reinforce auditor independence. In order to reduce the threat of familiarity, two types 
of auditor rotation might be suggested: internal and external rotation. While internal 
rotation allows a different audit partner from the same audit firm to engage in the 
audit for the next period (tendering), external rotation requires a change of audit firm 
(rotation).  
The European Commission has proposed a mandatory rotation policy for audit firms. 
In this respect, audit firms would no longer be appointed for many years, but the 
maximum duration will be 6 years (or 9 years in case of joint audits), including the 
renewed engagement.
189
 In addition, it is suggested that there should be a four years 
gap (cooling period) if the same audit firm were to be appointed after the maximum 
period of six years.
190
 The Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, 
however, takes the view that 6 years would be too costly and has proposed of a 
maximum period of 14 years.
191
 Internal rotation is also proposed by the 
                                                 
186
 Study by London Economics (n 162) p.73.  
187
 House of Lords Report (n 133) p.13.  
188
 Also, auditors who have long-tenure tend to be reluctant to make adjustments regarding errors in 
the prior audit periods because this would mean admitting past mistakes. See Max H. Bazerman, 
George Loewenstein, and Don A. Moore, ‘Why good accountants do bad audits’ (2002) 80(11) 
Harvard Business Review 96. 
189
 In case of continuous engagement of 6 years, the maximum duration of the engagement is 9 years. 
See Draft Regulation (n 102), Article 33.  
190
 See ibid, Article 33(2).  
191
 Committee on Legal Affairs, Reforming EU audit services to win back investors’ confidence Press 
release 25.04.2013.  
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Commission. However, its proposal does not specify any standard of such 
mechanism but only states that the rotation should take place on the basis of 
individuals rather than of a complete team.
192
 
These proposed policy options for the mandatory rotation of audit firms is expected 
to create a healthy competition environment. This policy will also increase the choice 
of auditors in the market, as mandatory rotation is likely to break up the barriers to 
mid-tier firms.
193
 Nevertheless, mandatory audit rotation is not unproblematic. As 
Arrunada and Paz-Ares argue, mandatory audit firm rotation results in significant 
costs
194
 and reduces audit quality.
195
 Mandatory audit firm rotation increases the so-
called “start-up cost” because a substantial amount of specific assets is destroyed and 
has to be rebuilt every time a rotation takes place.
196
 For example, auditors have to 
have knowledge of the audited company’s accounting system and internal control; 
the audited client must in turn make resources available for the audit.
197
 The auditor 
as well as the audited client must rebuild these audit routines every time a rotation 
takes place, which is costly for both sides of the engagement.
198
  
According to Arrunada and Paz-Ares, mandatory rotation also reduces audit quality 
because it undermines auditors’ ability (“technical competence”) and willingness to 
detect irregularities in the financial statements.
199
 Likewise, it is argued that financial 
reporting quality is lower when the audit-client relationship is short (one to three 
years) compared with long-term auditor tenures (nine to ten years).
200
 However, it 
was later found that fraudulent practices tend to occur in the first three years of the 
audit-client relationship.
201
 Therefore, these findings do not suggest that the reason 
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193
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194
 It is estimated by PwC that switching costs for the audited company could be up to £1 million, 
while Office of Fair Trading (OFT) found the average of FTSE 100 audit fees was £5.2 million. See 
OFT, Statutory audit market investigation reference to the Competition Commission of the supply of 
statutory audit services to large companies in the UK, October 2011 para.516. 
195
 Benito Arrunada and Candido Paz-Ares, ‘Mandatory Rotation of Company Auditors: A Critical 
Examination’ (1997) 17(1) International Review of Law and Economics 31. 
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behind undetected irregularities in the financial statements is necessarily a short 
auditor tenure.  
It can be concluded that there is no proof of a negative correlation between auditor 
continuity and the degree of auditor failure, as Arrunada and Paz-Ares claimed. 
However, there is also no empirical evidence that suggests that audit firm rotation 
will enhance competition in the market, but it is likely to increase audit costs. Thus, 
until now, regulators have focused on the rotation of key audit partners instead of 
audit firm rotation.
202
 The mandatory rotation of audit firms may not be the best 
remedy for increasing competition, but it can be considered an effective tool in terms 
of preventing auditors from becoming overfamiliar with the audited company. 
Alternatively, voluntary rotation might be suggested. However, if the auditor resigns 
voluntarily, investors might consider this resignation a warning sign for the company 
and this would therefore not be a perfect alternative to mandatory rotation.  
In addition to the above measures (i.e. strengthening audit committees, banning 
provision of non-audit services, and mandatory rotation of audit firms), transparency 
is another tool for reinforcing auditor independence. It is important that all fees, 
including audit fees and non-audit fees, should be disclosed separately in annual 
accounts. Whether the audited company or audit firm should disclose this 
information is questionable. Some suggest this information should be included in the 
audited company’s annual accounts.203 However, the Commission has proposed that 
the audit firm should disclose this information in the audit firm’s annual account to 
be publicly available on their website.
204
 
Furthermore, if audited company accounts generate a substantial part of the audit 
firm’s revenues, this should be published as well. In this regard, the Commission has 
proposed that audit firms should disclose in a transparency report (apart from the 
audit report 
205
and additional audit report
206
) the lists of entities from which the 
substantial part of the audit firm’s revenues (i.e. more than 5 per cent of its annual 
revenue) originate.
207
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3.3. Reducing Concentration in the Audit Market  
It has been found that the market of audits of large and listed companies is dominated 
by a few audit firms, namely the Big Four audit firms: Deloitte, PwC, EY (formerly 
Ernst & Young
208
) and KPMG.
209
 Although concentration may differ in terms of 
global revenues and the number of audit engagements,
210
 domination is apparent in 
the audit market. It is worth noting that the concentration level is the highest for 
listed companies.
211
 For this reason, the high level of concentration in terms of 
statutory audits of PIEs is under scrutiny by regulatory authorities. 
At the EU level, anti-competitive agreements and abusive practices by a dominant 
undertaking are prohibited.
212
 However, so far, there has been no intervention by the 
EU competition authorities in the audit market. In its report dated 2003, the Office of 
Fair Trading (OFT), the UK’s national competition authority, found no evidence to 
suggest that firms had acted to prevent, restrict, or distort competition contrary to the 
Competition Act 1998.
213
 As a result, since then, there has been no competition 
intervention from the OFT. More recently, in February 2013, the UK Competition 
Commission issued the findings of its investigations on the UK audit market 
following reference made by the OFT.
214
 After investigation, the UK Competition 
Commission concluded that the reputational barriers for mid-tier audit firms and high 
switching cost of company managers are likely to have an “adverse effect on 
competition” and hence restrict competition in the audit market.215 
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In its final report, the Competition Commission has proposed a 10-year mandatory 
rotation of FTSE 350 companies.
216
 By contrast, the UK Competition Commission 
does not address the scenario of a demise of one of the Big Four and the risk that the 
market would be exposed to in the aftermath of such collapse. Although a mandatory 
rotation rule might increase the choice of auditors for listed companies, it does not 
promise any prominent change in the audit market structure with regards 
competition.  
High concentration may a reverse effect on the effective function of the market.
217
  
Moreover, there would be serious consequences of a withdrawal of one of the Big 
Four from the market.
218
 There have been previous withdrawals from the market;
219
 
however, a withdrawal from the market now would have greater effects as the market 
is highly dependent of the services on these firms. It is said that the audit market 
would be disrupted in the case of a scenario where one of the Big Four collapsed. For 
instance, it is predicted that nearly 40 per cent of the UK’s FTSE 100 companies 
would have no auditor, and more than 50 per cent of France’s CAC 40 would be left 
without their joint audits.
220
  
Furthermore, the loss of confidence in the audit profession and, subsequently in the 
reliability of the markets is likely to result in inevitable risks if one of the Big Four 
collapses (e.g. as a result of fraud). This is explained via the famous ‘too big to fail’ 
phenomenon. It is possible that a Big Four firm could collapse because of criminal 
activities (e.g. tax sheltering), country bans
221
 or civil litigation costs
222
 in excess of 
their capital and insurance coverage.
223
 The possible effects of this turbulence would 
likely undermine market confidence significantly. Therefore, it is acknowledged that 
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domination in the market should be eliminated for the sake of stability in the 
markets.
224
 
In its proposal for a Regulation, the EU has specified a role for national authorities 
with respect of the risk of market concentration. Accordingly, national auditing 
authorities should monitor the risks arising from high concentration, such as the 
demise of audit firms with a significant market share, the disruption of audit services, 
and overall effect on the stability of the market.
225
 In addition, the Commission has 
proposed a number of policy measures in order to break up the dominance of the Big 
Four and reduce the effect of market concentration. The Commission has proposed to 
ban large audit firms and their networks (whose total audit revenues exceed €1,500 
million) from auditing PIEs in case they offer consulting services in the EU.
226
 
Therefore, the Commission aims to divide the large audit firms into two professions: 
audit firms that only provide audit work (pure audit firms) and audit firms that also 
provide consultancy services. The radical approach of the Commission might be 
justified on the grounds of the high proportion of advisory services in total revenues 
of the Big Four and their possible effects on independence.
227
 It is clear that the 
Commission’s proposal would have a great impact on the revenues of the Big Four if 
the proposals were accepted to become a rule. However, this approach might not be 
in the best interests of auditors and their professional development. Unsurprisingly, 
the audit profession does not support the Commission’s proposal. They argue that a 
strict ban on the provision of advisory services would restrict auditors’ ability to 
perform better quality audits.
228
 Likewise, most of the Legal Affairs Committee 
members of the European Parliament agreed that the general prohibition of advisory 
services would be “counterproductive” for audit quality.229 However, the Committee 
agrees with the ‘blacklisting’230 of advisory services directly affecting a company’s 
financial statements.  
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In order to open the market to new audit firms, a number of remedies are proposed. 
Strict ownership regulations for audit firms may create additional difficulties for 
small and medium-sized audit firms entering a specific market segment that is 
dominated by the Big Four (e.g. the listed market segment
231
). The Commission, 
therefore, has decided to liberalise the ownership rules of audit firms. In this respect, 
the law will no longer require statutory auditors or audit firms to hold a minimum of 
capital or voting rights.
232
 It is expected that the less strict ownership rules of audit 
firms will help small- and medium-sized audit firms to grow and encourage new 
firms to enter the market. In addition, removing market barriers for smaller audit 
firms, the EU has proposed to ban contractual clauses requiring the appointment of 
one of the Big Four.
233
 The prohibition of Big Four-only contractual clauses has been 
supported by the European Parliament.
234
 
In case of a scenario of the failure of one of the Big Four, in order to prevent 
contagious effects to other audit firms, the Commission has proposed that at least the 
six largest audit firms in each Member State establish contingency plans addressing a 
possible event threatening the continuity of operations of the concerned firm, 
including liability and reputation risks.
235
 
Another remedy to open the market for new audit firms and break up the dominance 
of the Big Four is the joint audit system. It was found that countries with a joint audit 
system requirement (e.g. France and in Denmark, until 2005) have lower 
concentration levels.
236
 In joint audit systems, listed companies are required to 
appoint two different audit firms who perform the audit work together and jointly 
sign the audit report. This practice may help smaller audit firms enter into a specific 
market segment that is largely dominated by the Big Four. 
However, the joint audit requirement for listed companies in Denmark was 
terminated because the costs were higher than the benefits.
237
 In addition to the 
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additional costs, joint audit systems may not be practical in terms of efficiency. 
There is a risk that more than one auditor (or audit firm) involved in auditing is likely 
to increase the audit process and may therefore result in a failure to issue audit 
reports on time. Because of the costs and possible disadvantages of the joint audit 
system, the Commission has chosen to leave it to companies to decide whether to 
have a joint audit.
238
  
Conclusion on high concentration  
High competition in a market may promote service providers to produce higher 
quality services. Currently, competition is restricted in the audit market insofar as the 
dominance of the Big Four audit firms is present. In order to reduce the effects of 
restricted competition in the market, two main remedy policies could be suggested. 
The first is to open the market to new audit firms by reducing barriers for entry. In 
this respect, liberalising ownership rules and voluntary joint audit system could be 
introduced.
239
 Second, policies could be focused on eliminating the existing 
domination of the particular firms. The prohibition of any restriction of the choice of 
auditors (i.e. contractual clauses requiring that the audit is performed by a Big Four 
only) and mandatory rotation of audit firms could be suggested in this respect.  
The above remedies alone might not be sufficient to control the risk of high 
concentration in the market, however. It is the general public perception that the Big 
Four always provide better quality audits.
240
 The bias of the Big Four’s 
professionalism derives from their global network, technological advantage, and 
sectorial expertise. Individually or in combination, these elements empower the Big 
Four with a ‘reputational advantage’.241 However, it is not certain how long the 
reputation of the Big Four will last. It is for this reason that the Commission’s 
invitation for the national audit authorities to monitor the risk arising from high 
concentration is so important. It can also be suggested that regulatory remedies to 
                                                 
238
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239
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enhance market competition should go further than introducing mandatory rotation, 
as the UK Competition Commission cited in its report.
242
 
3.4. Establishing a European passport and EU-wide Supervision  
Currently, auditors and audit firms need to be approved and pass an aptitude test to 
be able to provide statutory audit services in an EU Member State in which they want 
to carry out statutory audit services.
243
 Auditing and independence standards, as well 
as public oversight and quality assurance practices, vary between Member States in 
terms of their structures, mandates and administrative capacities.
244
 As a result, 
auditors and audit firms face significant compliance costs if they want to conduct 
audit services in more than one Member State.
245
 In order to remove unnecessary 
compliance costs, the European Commission aims to create a single market for 
statutory audit services under the European Quality Certificate framework. This 
framework provides an environment where auditors would be recognised across 
Europe once licensed in one Member State. In other words, the European passport 
system would establish mutual recognition of statutory auditors by all Member 
States. The European Quality Certificate will not be a condition for auditors and 
audit firms but will have a voluntary character.
246
  
Although a significant number of stakeholders support the idea, the public authorities 
of Member States are not in favour of a European passport for auditors.
247
 It is true 
that the enactment of Directive 2006/43/EC and the adoption of ISAs have helped to 
achieve a degree of common audit practices and rules across the EU.
248
 However, 
there are still differences between Member States on several issues (e.g. different 
standard-setting rules on auditor independence and selective adoption of ISAs).
249
 In 
addition to those issues, there are differences in the company and tax laws of the 
Member States. One can legitimately ask how to verify auditors’ competence in 
                                                 
242
 See UK Competition Commission Report, (n 215).   
243
 Directive 2006/43/EC (n 3), Article 14.  
244
 See Commission’s Impact Assessment (n 107) p. 23. See also Study by ESCP Europe (n 90) p. 5. 
245
 According to Directive 2006/43/EC, a Member State may approve a third-country auditor as 
statutory auditor if that person complies with requirements to be a statutory auditor in that Member 
State. Accordingly, the person should have a good repute (Article 4), met the educational 
qualifications (Article 6), succeed in the examination of professional competence (Article 7) and pass 
a test of theoretical knowledge (Article 8) to be followed by adequate practical training (Article 10). 
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 Draft Regulation (n 102), Article 50(1)(j). 
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 Commission’s Impact Assessment (n 107) p. 46.  
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 See Section 2.2 above.   
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 See ibid.  
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respect of national law knowledge (i.e. legislative rules on company tax law) given 
that Member States’ national laws are diverse.250  
The Europeanisation policy of the Commission has been criticised in terms of its 
added value to the audit market. It is said that the creation of a European passport for 
auditors would be more advantageous for the Big Four than for smaller sized audit 
firms.
251
 This is because the larger audit firms can cross borders, but smaller-sized 
audit firms in general tend to be active at local and regional levels only.
252
 Therefore, 
not the whole audit market, but rather only a part of the market - namely the largest 
audit firms - would be able to take advantage of this framework. In addition, a 
European certification for audit firms may create another barrier for smaller audit 
firms and might therefore have an adverse effect on concentration.
253
  
However, the creation of a single passport for auditors could be advantageous for a 
Union-wide supervision. At present, supervision over auditors and audit firms is 
carried out by national supervisory authorities.
254
 Establishing public oversight of the 
audit profession at a national level was first recommended by the Commission in 
2001.
255
 The later Commission Recommendation of 2008 suggested that the 
members of such a body should be compromised of non-practitioners, but left it to 
Member States to form such bodies.
256
 According to Directive 2006/43/EC, public 
oversight bodies would be responsible for the approval and registration of statutory 
auditors and audit firms, the adoption of standards on professional ethics, the 
continuing education of auditors, and conducting investigations and disciplinary 
actions regarding statutory auditors (and audit firms) when necessary.
257
 In addition, 
public oversight covers the audit firms’ quality assurance system that takes place at 
least every six years.
258
 The scope of the audit quality assurance system includes an 
assessment of compliance with international auditing standards and independence 
                                                 
250
 Commission’s Impact Assessment (n 107) p. 46. The Commission has proposed to not allow carve-
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requirements, audit fees charged, and reviews on audit firm’s internal quality control. 
A public oversight mechanism for statutory auditors and audit firms was established 
in every Member State as of 2010.
259
 In the UK, the monitoring operations of the 
UK’s Public Oversight Board on major audit firms are carried out through the Audit 
Inspection Unit (AIU),
260
 renamed as the Audit Quality Review.  
At present, there is no supervisory convergence at the EU level.
261
 For instance, there 
is no common practice on the part of national supervisory authorities regarding 
inspections and supervisions. In fact, it is common that national supervisory 
authorities are reluctant to issue sanctions following their inspections.
262
 In most 
Member States, practising auditors are involved in the quality assurance reviews of 
public oversight authorities, which undermines the independence and efficiency of 
such bodies.
263
 It is often the audit profession that has influence on these authorities 
because of the weak oversight structures deriving from budgetary constraints.
264
 In 
addition, the current supervisory framework under the national supervisory 
authorities is not sufficient to cover the integrated structures of audit firms that 
usually go beyond national border. For example, audits of an audit firm’s network in 
various Member States are not supervised by the national component authorities, but 
are supervised by the national supervisory authority with which the audit firm is 
registered.
265
 
These examples result in ineffective supervision over auditors at EU level and 
indicate the need for a more integrated supervision mechanism in the EU.
266
 In order 
to contribute the co-ordination of public oversight authorities across the EU, a 
European Group of Auditors Oversight Boards (EGAOB) has been established. 
Comprised of representatives from the authorities responsible for public oversight of 
Member States, the role of this body is to ensure co-operation between public 
                                                 
259
 Scoreboard on the transposition of the Statutory Audit Directive 2006/43/EC, 1 September 2010  
260
 See FRC, Professional Oversight Board Draft Publication Theme, December 2007.  
261
 Commission’s Impact Assessment (n 107) p. 153.  
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oversight authorities within the EU and audit oversight systems in different Member 
States are comparable.
267
 However, the EGAOB is not a legal entity because its 
structure is informal.
268
 Mainly, the EGAOB is a group formed by experts advising 
the Commission. Because of the structural limitations, it is said that the EGAOB has 
fallen short of securing the convergence of supervisory rules within the EU in terms 
of investigations and penalties.
269
  
Replacing the EGAOB, the Commission has proposed that EU-wide supervision over 
auditors should be ensured within the framework of the European Markets and 
Securities Authority (ESMA).
270
 Under this framework, the mandate, powers and 
independence requirements for those public authorities will be established at the EU 
level but supervision will be carried out nationally.
271
 Yet, a component authority of 
a Member State may request an investigation by a component authority of another 
Member State in the latter’s territory.  
The EGAOB has no powers to take formal decisions on inspections and oversights 
over auditors and audit networks; it was not practical to form such an EU-wide 
supervision mechanism under the EGAOB.
272
 However, establishing a newly created 
body for this role would be much more costly.
273
 In the light of these issues, the EU-
wide supervision system has been proposed to be created under the existing body of 
ESMA. Established in January 2011, the role of ESMA is to achieve integrity 
between Member States in securities regulation.
274
  
One may question the proficiency of ESMA in EU-wide auditing supervision 
because it is not specialised in the field of auditing. Yet, ESMA already collaborates 
with the European Banking Authority and European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority in the field of auditing regarding PIEs. Also, ESMA would be 
required to establish an internal committee devoted to audit policy comprising 
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members of the component authorities.
275
 Thus, it may benefit from this experience. 
The main work of ESMA is mostly related to PIEs. This might be the possible 
limitation of ESMA supervision in terms of the supervision of the whole audit 
market.
276
 Yet, when considering the fact that it is PIEs that are mostly involved in 
cross-border business, EU-wide supervision is most needed at PIE level. Therefore, 
this would actually be advantageous for EU-wide supervision under ESMA.  
CONCLUSION  
This chapter has sought to contribute to the literature through a critical analysis of 
existing and proposed laws of the EU in auditing. This chapter also showed how EU 
audit policy and laws have been shaped from Enron to date. It is submitted that the 
first factor that shaped the EU audit policy and laws is the long-standing single 
market objective. Directive 2006/43/EC is an important regulatory tool with a 
binding force in terms of harmonisation of the laws on auditing in the EU. This 
Directive is important in terms of setting up the core principles and requirements for 
EU statutory audit practices. However, as this chapter has submitted, Directive 
2006/43/EC did not establish a sufficient level of standardisation in auditing rules 
and practices within the EU. Divergence results add to additional regulatory costs, 
especially for auditors and audit firms that operate cross borders. In addition, this 
chapter has submitted that, at present, there is no effective supervision at EU level 
since only national supervisory authorities oversee the auditors and audit firms 
within their territory.  
These issues are seen as obstacles to the integration of markets and development of 
cross-border businesses. Therefore, the Commission aims to increase the level of 
harmonisation in statutory auditing in the EU and has issued proposal for a new 
Directive amending existing Directive 2006/43/EC
277
 and a Regulation for audits of 
PIEs.
278
 Currently, the statutory audit requirements for PIEs and other firms are 
governed by Directive 2006/43/EC. It is believed that the global financial crisis 
highlighted the importance of listed entities and financial institutions (i.e. PIEs in 
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general) in the economy. Therefore, the Commission has proposed to govern the 
statutory audit requirements of the PIEs with a separate Regulation. A directly 
applicable Regulation would provide a higher level of harmonisation and legal 
certainty. This new approach may suggest that maximum harmonisation is sought in 
auditing, instead of minimum harmonisation.  
The most fundamental proposals of the EU are the requirements of ISAs without 
allowing carve outs,
279
 the establishment of a European passport for auditors, and 
EU-wide supervision over statutory auditors in the EU.
280
 These proposals reflect the 
Commission’s aim to create a single market for auditing in the EU. In doing so, it 
expects to reduce additional costs for statutory auditors that go beyond national 
borders. These reforms would in this respect increase the level of harmonisation of 
the laws on auditing in the EU.   
This chapter has submitted that the effects of the crisis that was associated with 
auditing failures has been the second factor that shape the EU audit policy and laws. 
While post-Enron debates have focused on the problem of non-audit services, and 
oversight over audit profession, the post-financial crisis debates have focused on 
audit quality and the high-concentration issue. It was not until recently that the 
regulators addressed the restricted competition in the audit market.
281
 At the EU 
level, the Commission issued some radical proposals to change the status quo in the 
market aiming to break-up the dominance of the large audit firms. Some proposals, 
such as banning the Big Four-only contractual clauses have received support. 
However, it will take some time until an agreement is reached on relatively radical 
proposals, such as dividing the audit profession into pure audit firms and consultancy 
firms, and the mandatory rotation of audit firms. Restrictions on the provision of 
advisory services for the large audit firms would affect the large audit firms’ 
businesses in consultancy services. Yet, it is uncertain how this would affect the 
audit quality. It is also uncertain whether mandatory rotation would increase audit 
quality, whereas it is almost certain to increase the audit costs. It is an important 
question as to whether the Commission will keep its radical proposals to change the 
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situation in the market or will compromise those radical proposals with moderated 
suggestions.
282
    
It is true that financial scandals and crises give lawmakers opportunities to regulate 
the market. While crisis time regulations were seen as lifesavers during the crisis 
time, there is a risk that they have become an over-reaction to corporate scandals
283
 
and not be effective, but represent only symbolic actions.
284
 As for the Commission’s 
proposals, it is important that they provide a practical response to the issues, rather 
than following a regulatory routine.
285
 Time will tell as to when we might see the 
effects of these proposals in the EU audit market. 
Auditor liability has not been a topic of the 2011 proposals of the EU. Because audit 
quality largely depends on auditors’ judgement and care, which require professional 
scepticism, it may be suggested that legal reform should focus on how to increase the 
professional trustworthiness of auditors through training and education.
286
 
Alternatively, effective liability rules for auditor negligence can be used as a tool for 
motivation for auditors to provide better quality audits. However, large litigation 
risks faced by the Big Four may result in more concentration. The next chapter will 
directly address auditor liability, its regulation and consequences on the market.  
                                                 
282
 On 17 December 2013, the European Council and the Parliament have reached a preliminary 
agreement on the proposals. On 21 January 2014, the Legal Affairs Committee (the JURI) approved 
the draft agreement between the Parliament and Council. On 27 May 2014, the European Commission 
issued the Directive 2014/56/EU amending 2006/43/EC and Regulation No. 537/2014 in the Official 
Journal. 
283
 See also Chapter III, Section 2.2.  
284
 Roman Tomasic and Folarin Akinbami, ‘Towards a new corporate governance after the global 
financial crisis’ (2011) 22(8) International Company and Commercial Law Review 237 pp. 272-3.  
285
 Hatice Kubra Kandemir, ‘The EU Law on Auditing and the Role of Auditors in the Global 
Financial Crisis of 2008’ (2013) 10 International Journal of Disclosure and Governance 213.   
286
 Matthew Gill, Accountants’ Truth Knowledge and Ethics in the Financial World (OUP, 2009).   
 143 
 
CHAPTER V: AUDITOR LIABILITY 
INTRODUCTION  
EU law requires publicly held companies whose securities are admitted to a 
regulated market to disclose periodic financial information
1
 and prospectuses when 
securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading.
2
 Disclosing this kind of 
information about the financial situation and performance of companies is crucial for 
the efficient operation of markets, and such information is important for 
shareholders, investors, and other third parties who have an interest in capital 
markets. External auditors then check on the company management by ensuring the 
management’s financial accounts and other disclosure statements for public offerings 
present accurate information about that companies’ financial situation.3 Auditors 
undertake the responsibility of those accounts’ accuracy.4 
As well as the accuracy and credibility of audited accounts and prospectuses, the 
early detection of fraud in those statements is important in maintaining confidence in 
financial markets. Auditors provide an independent opinion about companies’ 
economic positions based on their financial accounts. In case of an audit failure, such 
as undetected or unreported material misstatements in the accounts, auditors can be 
subject to civil liability. Auditor liability regimes, including the conditions for a civil 
liability, are in general governed by the national law of EU Member States. EU law 
does not provide any regulation on auditor liability; nor do ISAs impose any liability 
on auditors, but only specify the auditors’ role in detecting and reporting on the 
company’s financial statements.  
                                                 
1
 Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the 
harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities 
are admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending Directive 2001/34/EC [2004] L390/38, 
Article 4 (as amended by Directive 2013/50/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
October 2013).  
2
 Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the 
prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and 
amending Directive 2001/34/EC [2003] OJ L345/64, Article 5 (as amended by Directive 2010/73/EU 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010). 
3
 It is required that financial statements be audited. See Directive 2004/109/EC (as amended) (n 1), 
Article 4(4).   
4
 See Section 3.2.2 below.  
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The previous chapters provided examples of audit failures.
5
 This chapter will 
examine the elements for a civil action against auditors with respect of the accuracy 
of financial accounts and public offerings. In doing so, this chapter critically 
discusses EU and UK law, as well as international standards: ISAs. Through the 
analysis of these three aspects, the objective of this chapter is to determine to whom 
auditors are in fact liable, and whether the law in this context is effective in holding 
auditors liable for misleading accounts and public offers.  
This chapter is laid out as follows: The first part presents how professional standards, 
namely ISAs, confer responsibilities for detecting fraud in financial statements upon 
auditors.
6
 It is shown that ISAs do not ascribe liability to auditors for negligent acts. 
The second section discusses the EU approach on auditor liability, and concludes that 
there is no common approach on auditor liability at the EU level. Since there is no 
uniformed application of auditor liability at the EU level, the last part examines UK 
law on auditor liability where liability rules are governed by both common law and 
statute.  
1. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AUDITOR FOR DETECTING MATERIAL 
MISSTATEMENT DUE TO FRAUD UNDER ISAs 
The duties of auditors are determined by the laws of Member States.
7
 In addition, 
international standards detail the duty of care to be exercised by auditors when 
performing audit work.  
ISAs 240, 300, 315, and 330 provide guidelines relating to auditing assurance and 
fraud detection. ISA 240 places the primary responsibility for the prevention and 
detection of fraud upon the management. Accordingly, an auditor’s responsibility is 
to establish reasonable assurances that a company’s financial statements are free 
from misleading information. The term ‘reasonable’ is rather vague. However, it can 
be understood that the auditor cannot obtain absolute assurances regarding the 
detection of material misstatements. According to ISA 240, auditors are required to 
give reasonable assurances only, as there are inherit limitations in internal control. 
                                                 
5
 See Chapter II, Section 3.3.  
6
 ISA 240. 
7
 See Section 3.1 below for UK laws on auditors’ duties.  
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Auditors are also required to show ‘professional scepticism’ when obtaining 
reasonable assurance throughout the audit. Scepticism is a mindset requiring 
continual questioning that mandates the auditor to critically evaluate existing 
information and to look for evidence of the validity of the given information.
8
 In this 
respect, a skeptical audit should involve critical and continuous evaluation of 
information given by the management, actively looking for risks of material 
misstatements, and designate an audit test to identify those misstatements.
9
 In order 
to fulfill the role of professional skepticism, an auditor should develop a good 
understanding of the audited entity’s business and its environment.10 Establishing an 
audit plan involves the creation of an overall audit strategy prior to the auditor’s 
identification and assessment of the risks of material misstatement
11
, and the design 
of further audit procedure if necessary (e.g. in response to assessed risk).
12
   
The guidance provided by ISAs only requires auditors to take a minimum concern 
for financial fraud but does not place the auditor in the role of a first responder for 
fraud.
13
 In other words, according to ISA, auditors will not become first responders 
to financial fraud if they maintained “an attitude of professional skepticism 
throughout the audit”14. First responders for financial fraud are the management and 
the persons responsible for governance of the entity. Therefore, ISAs do not impose a 
liability on auditors directly. However, auditors still can be held liable for undetected 
fraud in accounts under statutory law and common law rules.  
2. AUDITOR LIABILITY IN EU LAW 
Although EU law does not itself directly impose any uniform rules on auditor 
liability, auditor liability might arise due to misstatements in and omissions from the 
periodic disclosures and prospectuses issued in regulated markets, as harmonised by 
                                                 
8
 FRC, Auditing Practices Board, ‘Professional Scepticism Establishing a Common Understanding 
and Reaffirming Its Central Role in Delivering Audit Quality’, March 2012.  
9
 Ibid, pp. 12-3.  
10
 ISA 315. 
11
 ISA 300. 
12
 ISA 330. 
13
 G. Stevenson Smith, ‘Can an auditor ever be a first responder to financial frauds?’ (2012) 19(3) 
Journal of Financial Crime 291. 
14
 See ISA 240. See also the case, Llyod Cheyman & Co Ltd v Littlejohn & Co [1987] BCLC 303, 
where not applying professional practice was regarded as evidence of breach of duty. See also Paul L. 
Davies and Sarah Worthington, Gower & Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law, (9th edn, 
Sweet and Maxwell, London 2012) p. 937. 
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EU law. The Transparency Directive 2004/109/EC (as amended) requires companies 
whose securities are traded on regulated markets (e.g. the London Stock Exchange) 
to provide periodic disclosure documents (e.g. annual and half-yearly financial 
reports).
15
 In addition, according to the Prospectus Directive 2003/71/EC (as 
amended), a prospectus must be available to the public when securities are offered to 
the public or admitted to trading.
16
 Member States implement these directives by 
setting the rules for listing standards, disclosure of information in a prospectus and 
periodic information under a component authority.
17
  
A prospectus is a disclosure document and it must contain all the information 
required by investors to make an informed assessment of assets and liabilities, 
financial position, profit and losses, and the prospects of the issuer and of any 
guarantor and the rights attaching to the securities.
18
 As the Prospectus Directive 
requires, Member States shall apply “their laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions on civil liability” to those responsible for the information contained in the 
prospectus.
19
 Similarly, Transparency Directive 2004/109/EC (as amended) requires 
Member States’ laws, regulations, and administrative provisions on liability apply to 
the issuers and other persons responsible under the Directive.
20
  
Although EU law left auditor liability rules to be regulated by Member States, in 
2008, the European Commission issued Recommendation 2008/473/EC allowing 
liability limitations.
21
 In the Recommendation, the European Commission suggested 
three possible liability limiting methods, arguing that this would reduce barriers to 
entering the audit market and reduce liability risk in capital markets.
22
 The suggested 
liability caps were as follows: (i) an EU-wide cap that sets a maximum amount of 
                                                 
15
 Directive 2004/109/EC (as amended) (n 1), Articles 4-6.  
16
 Directive 2003/71/EC (as amended) (n 2), Article 5.  
17
 FCA’s Prospectuses Rules, Listing Rules and Disclosure and Transparency Rules exist for the 
purpose of implementing the Prospectus Directive and Transparency Directive respectively. See 
further Section 3.2.2 below.  
18
 See Directive 2003/71/EC (as amended) (n 2), Article 5(1). See also the Commission Regulation No 
862/2012 that sets out the requirements as regards to information included into a prospectus. See 
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 862/2012 (amending Regulation (EC) No 809/2004) 
under authority given by the Directive 2010/73/EU.   
19
 Directive 2003/71/EC (as amended) (n 2), Article 6.  
20
 Directive 2004/109/EC (as amended) (n 1), Article 7.  
21
 Commission Recommendation of 5 June 2008 concerning the limitation of the civil liability of 
statutory auditors and audit firms 2008/473/EC OJ L 162/39. 
22
 Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying Document to The Commission 
Recommendation Concerning the Limitation of the Civil Liability of Statutory Auditors and Audit 
Firms Brussels, SEC(2008) 1975. 
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compensation, (ii) a cap on auditors’ liability depending on the company size 
(measured by its market capitalisation), and (iii) proportionate liability where the 
auditor is liable only for the share of the loss that is attributed to his (or her) actions 
(or inaction).
23
 In other words, under proportionate liability, an auditor could be 
liable only for the proportion of loss that corresponds to their degree of responsibility 
in negligence.  
The proposed liability limiting methods aimed to restrict the liability exposure of the 
audit profession. The main grounds for this approach of the Commission might be 
the possible disappearance risk of the Big Four in case of any major lawsuits takes 
place.
24
 Small and mid-tier audit firms face obstacles to entering the audits of large 
listed firms that are dominated by the Big Four.
25
 As these firms face difficulties 
accessing the market and competing with the Big Four, liability risks constitute 
another difficulty. The existence of an auditor liability cap may help smaller audit 
firms breaking up the market and entering into a specific market segment that is 
currently dominated by the Big Four (i.e. the main index and regulated market).
26
 
Also, an auditor liability cap might help reduce the risk of firms’ failure because of 
civil litigation. Moreover, it might encourage the growth of smaller audit firms 
because investors may be eager to invest in the audit firms if liability risks were 
reduced. Therefore, an auditor liability cap could be helpful in reducing the audit 
market concentration and eliminating the risk of further concentration. 
Directive 2006/43/EC left auditor liability issue to be regulated by the national laws 
of the Member States.
27
 As a result, there is no common approach in EU Member 
States with respect of auditor liability regimes and thus, there are differences in the 
scope of auditor liability, statutory liability limitations, and practices of standing to 
sue.
28
 These differences may suggest that there is no harmonisation on auditor 
                                                 
23
 Commission Recommendation 2008/473/EC (n 21).  
24
 See also Section 3.3 below.  
25
 For the high concentration in the audit market, see Chapter II, Section 2.4.  
26
 Study by London Economics on the Economic Impact of Auditors’ Liability Regimes 
(MARKT/2005/24/F) Final Report to EC-DG Internal Market and Services, Germany September 
2006 p. 164.  
27
 Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2006 on statutory 
audits and annual consolidated accounts, amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC 
and repealing Council Directive 84/253/EEC OJ L 157/87, Article 31.  
28
 A Study on Systems of Civil Liability of Statutory Auditors in the Context of a Single Market for 
Auditing Services in the European Union, carried out on behalf of the European Commission, 15 
January 2001 p. 101. 
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liability in the EU, although EU Recommendation 2008/473/EC aimed to establish a 
common approach to liability caps.  
Apart from the permission given for liability limitation agreements, the EU has left 
the regulation of auditor liability to Member States. Although auditor liability has 
been much debated since the global financial crisis, recent EU reforms did not cover 
this issue.
29
 This may suggest that the EU is not in favour of EU-level regulation on 
auditor liability. However, the lack of EU-level regulation on auditor liability should 
not reduce the significance of this issue. It is most likely that an ideal liability regime 
would be the one that suits a particular country’s legislative and market structure 
most. The differences between Member States can account for the reason the EU 
chose to propose liability limitations in the form of a Recommendation rather than a 
binding regulation.  
In light of the above considerations, further examination of auditor liability for 
tortious acts and negligent misstatements is necessary in order to understand the role 
of auditors and their legal responsibility. To provide an example, the next section 
will closely look at UK law and question to whom and under what conditions 
auditors can be held liable in UK law. The pillars of the liability regime in the UK 
were set in the late 19
th
 century.
30
 Its rules have broad application, which has resulted 
in extensive discussion on the issue. Thus, looking into the UK liability regime is 
useful for setting the scene for the subsequent discussion of auditing law in Turkey 
(including questions of auditor liability) in Chapter VI.  
3. AUDITOR LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE AND FRAUD IN UK LAW 
As previous chapters discussed, auditors have two roles: detectives (public 
watchdogs) and certifiers (gatekeepers).
31
 In addition to the detective-auditor role, 
companies ask auditors to approve the information that will be disclosed to third 
parties, namely shareholders, investors or in general to the public. Because of this 
dual role, there is no single liability regime for auditors. Instead, auditors may be 
                                                 
29
 For a critique of the EU reforms, see Chapter IV, Section 3.  
30
 See Section 3.1 below.  
31
 For the dual role of auditors, see Chapter II, Section 1.2.  
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potentially subject to three or four liability rules (i.e. ‘multi-layered’ liability of 
auditors
32
).  
In addition to civil liability, auditors might be subject to criminal liability for breach 
of their duties. Although discussions in this section will mainly consider civil 
liability rules, it may be useful to briefly explain what the criminal liability 
conditions are. As the Companies Act 2006 obliges, an auditor must carry out 
investigations that enable him (or her) to form an opinion as to whether the 
company’s accounts are in agreement with the accounting records, otherwise the 
auditor shall state the fact in this report.
33
 According to the Companies Act 2006, an 
auditor who knowingly or recklessly makes a statement in the audit report that is 
misleading, false, or deceptive is subject to criminal liability.
34
 An auditor can also 
be subject to criminal liability for intentional or reckless misstatements.
35
 In other 
words, the claimant company must prove that the auditor has intentionally stated the 
inaccurate information.  
Figure 5.1: Auditor Liability in UK Law 
                                                 
32
 Giudici explains auditor liability under four titles: (i) auditor liability to the company, (ii) auditor 
liability to third parties, (iii) auditor liability in primary markets, and (iv) auditor liability in secondary 
markets. See Paolo Giudici, ‘Auditors’ Multi-Layered Liability Regime’ (2012) 13(4) European 
Business Organization Law Review 501. 
33
 Companies Act 2006, s. 498.  
34
 Ibid, s. 507.  
35
 Davies and Worthington (n 14) p. 846. 
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As Figure 5.1 shows, auditors are liable to both the audited company and third 
parties (i.e. the investors). These will be examined separately.  
3.1. Auditor Liability to the Company  
Auditors are hired and paid by a company to provide an audit report based on the 
financial statements of that company. This contractual relationship imposes on 
auditors a duty of care to the audit client (i.e. the audited company). Both under 
statutory law and common law, auditors owe a duty of care to the company that they 
audit, i.e. see Figure 5.1 above.  
Although Chapter 6 of the Companies Act 2006 relates to auditor liability, the Act 
does not specify the conditions of a liability regime. Instead, the elements of civil 
liability action are specified by common law rules.
36
 Under case law, a claim against 
an auditor could be based either on the tort of negligence or contract. 
Cases from the 19
th
 century described the standard of care to be exercised by auditors 
when performing the audit work. In Re London and General Bank,
 
Lindley LJ stated 
that:
 37
 
 “An auditor… is not an issuer; he does not guarantee that the books do 
correctly show the true position of the company’s affair; he does not even 
guarantee that his balance sheet is accurate according to the books of the 
company…” but auditors must exercise “reasonable care and skill” and 
“…he must not certify what he does not believe to be true”.  
In another 19
th
 century case, in Re Kingston Mill Company,
38
 the accounts of the 
company had been certified wrongly by company managers for years. The liquidator 
of the company claimed against the auditors for the overstated value of stock-in-
trade. For the value of the stock, auditors had relied on the certificate of a director 
and manager. The court discharged auditors of liability for believing the 
certifications of the company director and held that they were not in breach of their 
duty of care and skill because they were entitled to rely on the director. Lopes LJ 
                                                 
36
 Janne Chung, Jonathan Farrar, Poonam Puri, and Linda Thorne, ‘Auditor Liability to third parties 
after Sarbanes-Oxley: An international comparison of regulatory and legal reforms’ (2010) 19(1) 
Journal of International Accounting, Auditing, and Taxation 66 p. 70.  
37
 Lindley LJ in Re London and General Bank (No. 2) [1895] 2 Ch. 673, Court of Appeal. 
38
 Re Kingston Cotton Mill Co. (No. 2) [1896] 2 Ch. 279, Court of Appeal. 
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described the duty of auditors in stating that “An auditor is not bound to be detective. 
He is a watchdog, but not a bloodhound”.39  
This case established that auditors may rely on the certifications of the company 
director in the absence of suspicious circumstances. However, it is a professional 
requirement for auditors to have a questioning mind in terms of ‘professional 
scepticism’.40 Therefore, auditors must be critical of the accounts and reports 
provided by the company management in order to perform the audit work properly.  
Based on the contractual relationship between the auditor and the company, the 
statutory auditor’s duty is to ensure the annual accounts of the company present a 
true and fair view. In addition, the statutory auditor is responsible for the certification 
of the accounts, and for consideration of fraudulent misstatements in financial 
accounts. In principle, if an auditor fails to discover misstatements in a company’s 
account due to negligence, the auditor could be held liable and be asked to recover 
the whole of the loss. In addition, the statutory auditor must alert the audited 
company and disclose information about important events, such as the increase or 
decrease of capital, mergers, insolvency, and any other factors that might affect the 
company’s going concern ability.41 The company and the auditor have a client 
relationship and the audit client could make a claim against the auditor based on the 
contract between them.
42
   
Nevertheless, a different result was reached in Stone & Rolls v Moore.
43
 Stone & 
Rolls (S&R) was a one-man company under complete control and ownership of Mr. 
Stojevic that was involved in a large-scale fraud. The company went into liquidation 
as a result of the claims brought against it by banks. The appointed liquidators sued 
the auditor (Moore Stephens) on behalf of the company, claiming that the auditors 
should have discovered the fraud. The auditor raised the defence of ex turpi causa 
non oritur actio: that a party engaged in an illegal act cannot bring a claim.
44
 If this 
defence was to succeed, then the court would have to treat the fraud of the “directing 
                                                 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 See ISA 315. See also Section 1 above.  
41
 For auditors’ duty to issue going concern opinions, see Chapter II, Section 3.1.  
42
 Davies and Worthington (n 14) p. 837.   
43
 Stone & Rolls Ltd (In Liquidation) v Moore Stephens (A Firm) [2009] 2 B.C.L.C. 563; [2009] 
UKHL 39; [2009] 1 AC 1391, House of Lords. 
44
 Lee Roach, ‘Auditor liability: the case for limitation: Part 1’ (2010) 31(5) Company Lawyer 135, p. 
140.  
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mind and will” of the company (i.e. Mr. Stojevic) as the fraud of the company. The 
House of Lords was prepared to do so. 
By a three to two majority
45, the House of Lords held that Stojevic’s deliberate fraud 
– which would be attributed to the company itself - prevented the auditors from 
being liable, even though the auditors had failed in their contractual duty (i.e. to use 
reasonable care and skill in investigating the accounts and documents).
46
 Lord 
Philips held that S&R’s claim could not succeed for two reasons. First, S&R was 
seeking to put itself forward as the victim of fraud when it was, in fact, the 
perpetrator of the fraud.
47
 Second, S&R should not be able to seek compensation for 
the consequences of its own fraud where the defendants (i.e. S&R’s auditors: Moore 
Stephens) were also the victims of S&R’s fraud.48  
The other issue here is the fact that S&R was an insolvent company. This meant that 
the beneficiaries of a successful claim against the auditors would not be the 
shareholders, but the creditors. It might seem appropriate to use the ex turpi causa 
defence to prevent a one-man company, controlled by a fraudulent shareholder, from 
suing for the benefit of that shareholder. But should it not be different if the benefit 
of the action would go to the creditors, who took no part in the fraud? In addition to 
the creditors, other stakeholders may be affected by the fraudster’s mismanagement, 
and as argued, excluding the interests of other stakeholders may be unjust.
49
 Yet, the 
House of Lords insisted on applying the ex turpi causa defence, notwithstanding that 
interests of creditors thereby lost out.
50
 This can be justified by reasoning that an 
auditor’s duty to the company is owed for the benefit of the interests of the 
shareholders but not the interest of its creditors.
51
 Because S&R was a one-man 
                                                 
45
 The majority judges were Lords Philips, Walker and Brown; the dissenting judges were Lords Scott 
and Lord Mance. 
46
 Stone & Rolls Ltd (In Liq) v Moore Stephens (A Firm) (n 43).  
47
 Lord Philips of Worth Matravers para. 61 in Stone & Rolls Ltd (In Liq) v Moore Stephens (A Firm) 
(n 43).  
48
 Ibid.  
49
 Ernest states that other than creditors there are also other stakeholders who would be affected by the 
fraudster’s mismanagement and the auditors’ failure to detect such fraud. See Lim Ernest, ‘A critique 
of corporate attribution: “directing mind and will” and corporate objectives’ (2013) 3 Journal of 
Business Law 333 pp. 350-1.  
50
 Ibid.  
51
 See Lord Philips of Worth Matravers para.19 in Stone & Rolls Ltd (In Liq) v Moore Stephens (A 
Firm) (n 43). See also Len Sealy and Sarah Worthington, Sealy’s Cases and Materials in Company 
Law (9
th
 edn, OUP 2010) p. 442. See also Al Saudi Banque v Clarke Pixley [1990] Ch 313, a claim 
that a duty of care was owed by auditors to a bank lending to a company was rejected.  
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company and the sole shareholder was the perpetrator of the fraud, the ex turpi causa 
defence was applicable: S&R could not make a claim by relying on its own illegal 
acts.  
Lord Brown and Lord Walker explicitly rejected the argument advanced by the 
company – through its liquidator - that the auditors should be liable in respect of all 
such losses as were occasioned by the fraud from the time when auditors should have 
uncovered it.
52
 Such a liability cannot be imposed on auditors because such a duty - 
of detection of fraud - is not the responsibility of auditors, and therefore would be 
counter to the principle established in Caparo.
53
 Auditors cannot be held liable for 
relying on management’s representations and company records54 if they showed 
professional scepticism regarding the accounts.
55
  
In this case, the House of Lords attributed the fraud to the ‘directing mind and will’ 
of the company. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether the negligent auditors will still be 
discharged of the liability for undetected fraud if there were non-fraudulent 
shareholders or directors.
56
 It may be useful to discuss here what if it was not a one-
man company but there was a powerful fraudster director with a ‘directing mind and 
will’ and also there were current shareholders that did not involve in fraud.  
The scenario reads as follows: there is a ‘directing mind and will’ who is the 
perpetrator of the fraud, and the auditors failed to detect the fraud. If the company 
sued the auditors, the auditors might be able to invoke a defence based on ex turpi 
causa. Shareholders, however, cannot sue the auditors on behalf of the company (as 
opposed to derivate actions due to directors’ misconduct).57 
What if the current shareholders decide to sue the auditors in their own names? To 
make a successful claim, innocent shareholders have to meet the three criteria 
                                                 
52
 Lord Brown of Eaton-Under-Heywood para. 202 and Lord Walker para 241 in Stone & Rolls Ltd 
(In Liq) v Moore Stephens (A Firm) (n 43). See also Sealy and Worthington (n 51) pp. 442-3. 
53
 Lord Brown of Eaton-Under-Heywood para 202 in Stone & Rolls Ltd (In Liq) v Moore Stephens (A 
Firm) (n 43). 
54
 See Re Kingston Cotton Mill Co. (n 38).  
55
 See Section 1 above.  
56
 Davies and Worthington (n 14) pp. 843-4. See also Sealy and Worthington (n 51) pp. 165-73.  
57
 A derivative claim must be brought for the actions arise from an actual or proposed act or omission 
involving negligence, default, and breach of duty or breach of trust by a director of the company. See 
Companies Act 2006, Part 11, ss. 260(3) and 265(3). 
Chapter V: Auditor Liability  
 
154 
 
established by Caparo
58
 (i.e. (i) foreseeability of damage, (ii) proximity of 
relationship, and (iii) reasonableness to owe a duty of care).  If some of the 
shareholders are involved in fraud, the Court may reject the claim, arguing that it is 
not fair and reasonable to make a claim because of the possibility of “…the 
fraudulent shareholders profiting from their dishonesty”, 59 as Lord Philips stated.  In 
other words, if the class action is accepted by the courts, shareholders who were 
involved in the wrongdoing might benefit by an increase in value of the company 
which would be unjust. In addition, there may be a problem due to the principle of 
‘no reflective loss’: namely, that shareholders cannot bring a claim against where the 
loss they claim to have suffered is itself simply a consequence of a loss first suffered 
by the company.
60
  
Thus, it seems that it is difficult to sue auditors on behalf of the company and in the 
personal claim of the shareholder’s damages where a ‘directing mind and will’ (e.g. a 
powerful CEO) was involved in fraud whilst controlling the company. This decision 
of the House of Lords is, in fact, in line with the professional standards that attribute 
primary responsibility for detecting fraud to the company management instead of the 
auditors. Thus, the decision on Stone & Ross v Moore seems legitimate. Otherwise, it 
would be unjust to allow compensation to the company management for a loss 
resultant from their own wrongdoings where their main role was to prevent such 
misconduct.  
Conclusion  
With regards the contractual relationship, an auditor could be held liable if he (or 
she) failed to meet his (or her) duty of care in the completion of his duties to the 
company. For instance, if the auditor fails to discover irregular or misleading 
information in the accounts, not to disclose or late disclose of fraud, and not to 
complete other duties, he (or she) could be held liable. Yet, for a class action in 
negligence it must be shown that auditors owe a duty of care to the company (based 
on contract) or misstatements were made intentionally and recklessly (based on tort). 
                                                 
58
 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 A.C. 605. See also Section 3.2.1 below.  
59
 Lord Philips of Worth Matravers para. 61 in Stone & Rolls Ltd (In Liq) v Moore Stephens (A Firm) 
(n 43).  
60
 See Johnson v Gore Wood & Co. [2002] 2 A.C 1, House of Lords.   
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Therefore, auditors’ liability to the company is limited in accordance with the scope 
of their duty of care to the company as based on their contractual relationship.
61
   
Other than a claim based on contract, a claimant can take a class action based on the 
tort of negligence. Tortious auditor liability is often used for third parties other than 
the company, such as investors. Although common law established auditor liability 
to the company in principle, auditor liability to third parties is limited under common 
law rules. Hence, the statutory provisions of FSMA 2000 also determined the 
elements of the auditor liability to third parties. Next, auditor liability to third parties 
under common law and statutory law will be examined respectively.  
3.2. Auditor Liability to Third Parties  
The question under this auditor liability regime is whether an auditor owes a duty of 
care to a creditor or a shareholder who relies on its audit report to get funds for the 
company or to buy shares of the company in financial markets. In financial markets, 
audited accounts are required to be available to the public,
62
 for the use of 
prospective purchasers of shares, or potential creditors. It should be considered 
cautiously how wide the scope of auditor liability for negligence and fraud to third 
parties should be. Otherwise, auditors would be liable to a very large number of 
persons. If liability on the part of auditors were unrestricted, this would cause a 
liability, as famously described, of “a liability in an indeterminate amount for an 
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class”.63 
In line with this argument, UK common law established that auditors owe no general 
duty to third parties, but owe a duty of care to a third party in a tort of negligence, if 
special conditions exist. Common law and FSMA rules will be examined separately 
as they verify auditor liability differently. 
 
                                                 
61
 Davies and Worthington (n 14) p. 841. 
62
 Listing Rules require that companies provide full information when shares are first offered to the 
public, and on a continuing basis.  
63
 Cardozo C.J. in Ultramares Corp v Touche (1931) 174 N.E. 441.  
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3.2.1.  Auditor Liability to Third Parties under Common Law  
UK common law rules establish a duty of care for auditors to the company and 
provide a relatively clear view on the scope of such duty.
64
 However, the common 
law approach on auditor liability to third parties is rather complicated. Besides, 
common law imposes a limited duty of care on auditors to third parties by binding 
liability to special circumstances and conditions.  
Derry v Peek
65
 recognised auditor liability to third parties if only a tortious act exists, 
meaning that any third party may sue the auditor in principle, but that the auditor 
could be liable only if the claimant proves that the auditor owed a duty in tort of 
deceit. Moreover, this liability is subject to two conditions: the liability arises only if 
the fraudulent auditor is aware that statements are misrepresented, and that some 
investors are going to rely on them.    
In Derry v Peek,
66
 the company showed in its prospectus that it had permission to use 
steam trams, although there was no such permission. After the prospectus was issued, 
the company did not get permission and went into liquidation. Shareholders, who had 
purchased stakes in the company after relying on the statement’s truth, sued the 
company. The House of Lords decided that liability in the tort of negligence caused 
by misstatements could not be accepted because the company honestly believed that 
it would get permission.
67
 The House of Lords reported that in an action of deceit, 
the plaintiff must prove actual fraud.
68
 If the person made such statement in the 
honest belief of its truth, this cannot be considered as fraud and therefore, the person 
cannot be held liable because of the economic loss. Therefore, the liability imposed 
by Derry v Peek required false statements. In other words, if the defendant honestly 
(even if unreasonably) believed that the statements were true, he (or she) could not 
be held liable for fraud.
69
 In addition, the fraudulent auditor will escape liability if he 
(or she) did not intend the claimant to rely on that false statement. These limitations 
                                                 
64
 See Section 3.1 above. 
65
 Derry v Peek (1889) 14 A.C. 337, House of Lords. 
66
 Ibid. 
67
 Davies and Worthington (n 14) p. 930. 
68
 Derry v Peek (n 65). 
69
 For criminal liability, auditors must knowingly or recklessly misstate the accounts in the audit 
report that are misleading, false or deceptive. See Companies Act 2006, s.507 (1), (3). See also 
Section 3.1 above.  
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for liability limited the range of potential claimants and the circumstances in which 
liability for deceit will arise.
70
 
Later, the decision in Hedley Bryne
71
 overruled these limitations by recognising a 
general duty to take care to avoid negligent misstatements causing economic loss.
72
 
This means that a contractual relationship was not necessary for tortious liability 
claims.
73
 In Hedley Byrne, it was held that a duty of care will arise and a person 
could be held liable if he negligently makes a false statement and this causes a 
financial loss to another.
74
 However, it was not clear from Hedley Bryne (a case not 
involving an auditor) in what conditions a duty of care to avoid misstatements 
causing economic loss would be imposed on auditors.
75
 Instead, Caparo
76
 is accepted 
as the leading case on the application of a general duty of care of auditors to third 
parties. Caparo viewed auditor liability to third parties in a rather limited way, 
holding that auditors owe no general duty of care to third parties, thus favouring 
auditors over investors.  
Caparo Industries Plc. launched a takeover bid for Fidelity Plc. but later discovered 
that the company’s profits had been overstated by its auditor (Dickman who was a 
partner in Touche Ross). Caparo unsuccessfully sued the auditor, claiming that it had 
paid too much for shares in relying on the certification of the auditor who negligently 
stated a profit of £1.2 million when there had in reality been a loss of £0.4 million.77 
However, this case held that auditors owed no general duty of care to members of the 
public who relied on the company’s audited accounts when deciding to buy shares 
and subsequently suffered loss.
78
 
In Caparo, the House of Lords stated that auditors owed a duty of care to the 
company and to its shareholders (collectively), but not to individual shareholders or 
any other third parties. The reason for this is that the audit work is performed under 
                                                 
70
 Davies and Worthington (n 14) p. 847. 
71
 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller &Partners Ltd [1964] A.C. 465, House of Lords.  
72
 Davies and Worthington (n 14) p. 847. 
73
 Roach (n 44) p. 139.  
74
 Hedley Byrne (n 71) at 514.  
75
 Davies and Worthington (n 14) p. 847. 
76
 Caparo (n 58). 
77
 Carl Pacini, William Hillison, Ratnam Alagiah, and Sally Gunz, ‘Commonwealth Convergence 
Toward a Narrower Scope of Auditor Liability to Third Parties for Negligent Misstatements’ (2002) 
38(3) Abacus 425 p. 461.  
78
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contract between the auditor and the company as a separate person, and hence 
auditors owe a contractual duty of care to the company but not to individual 
shareholders.
79
 
However, the House of Lords determined that auditors owe a duty of care in 
negligence to third parties if three special conditions exist, with the burden of proof 
placed on the defendant.
80
 This three-stage test of Caparo requires: first, the 
defendant must know, or ought to know, that a third party would rely on their work 
(foreseeability of damage); second, there should be a relationship of sufficient 
proximity between the claimant and respondent (e.g. the auditor knew that the 
statement or information would be communicated to the respondent directly or 
indirectly and knew that it was very likely that the claimant would rely on it in 
deciding whether or not to engage in transactions
81
); and third, it must be just and 
reasonable to impose a duty of care (e.g. auditors of a subsidiary might be assumed 
to have responsibility in owing a duty of care to a client’s parent company82).  
The judge’s decision was based on the argument that auditors owed no duty of care 
to anyone who relied on the accounts and audit reports and purchased company 
shares regardless of whether this person is an existing shareholder or non-
shareholder.
83
 In other words, the judgement stated that auditors owe a duty to the 
company (arising from their contractual relationship) but not to creditors or to any 
single shareholder.
84
 Therefore, auditors owed Caparo no duty of care in negligence 
because liability did not arise since there was no proximity of relationship. Of course, 
auditors would be held liable if these special conditions existed; say, if the auditor 
knew that the information would be communicated to the claimant and knew that the 
claimant would rely on that information when making a transaction and resultantly 
suffered a loss.  
                                                 
79
 In principle, individual members may have a claim based on tort for negligent misstatements. See 
Sealy and Worthington (n 51) p.434. See also Section 3.1 above. 
80
 Davies and Worthington (n 14) p. 925. 
81
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According to the ruling in Caparo, auditors of a public company owe no general duty 
of care to non-clients (i.e. third parties, such as individual shareholders, creditors, or 
prospective purchasers of shares of the company) who relied upon the accounts in 
deciding to buy shares in the company. To make a claim based on negligence, it is 
necessary to prove that the defendant was fully aware and knew that the information 
would be communicated to the plaintiff directly (or indirectly) and knew that it was 
very likely that the plaintiff would rely on that information in deciding whether or 
not to make a transaction. Without such limitation, auditors would be subject to 
unlimited liability towards unlimited persons who suffered economic loss (i.e. the 
floodgate argument
85
).  
The Caparo judgement was later applied by other courts. In the Al Nakib
86
 case, the 
prospectus was issued in connection with a rights issue (the opportunity for existing 
shareholders to buy additional shares in a company) but the claimants used the 
prospectus for buying shares in the market. It was held that as the prospectus 
addressed existing shareholders only, the duty of care notion should not cover the 
relationship between the issuer and purchasers on the open market. 
Both in ADT Ltd v BDO Binder Hamlyn
87
 and in Yorkshire Enterprise Ltd et al v 
Robson Rhodes
88
 the Courts granted damages to investors where the auditors 
certified that the annual financial accounts were free from material misstatement 
although they were actually misstated.  
In ADT Ltd v BDO, the plaintiff completed the acquisition of the targeted company in 
reliance on the statutory auditor’s (BDO Binder Hamlyn) confirmation that the 
audited accounts presented a true picture of the company. By orally confirming the 
accuracy of the audited accounts, the auditor assumed responsibility towards to the 
plaintiff.
89
 Therefore, the Court found auditors negligent and concluded the 
plaintiff’s damages should be compensated. BDO Binder Hamlyn entered an appeal, 
but later withdrew it and settled for a payment of £50 million.90 
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In Yorkshire Enterprise Ltd et al v Robson Rhodes,
91
 auditors were held liable for 
negligently misinforming a company who relied on the financial reports of statutory 
auditors for their investment. The ‘special relationship’ required by Caparo92 existed, 
since the auditors were aware that the final decision to invest in the company would 
be based on those reports. 
In Possfund v Diamond,
 93
 the Chancery Division of the High Court suggested the 
application of liability for negligence regarding third parties in a broader way. The 
court stated that although a prospectus is issued to give information for existing 
shareholders, the information in prospectuses is also used in aftermarket purchases.
94
 
Therefore, it is suggested that the scope of the duty of care owed was not only to the 
initial subscriber, but also extended to subsequent purchasers in the aftermarket, 
since the aim of a prospectus was also to induce purchasers in the aftermarket.
95
 
It is true that companies issue prospectuses not only for subscribers but also for 
aftermarket interests. Hence, the view held in Possfund is rather satisfactory in terms 
of the current market practices comparing the narrow approaches held in both 
Caparo and subsequent cases. Nevertheless, the decision of the Chancery Division 
could not change the law established by higher courts in Caparo. Hence, the 
restricted liability of auditors to third parties under common law is standing. A 
broader approach to auditor liability to third parties can be found under the statutory 
provisions of FSMA 2000, which will be examined next.  
3.2.2.  Auditor Liability to Third Parties under Statutory Law 
The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) is the primary regulator in the financial 
markets area. The FCA sets the rules and standards for the disclosure requirements of 
companies whose shares are traded in primary and secondary markets. Previously, 
the FSA was the single regulatory body in the UK financial markets area.
96
 In 2012, 
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via amendments in Financial Services Act,
97
 the role of the FSA as a single 
regulatory body split to three new regulatory bodies: Financial Policy Committee 
(FPC) of the Bank of England, FCA, and the Prudential Regulatory Authority 
(PRA).
98
 However, the new Act does not provide for any substantial changes 
regarding the general functions of regulatory bodies. The Act determines the 
objectives of the FCA as stabilizing market confidence (the strategic objective) and 
consumer protection (the operational objective). In addition, two new objectives of 
efficiency and choice, and integrity, replaced the reduction of financial crime 
objective.
99
 
Within this scope, the FCA issues rules and gives general guidance regarding the 
policy and principles of the FSMA.
100
 The requirements of EU Directives in terms of 
listing requirements, public offerings, and disclosure requirements are transposed 
into UK domestic law through rules issued by the FCA under amendments to FSMA 
2000 (i.e. Listing Rules, Prospectus Rules, and Disclosure and Transparency 
Rules).
101
 Civil liability remedies are available for the non-implementation of the 
FCA’s rules.102 This section will examine civil liability of auditors for prospectuses 
as governed by s. 90 of FSMA. 
However, it is first necessary to point out what might appear to be another statutory 
basis for action. The Misrepresentation Act 1967 introduced a statutory remedy for 
negligent misstatements contained in a document other than prospectuses, issued in 
connection with the offer.
103
 The Misrepresentation Act 1967 gives a cause of action 
only to the other party to the contract,
104
 such as an injured investor. Because the 
Misrepresentation Act 1967 requires there should be a contractual relationship for 
negligence liability between the claimant and the defendant, it is unlikely auditors 
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would be sued under this Act. Therefore, this Act will not be considered further. In 
addition, s. 90A of FSMA concerns the liability of issuers only, and exclusively for 
fraudulent misstatements in, or dishonest omissions, from periodic disclosures.
105
 
Therefore, s. 90A of FSMA will not be considered here as a basis for auditor 
liability. 
Liability for prospectuses 
Any public sale of shares in the UK must have a prospectus containing information 
about those shares.
106
 Such a prospectus is produced by the issuer to promote its 
securities to investors.
107
 A prospectus must be available to the public whenever (a) 
transferable securities are to be offered to the public and (b) transferable securities 
are to be admitted to trade on a regulated market.
108
 The Prospectus Rules made by 
the FCA govern the publication and content of prospectuses in the UK. The FCA 
also checks whether they are compatible with the requirements stated by the EU 
Directives and FSMA.  
One may ask why there is liability for prospectus misstatements on the basis of 
negligence. A prospectus is a ‘selling document’, produced by the issuer to promote 
its securities to investors.
109
 Thus, it is recognized that the issuer may be tempted to 
make a fraudulent misstatement in the prospectus. For instance, the issuer has an 
extra incentive to hide financial negativities in fund raising because he (or she) will 
seek to receive high offers.
110
 
In financial markets where companies offer their securities for sale, they must 
appoint sponsors.
111
 A sponsor guides the company in the admission of equity shares 
and meeting responsibilities under the FCA regulations.
112
 Before submitting to the 
FCA for approval, information in the prospectus must be certified by an auditor, 
stating that no false or misleading information is included in the financial statements. 
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So, a written report of the auditor on historical, prospective and interim financial 
information is included in the preliminary prospectus.
113
  
Civil remedies under s. 90 of FSMA  
For negligent false or misleading statements in or omissions from prospectuses s. 90 
of FSMA imposes civil liability. Investors may compensate their loss caused by 
misstatements in or omissions from prospectuses based on negligence. The defendant 
may escape liability if he (or she) successfully disproves his (or her) negligence.
114
 
S.90 imposes liability on “any person responsible” to pay compensation to “a 
person” who acquired securities and suffered loss caused by any untrue or 
misleading statements in, or omission from, prospectuses of any matter that are 
required to be included by FSMA.
115
 For instance, any person responsible for issuing 
necessary supplementary prospectuses could be held liable to compensate.
116
 The 
claimant here is anyone who acquired securities, has contracted to acquire them, or 
has an interest in them and who can show a loss caused by the misstatement or 
omission.
117
  
Auditors are accepted responsible and can be held liable as a result of misstatements 
or omissions in prospectuses. Auditors are in a position to read the prospectus before 
the registration and to give their consent to the certification of any part of the 
prospectus.
118
 Accordingly, auditors accept responsibility by issuing a report based 
on the financial information in the prospectus and certifying that there is no false or 
misleading information included in the statements. Therefore, auditors who accept 
responsibility in relation to specific parts of a prospectus can be considered 
defendants for the application of s. 90. However, certifying financial information in 
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the prospectus does not mean an assurance; instead users of the auditor’s report must 
assess whether the company shares is a good buy.
119
 
The burden of the proof is on the defendant (i.e. “any person responsible”): so the 
defendant can escape liability under s. 90, if he (or she) satisfies the court that he 
reasonably believed the statements were true or not misleading.
120
 The defendant 
also has to prove one or more of the conditions set by the law: (a) that he (or she) 
continued in his belief until the time when the securities were acquired, (b) they were 
acquired before it was reasonably practicable to bring a correction, and (c) before the 
securities acquired he had taken all such steps to make the correction.
121
 Thereof, 
‘any person responsible’ can be held liable unless he (or she) disproves negligence.   
Other than the defence of negligence, the defendant might escape liability if he (or 
she) disproves the casual link between the defendant’s conduct and the loss.122 Such 
causal link could be disproved if the defendant proves that the claimant was aware of 
the false statements and the matters omitted but still made the transaction.  
 A comparison of liability under s. 90 and liability under common law 
Instead of a claim under s. 90 of FSMA, a claimant can make a claim under common 
law rules.
123
 Civil remedies available under FSMA rules are superior to those 
available under general law; thus, general rules are applicable only when the special 
rules under FSMA are inapplicable.
124
 
Common law rules require that there should be a contractual relationship (or a 
special relationship
125
) for negligence liability between the claimant and the 
defendant. However, such a contractual relationship (or ‘assumed responsibility’) is 
not required for a claim based on negligence under s. 90. Any person who has 
acquired securities on the market, whether by directly from the company or by 
buying shares on the market, and has shown the loss was caused by misstatement or 
omissions can be compensated for economic damage under s. 90. 
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To make a claim under common law rules, the claimant must show that he (or she) 
relied on the statement and that the maker of the false statement intended the 
recipient to rely on it.
126
 Moreover, for a successful claim, there should be tort of 
deceit, meaning that the defendant must have intentionally misstated information for 
the use of investors. To put it otherwise, the defendant can escape liability if he (or 
she) proves the existence of an honest and reasonable belief in the representation of 
the accounts.
127
 These conditions make it difficult to make a claim under common 
law. On the contrary, according to s. 90, the claimant must only show that they 
suffered a loss as a result of the misstatement in or omission from prospectuses but it 
is not necessary to show that they relied on the misstatement. Because of the 
limitations on the cause of action under the common law, a claim under s. 90 would 
be more attractive where it is available.
128
 It can be concluded that statutory law 
recognises a wider application of the compensation regime for offered shares than 
common law rules.
129
    
Conclusion on civil liability to third parties  
In case of negligent audits, the company, and anyone to whom auditors owe a duty of 
care based on their contractual relationship with the company, can claim 
compensation.
130
 However, it is difficult for third parties, such as individual 
shareholders, to successfully sue auditors for negligent audits unless the auditor 
makes a false statement knowing that a specific person would rely on that 
statement.
131
 In other words, common law rules established no duty of care owed by 
auditors to third parties unless either there is tort of deceit or the three-tier test of 
Caparo can be established. The duty owed by auditors to individual shareholders 
who purchased shares in the company is limited because of the special conditions 
established by Caparo. With respect of liability for prospectuses, despite the 
restricted scope of auditor liability in common law, under s. 90, auditors can be sued 
by any person who acquired shares on the regulated market and suffered a loss.
132
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Audited accounts and auditor’s report are publicly available, and a very large number 
of people read and use those reports. A wider application of liability rules can be 
considered an effective tool to prompt auditors to meet their statutory responsibilities 
and perform high quality audits.
133
 However, the audit market today depends highly 
on the services of the biggest four audit firms.
134
 Disappearance of one of the large 
audit firms, followed by a major liability claim, is likely to distort audit services in 
the market. The issue of the civil litigation burden on auditors and its effect on the 
market, and possible ways of limiting liability for auditors, will be discussed next.  
3.3. Auditor Liability Limitation and Further Issues 
Previous parts have established the extent of auditors’ liability to either the company, 
or third parties.
135
 Further issues on auditor liability will be discussed in this part. 
When an audit firm is appointed, the firm (generally formed as partnerships) will be 
held liable together with the auditor who signed the audit report, because of joint and 
several liability.
136
 In other words, each audit partner is jointly and severally liable 
for the debts of the firm and can therefore be asked to pay for damages regardless of 
the degree of their involvement at fault. Hence, the tort doctrine of joint and several 
liability increases the liability risk for each individual auditor.
137
 
Audit firms are currently obliged to make professional insurance coverage (or 
equivalent arrangements) for their services.
138
 However, as reported, mandatory 
insurance covers less than 5% of the larger claims for the Big Four audit firms.
139
 
Therefore, it is not possible for auditors to cover the whole liability risk with 
insurance mechanisms. 
Moreover, it is a classic case where a claimant who suffered loss as a result of 
damages caused by the fraudulent or negligent act of someone within the company 
seeks to recover the whole of the loss from the auditor, even if the auditor’s part at 
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fault is minor.
140
 This is because auditors are seen, in general, as the ‘last resort for 
compensation’, while the fraudulent company is likely to have gone insolvent.141 
This situation is referred to ‘deep pockets syndrome’.142 
Concerns about the liability risk for audit firms and the possible effects on 
concentration in the capital markets prompted the UK to allow contractual liability 
limitations between a company and its auditor. In 2006, the UK allowed ‘liability 
limitation agreements’ subject to the following conditions: (i) before making the 
contract the company must first get permission from the shareholders,
143
 (ii) auditors 
can only agree to limit their liability to what is a fair and reasonable amount,
144
 and 
(iii) the agreement may relate to only a single financial year, but it can be 
renewable.
145
 Under this scheme, the company and its auditor can establish a 
proportionate liability scheme or maximum amounts of monetary compensation.
146
 
Nevertheless, there is no guidance on what is a reasonable amount, although it would 
be unreasonable, if not impossible, for the UK Government to set such a threshold, 
since audit risks in some certain industries are higher.
147
 The liability limitation 
agreement is optional, and is only limits the liability to the company, not to third 
parties. Therefore, a major liability claim under either s. 90 or common law, 
exceeding the insurance cover, could still destroy an audit firm.    
Given the insufficient capacity of insurance coverage, liability limitation agreements 
are necessary to protect the large audit firms from being destroyed by a major claim. 
Through liability limitation agreements, large audit firms will face less risk of 
liability.
148
 As a result, auditors would be affected less by ‘deep pockets syndrome’, 
since the other parties of joint and several liability, such as directors, would also 
become subjects of any litigation. 
149
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According to the liability limitations agreements, as introduced under the Companies 
Act 2006, auditors and a company can specify either a fixed cap or a limitation based 
upon proportionate liability.
150
 Accordingly, liability limitation agreements can 
indicate that liability will be limited to a fixed amount, or that an auditor will only be 
liable for the proportion of the damage that caused by him (or her). However, the 
drawback with the liability limitation agreements is that the Companies Act 2006 
does not state any difference for deliberate and negligent acts.
151
 One can argue that 
the law should not provide protection for auditors who intentionally breached their 
duties. In parallel with this argument, EU Recommendation 2008/473/EC indicated 
that liability limitations should exclude cases of intentional breach of duties by 
auditors.
152
 However, UK law does not follow the EU Recommendation. It seems 
that the UK and EU have different approaches in liability limitation agreements: the 
former believes that auditor liability should not be limited for intentional breaches of 
duty, whereas the latter allows such a limitation. These different approaches might 
hinder future harmonisation attempts in the EU, if there will be any.   
Other than the liability limitations agreement, audit firms can be formed as Limited 
Liability Partnership (LLP)
153
 to benefit from limited liability and can reduce 
partners’ personal liability.154 Although the form of LLP can protect the personal 
assets of non-negligent audit partners, the audit firm is still liable for all its 
partners’.155 As a result, a major claim that exceeded the insurance cover could still 
destroy an audit firm.
156
 Moreover, it is also possible that the member firms of a 
network could be sued together with the global firm. Normally, the LLP structure of 
the network firms (i.e. the Big Four) allows member firms to operate in different 
countries with a global company to act as an umbrella entity of the network.
157
 
Hence, any outcome that means a member firm has to pay does not affect the other 
member firms. However, an action can be brought to the global company if a 
member firm failed to satisfy the claims due to insufficient capital.
158
 For instance, in 
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the Parmalat case, the global firms Grant Thornton International and Deloitte 
International were sued together with US member firms Grant Thornton LLP and 
Deloitte LLP and Italian firms.
159
    
Increased liability rules might be an effective tool in terms of ensuring auditor 
independence and audit quality.
160
 However, in the current market conditions 
wherein the concentration is high and the choice of audit firms is limited, a major 
liability claim might result in undesirable consequences. Without any liability 
limitation, for instance, (i) one of the Big Four could fail or disappear as a result of a 
major liability claim, (ii) if one of the Big Four disappeared, the concentration and 
lack of choice would be worsened and statutory audit services would be disrupted, 
(iii) liability risks might make the audit profession less attractive and form an 
obstacle for mid-tier audit firms entering the market for audits for large listed 
companies.
161
  
In fact, audit firms in the EU are subject to high-value actual and potential liability 
claims. In 2005, the biggest six audit firms (the Big Four, as well as Grant Thornton 
and BDO) dealt with 28 outstanding matters that could result in liability claims worth 
more than €75 million.162 Moreover, the time and costs involved in litigation is 
another significant factor in addition to final settlement costs in liability claims. 
Given such a risk, investors would be reluctant to invest in audit firms, whereas 
small and mid-tier firms need to compete with the Big Four.  
Debates on auditors’ roles and their liability for false and misleading information 
regarding accounts have surfaced again since the global financial crisis that involved 
audit failures.
163
 In fact, large audit firms have been exposed to civil litigation, 
especially in the US after negligent audits.
164
 Audit failures during the crisis have led 
lawmakers to issue more laws on other subjects, such as independence and high-
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concentration,
165
 whereas regulators have been reluctant to take action and issue 
stricter rules on auditor liability issue. The likely reason behind this is the possible 
risk of the liability exposure of large audit firms and the subsequent consequences on 
the audit services market.  
CONCLUSION 
“Because punishment for fraud and recovery of damages are so rare, prevention is 
the only viable course of action.”166 
Auditor liability is an area that is mostly dealt with by national laws. As a result, 
neither international regulators nor the EU have chosen to regulate this area. 
Although internationally, professional standards (namely ISAs) have found wide 
recognition in a number of jurisdictions, including the UK
167
, in terms of liability in 
cases of negligence, ISAs do not impose any liability on auditors. For negligent 
misstatements, ISAs do not issue any standards; instead, they set standards mainly on 
the basic principles of audit performance. In terms of false or misleading information 
in the statements, ISAs only set rules with regards the detection of fraud in financial 
statements. Nor do ISAs impose primary responsibility on statutory auditors. 
Nevertheless, failure in the application of auditing standards can be regarded as 
breach of duty. 
The European Union, on the other hand, has left the regulation of auditor liability to 
Member States. Apart from Recommendation 2008/473/EC on liability caps, there is 
no harmonisation on the substance of liability rules. As for Member States, for 
instance, in UK, common law regarding the scope of auditors’ liability can be 
considered relatively narrow.
168
 Auditors owe a duty of care to the company based 
on a contractual relationship and owe a duty of care to third parties in tort, for 
negligent misstatements only under very restrictive conditions.
169
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In the UK, the auditor liability regime is set by cases (some of which are a century 
old) that do not pay sufficient attention to the public role of auditors. Therefore, 
common law rules on auditor liability do not fit well into the current needs of 
financial markets.
170
 One of the functions of audited financial statements is to attract 
potential investors. In this respect, in case of any misrepresentation in those 
statements, not only the company and its shareholders but also every potential user of 
these statements would be affected by that false representation. However, claimants, 
especially those who do not have a contractual relationship with the auditor, face a 
difficulty in fulfilling the requirement to show the defendant owed a duty of care.
171
 
When auditors are seen as the watchdogs of the company and serve the owners of the 
company as detectives, the Caparo judgement is applicable; here, auditors are only 
liable to the company. However, the auditor’s role has changed, and they are now 
seen as professional gatekeepers, appointed by the company, who approve the 
financial information for potential third party users. In this respect, an auditor’s role 
has been expanded to include a public role, namely certifying the information for 
third parties, mainly investors and creditors. One could therefore suggest that the 
liability of auditors should be extended to include anyone who can be viewed as a 
potential user of audited financial statements, because of the public role of auditing. 
In this respect, the statutory provisions of FSMA provide a broader scope for auditor 
liability for negligent misstatements in terms of liability for prospectuses. Auditors 
fall into the “responsible person” definition for prospectuses under s. 90. 
Accordingly, an auditor could be held liable if he (or she) includes any untrue or 
misleading statements in specific parts of the prospectus and causes losses to persons 
who acquired securities in the market. It would be enough to make a claim under s. 
90 if the misstatements affected the market price and caused losses. Therefore, 
making a liability claim under s. 90 would be more attractive than making a claim 
under common laws since both require a contractual relationship between the 
claimant and the defendant and thus have a limited scope for liability.  
In conclusion, rather than making a claim under common law, the provisions of the 
FSMA have become more attractive as regards making a liability claim in primary 
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and secondary markets. It is expected that UK financial markets would provide better 
investor protection through improving liability rules for statutory auditors regarding 
the accuracy of the financial statements in the prospectuses.  
Although improved liability rules are necessary for market confidence and investor 
protection, the risks of major liability claims to the audit profession, in particular, the 
Big Four should not be disregarded. Liability claims tend to produce high litigation 
costs and might result in a possible loss of reputation. This situation constitutes a risk 
of further concentration in audit market, if one of the Big Four were to collapse as a 
result of major liability claims that exceed the insurance cover. Liability limitations 
by contract might be a remedy in this respect, but they only limit liability to the 
company. It is crucial that regulatory authorities should calculate litigation costs on 
the audit profession and take action over the consequences of those liability claims 
on the Big Four while improving investor confidence in the markets through 
increased investor protection towards false and misleading information in audited 
accounts. Alternatively, a better solution would be to take measures to prevent fraud 
in the first place, rather than to increase the liability rules.  
This chapter complements previous chapters’ discussions in terms of exploring the 
role of auditors and their duties and liabilities in financial markets. So far, the 
discussions in this thesis have focused on a structural and conceptual analysis of 
external auditing, including its regulation in the EU. Chapter VII will question the 
level of convergence between Turkish and the EU laws on auditing. Before that, in 
order to add Turkey to the discussion on convergence, the next chapter will examine 
Turkish laws and regulations in auditing in the light of its harmonisation with EU 
law. As this chapter has shown, the UK has a considerably developed liability regime 
and its rules have found their application widely in the field. Although there is no 
common approach in the EU in terms of auditor liability rules, studying the Turkish 
experience will show whether there are similarities in auditor liability rules. This 
indication will tell us more about audit regulation and whether it follows an 
international route.
172
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CHAPTER VI: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF AUDIT 
REGULATIONS AND REFORMS IN TURKEY 
INTRODUCTION 
Turkey, as a candidate for EU membership, has launched a number of company law 
reforms. The main objective of these reforms is to integrate the Turkish financial 
market with the EU.
1
 More specifically, there are two driving forces behind the 
reforms. The first is the objective of preventing audit failures similar to the Imar 
Bank case, which is the biggest accounting and auditing scandal in the Turkish 
Banking history. EU membership for Turkey is the other motivation; achieving the 
objective of becoming a part of international markets. Within these driving forces, 
Turkey has made substantial amendments in its company and capital markets laws in 
line with the EU acquis and has reformed its laws on auditing respectively. 
The objective of this chapter is to study Turkish laws in the field of external auditing. 
In addition, this chapter provides a background to the convergence analysis studied 
in Chapter VII. Turkey is taken as a case study because it presents a good example 
for emerging economies in the context of harmonisation of rules and standards for 
audit profession. The EU membership aspiration of Turkey also provides room for a 
discussion on Turkey’s ability and success in terms of the adaption of EU laws. In 
addition, as a major trading partner of European countries,
2
 Turkey’s integration with 
EU law deserves attention.  
This chapter is structured as follows. The first section starts with the background to 
and motivations of the reforms in Turkey by examining past audit failures in the Imar 
Bank case. This is followed by some background information on the financial 
development of Turkey as well as a critical discussion on Turkey’s progress in the 
EU accession process. The second section presents how external auditing is regulated 
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under Turkish law before reforms were enacted. Accordingly, the Profession Act, 
Capital Markets Codes, Commercial Codes, and the Capital Markets Board’s (SPK) 
communiqués on external auditing are presented as the main sources of audit 
regulation in Turkey. The background to the audit profession, audit firms in Turkey 
and SPK monitoring over audit firms will be discussed in the third section. Lastly, 
the fourth section critically examines reforms of external auditing. This section also 
details auditor liability rules under the new Commercial Code, issued for the first 
time.  
1. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATIONS OF TURKISH LAWS ON 
AUDITING 
The prevention of audit failures and the aspiration of EU membership are the main 
motivations for audit reforms in Turkey. However, before elaborating on the 
motivations for these reforms, it is necessary to briefly refer to the primary elements 
of corporate governance system for Turkish listed firms and their relationship with 
external auditing.
3
  
1.1. Corporate Governance in Turkey 
1.1.1. Ownership and Control Structures of Turkish Listed Firms 
Public limited companies (anonim şirket) and limited liability (or private limited) 
companies (limited şirket) are the two most common types of business organisation 
in Turkey.
4
 The corporate governance system of Turkish companies is categorised as 
an insider-corporate governance system wherein one or more majority shareholders 
own blocks of shares in the company.
5
 The ownership structures of Turkish listed 
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firms are highly concentrated.
6
 According to a report dated to 2005,
7
 a single 
shareholder (either the founder of the company or a member of the funding family) 
controlled more than 50 per cent of voting rights in 45 per cent of each listed 
company on the Istanbul Stock Exchange
8
 (ISE). 
In family companies, family members dominate the board, and at least one family 
member is effective in the financial control of the company.
9
 Improving the external 
auditing mechanism in a company can be an effective solution to the agency problem 
in Turkish companies,
10
 which often occurs as dominant shareholders’ 
(owners/managers) incentives to expropriate the rights of minority shareholders.
11
 
For the purposes of this chapter, Turkish corporate governance will be examined in 
terms of external auditing.
12
  
1.1.2. Corporate Governance and External Auditing in Turkey 
Turkey is considered an “emerging market economy”13 that seeks investment from 
other countries. External auditing is one of the most important tools for investors to 
assess the business of the company that they want to invest in. In other words, 
investors rely on auditors’ assurances on financial statements for their investments. 
In addition, in terms of its governance function, having high quality audits is 
regarded as a foundation for a sound governance system in Turkish listed firms.
14
 
Therefore, external auditing, carried out by independent and professional auditors, is 
an important element in the corporate governance of Turkish listed firms. 
                                                 
6
 Ali Kosklu, ‘Corporate Governance in Turkey in Light of the Major Systems’ 11 January 2008 
available at http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=56090 accessed 07/06/2013. 
7
 Institute of International Finance’s Equity Advisory Group, ‘Corporate Governance in Turkey: An 
Investor Perspective’, Task Force Report, April 2005 p. 7.    
8
 With the enactment of the Capital Markets Law No. 6362 on 30 December 2012, the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange was renamed Borsa Istanbul (BIST) and started to operate on 3 April 2013.  
9
 Gül Okutan Nilsson, ‘Corporate Governance in Turkey’ (2007) 8 European Business Organization 
Law Reviews 195.  
10
 Ibid p. 201.  
11
 See Chapter I, Section 3.1. 
12
 Apart from external auditing, the new TCC introduced operational audits and special purpose 
audits. Operational auditing includes a report regarding the establishment of the company (Article 
351). Special purpose auditing refers to the special examination of the accounts by the auditors 
appointed by the courts for a specific purpose, such as examination before take over (Article 406). 
However, in accordance with the context of this thesis, external auditing is the main subject of the 
evaluations throughout this chapter.  
13
 IMF, ‘World Economic Outlook’, October 2012 p. 21.  
14
 For the governance function of external auditing in concentrated systems see Chapter I, Section 3.2. 
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In Turkish companies, where the owners and the managers of the company are 
usually the same person (or the owner and the manager belong to the same family), 
external auditing plays a significant role, especially for minority shareholders. In 
family-owned companies, it is unlikely that managers (usually a family member) 
would be involved with fraud and corruption (that might eventually lead to a 
bankruptcy) in the company in which he (or she) has a common interest with the 
owners. Similarly, in cases where the company owners and the company manager are 
the same person, it is unlikely that the manager would corrupt his (or her) own 
company by engaging in fraud. However, although it is rare, there are cases where 
the management itself (the owners) engaged in fraud in the company, e.g. the Imar 
Bank case.
15
 Hence, there is a risk that controlling shareholders might engage in 
fraud. They may also have an incentive to exploit the rights of minority shareholders, 
e.g. by restricting access to important financial information. External auditing in 
Turkey is particularly important for minority shareholders, who can get necessary 
information about the financial situation of the company through audited financial 
statements.
16
 
The Turkish Commercial Code (TCC) empowers the Capital Markets Board of 
Turkey (SPK) as the single authority to issue corporate governance principles in 
Turkey.
17
 The Corporate Governance Principles of SPK are based on a ‘comply or 
explain’ principle.18 Since 2004, all listed companies are obliged to annually prepare 
a corporate governance report showing the degree of compliance with these 
principles and explain reasons for any departure.
19
 Although the Corporate 
Governance Principles of the SPK are not obligatory, some rules within the SPK 
regulations and communiqués relating to corporate governance are mandatory, 
having been published in the Official Gazette, i.e. Serial X, No. 22 Communiqué on 
                                                 
15
 See Section 1.2 below.  
16
 See also Chapter I, Section 3.2.  
17
 TCC No. 6102 (n 4), Article 1529.  
18
 The SPK Principles were based on OECD Corporate Governance Principles and published in 2003 
(updated in 2005 and in 2011). English version before the 2011 amendment is available at 
http://www.cmb.gov.tr/displayfile.aspx?action=displayfile&pageid=84&fn=84.pdf&submenuheader=
-1 accessed 08/03/2013.  
19
 BIST Corporate Governance Index (XKURY) operates in Borsa Istanbul since 2007. The index 
includes the companies that apply the corporate governance principles. See Borsa Istanbul website 
http://borsaistanbul.com/en/products-and-markets/indices/equity-indices/corporate-governance-index 
accessed 30/05/2013. 
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independent auditing.
20
 Similarly, the new TCC incorporated the main features of 
corporate governance principles throughout the Code.
21
 For example, the new TCC 
aims to obtain efficient disclosure and transparency mechanisms in companies.
22
 
Accordingly, many corporate governance principles are now implemented through 
the new TCC.
23
  
Strong corporate governance is a pre-condition for the establishment of an advanced 
efficient equity market for emerging economies.
24
 Better corporate governance 
frameworks can enable access to financing and lower costs of capital,
25
 and thereby 
enable companies to perform better which is important to attract investments. In 
addition, corporate governance principles can be used as a vehicle for the 
standardisation of company law in the EU.
26
 It is also possible to use improved 
corporate governance standards as a tool to prevent fraud and misconduct.   
1.2. Audit Failures  
When the Enron scandal occurred in the US, similar accounting scandals appeared in 
Europe (e.g. Parmalat and Royal Ahold).
27
 The US and European countries 
experienced these scandals despite their developed economies and advanced legal 
environments. One might think that experiencing such a scandal is far more 
hazardous for countries whose legal environment have not developed well, and 
economic conditions are fragile. Indeed, when the Imar Bank scandal was revealed to 
the markets between the years 2000-2003, the economy was unstable, the political 
environment was fragile, and the legal setting in Turkey was weak. This was because 
the Turkish banking sector experienced a financial crisis in November 2000 and 
February 2001, due to financial instability, weak capital, and corporate governance 
                                                 
20
 Communiqué Series: X, No: 22 regarding independent audit standards in financial markets, Official 
Gazette No. 26196 (12.06.2006). See also Section 2.3 below for a detailed explanation of the 
Communiqué.    
21
 Ünal Tekinalp, ‘Zorunlu Hedefler Baglaminda Turk Ticaret Kanunu Tasarisi’nda Anonim Sirkete 
Iliskin Kurumsal ve Dogmatik Duzen’ (2005) No. 4 Hukuk Perspektifleri Dergisi p. 635.  
22
 TCC General Justification (n 1) para.102.  
23
 See also Sections 2.4 and 4.1 below for a detailed analysis of the new TCC. 
24
 Dennis C. Mueller, The Corporation: Investment, Mergers, and Growth (Rutledge, London 2003)   
25
 Stijn Claessens and B. Burcin Yurtoglu, ‘Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets: A Survey’ 
available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1988880  
26
 See Section 1.3.2 below.  
27
 See Guido Ferrarini and Paolo Giudici, ‘Financial Scandals and the Role of Private Enforcement: 
the Parmalat Case’ European Corporate Governance Institute Law Working Paper No. 40/2005, May 
2005. See also Michael C. Knaap and Carol A. Knaap ‘Europe's Enron: Royal Ahold, N.V.’ (2007) 
22(4) Issues in Accounting Education 641.  
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structures.
28
 Following the crisis, several banks were transferred to the Saving 
Deposits Insurance Fund (TMSF), mainly due to mismanagement. Although the 
weak and fragile economic structure played a role in the failure of the major banks, 
fraud was also involved in some of the banking failures, e.g. the Imar Bank. 
The estimated amount of fraud involved in the Imar Bank scandal was $6.4 billion;
29
 
however, some argued that the true cost was much higher, at $11.7 billion.
30
 When 
the loss created by the Imar Bank scandal is added to the total financial burden of the 
economic crisis to the Turkish economy, the number is huge - $43 billion.
31
  
1.1.1.  The Imar Bank Case  
The Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BDDK) was put into operation in 
August 2000, just after the banking crisis, to regulate and supervise the banking 
sector in Turkey.
32
 As soon as the BDDK started this function, investigations into the 
Imar Bank began, partly due to a “decline in profitability and the illiquidity”, but 
mainly because of “the use of almost all of the credits of Imar Bank by Uzan 
Group”.33 In July 2003, the BDDK took over the Imar Bank, claiming that the bank 
had not met its legal and financial responsibilities, and most importantly posed a risk 
to the entire banking sector.
34
 Investigations revealed the unlicensed and short selling 
of government securities. Moreover, many transactions were left out of the records, 
actual amount deposits collected from customers were not reported correctly to the 
public authorities, and off-shore deposit accounts were transformed into domestic 
deposit accounts.
35
  
The Uzan family bought the Imar Bank in 1984. In the 1990s, the Uzan family 
owned an “empire” of 260 companies under the Rumeli Holding, including 2 banks: 
                                                 
28
 BDDK, ‘From Crisis to Financial Stability Turkey Experience’, Working Paper (Revised 2nd edn), 
Ankara 29.12.2009. 
29
 Ibid p. 25. 
30
 Mine Omurgonulsen and Ugur Omurgonulsen, ‘Critical thinking about creative accounting in the 
face of a recent scandal in the Turkish banking sector’ (2009) 20 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 
651. 
31
 Ibid p. 658. 
32
 In addition, the BDDK enables coordination with Basel Committee regulations on the banking 
sector. 
33
 BDDK, ‘Turk Bankacilik Sektorunun Guclendirilmesine Yonelik Calismalar ve Imar Bankasi 
Olayi, Press Conference, Ankara 23.10.2003. 
34
 Omurgonulsen and Omurgonulsen (n 30) p. 660.  
35
 BDDK Working Paper (n 28) p. 18.  
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Imar Bank and Adabank, hydro-electrical power stations, a mobile phone service 
company, 5 television channels, 12 radio stations, and 2 national newspapers.
36
 The 
Uzan Group faced civil and criminal lawsuits for extortion, fraud, and unlawful 
transactions, including international law-suits with major companies, such as 
Motorola.
37
  
With respect to fraud in the Imar Bank, a number of steps were enacted, including 
charges of being a member of a criminal organisation led by Kemal Uzan,
38
 and 
failing to handing over documents to auditors and obstructing audit work.
39
 
Accordingly, the 8
th
 High Criminal Court of Istanbul stated that:
 40
 
“… equal to 8 billion 500 million TL41 were illegally transferred into 
controlling shareholders: Uzan family group members and its group firms, 
through fraudulent, concealed and organized techniques which represent the 
biggest fraud in the Turkish banking sector and a highly remarkable scandal 
in the world banking history.”  
Uzan family members were found guilty of being “members of a criminal 
organisation” and participating in “continuous embezzlement”; they were sentenced 
to imprisonment for a minimum of 15 years.
42
 However, some family members were 
released on bail a few months after the judgement.
43
 Regarding the charges for 
obstructing audit work, a number of defendants, including Uzan family members 
were sentenced to imprisonment and monetary fines.
44
  
                                                 
36
 Omurgonulsen and Omurgonulsen (n 30) p. 659.  
37
 Motorola Inc v. Kemal Uzan, (2006) No. 06-1222, US District Court, Southern District of New 
York. In 2002, Motorola and Nokia sued the Uzan family, accusing them of borrowing $2.7 billion in 
bad faith. The U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the ruling by Judge Rakoff requiring the Uzan family to 
pay compensatory damages of $2.1 billion to Motorola. See David Glovin, ‘Motorola’s $1 Billion 
Award in Uzan Case is Upheld (Update 4)’, Bloomberg, 21 November 2007. 
38
 Turkiye Imar Bankasi, 8
th
 High Criminal Court of Istanbul (Istanbul 8. Agir Ceza Mahkemesi) 21 
February 2006.  
39
 Turkiye Imar Bankasi, 8
th
 High Criminal Court of Istanbul (Istanbul 8. Agir Ceza Mahkemesi) 13 
August 2008.   
40
 Turkiye Imar Bankasi (n 38). See Omurgonulsen and Omurgonulsen (n 30) p. 667. See also Esra 
Alus, ‘Mahkeme “Kemal Uzan cetesi” dedi’, Milliyet, 22 February 2006. There is no easy access to 
the original court decisions, e.g. court decisions are not available online for third parties. 
41
 At that time, this amount was equal to approximately 1.33 billion Euros. Exchange rates announced 
on 02.21.2006 by the Central Bank of Turkey as EUR/TRY: 1.5623.  
42
 See also Alus (n 40). 
43
 Bahattin Uzan relased on 500,000 YTL bail after he was sentenced to a sentence of 17 years’ 2 
months’ and 20 days’ imprisonment. See ‘Bahattin Uzan tahliye oldu’, Hurriyet, 10 April 2006.  
44
 Turkiye Imar Bankasi (n 39). See also ‘Imar Bankasi Davasi Karara Baglandi’ SonDakika.com, 13 
August 2008.  
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In July 2003, management and control of the Imar Bank was transferred to the 
Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF), which undertook the liquidation process 
for the bank.
45
 TMSF intensively examined all aspects of the Imar Bank scandal and 
it was realised that the actual size of the fraud could not be determined by the BDDK 
before the take-over.
46
 There were also lawsuits against BDDK and its auditors, 
which will be examined separately in the next part.  
1.2.2.  The Role of BDDK Auditors in the Imar Bank Case 
The Imar Bank was under close supervision because of the economic crisis that 
occurred in the banking sector in 2000. Thus, the BDDK were closely supervising 
the Imar Bank for the period 2000-2003.
47
 In this period, it was BDDK’s 
responsibility to sign public auditors to audit the bank’s financial reports.48 Despite 
close supervision by the BDDK, the Imar Bank management was able to engage in 
misconduct and managed to illegally transfer money to controlling shareholders and 
firms of the group.
49
 One may ask how fraudulent or ‘creative’ accounting practices 
could have been carried out under such close supervision; the role of BDDK and its 
public auditors in this case is therefore worth examining.  
There was no single contributor to the fraud in the Imar Bank case; instead, there 
were a number of reasons of why the fraud remained undetected for so long despite 
the fact that the BDDK was in close supervision with the bank.
50
 First, internal 
control mechanisms were designed to operate in accordance with controlling 
shareholders’ demands. To enable that, the Imar Bank had two separate accounting 
systems: one for branch records, reflecting accurate information, and the other kept 
in the general directorate to provide manipulated information for BDDK 
                                                 
45
 Omurgonulsen and Omurgonulsen (n 30) p. 662.  
46
 Ibid p. 663.  
47
 BDDK Press Conference (n 33) p. 61.  
48
 It should be mentioned that the audit carried out by BDDK auditors of the Imar Bank accounts was 
a kind of special purpose auditing, which included the aim of discovering any accounting malpractices 
in the bank.  
49
 It is argued that Uzan group used the 80 per cent of the funds for its own companies, with Law No. 
4389 letting bank owners to channel the maximum 25 per cent of total deposits to their own 
companies. See Recep Bahar, ‘Soru ve Cevaplarla Uzan Hortumu’ Yeni Mesaj 6 July 2003.   
50
 Commission of Inquiry into the Supervisory Implications of the Failure of the Imar Bank by Jean-
Louis Fort and Peter Hayward, August 2004 (Inquiry on Imar Bank) available at 
http://www.forecasturkey.com/Articles/Government/UT/rapor_20040831.pdf accessed 08/05/2013.  
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investigations.
51
  
Second, auditors (i.e. public auditors appointed by the BDDK) lacked experience of 
the specialised process for the effective audit of a financial institution.
52
 The Imar 
Bank was subject to a recapitalisation program after the banking crisis in 1994. 
Hence, public auditors assigned by the BDDK assessed the solvency and capital 
needs of the bank. This process was checked by an independent audit firm (Gozlem 
Denetim ve Danismanlik Hizmetleri A.S
53
) appointed by the BDDK. However, no 
questions arose at any of the three levels of the audit. This situation suggests that 
both public auditors and the audit firm appointed by the BDDK simply relied on the 
information provided by the bank but did not verify it.
54
 It was stated by the inquiry 
that the examination process carried out by BDDK auditors failed to detect any 
misreporting.
55
 Third, the Imar Bank failed to establish a sound corporate governance 
structure. For example, the board did not function properly, in that they did not 
receive any audit reports from the internal control services. In addition, board 
members had close relationships with controlling shareholders and were ready to act 
to serve their interests.
56
  
In September 2003, the Prime Ministry Inspection Board launched an investigation 
regarding concerns about the independence of the public auditors of the BDDK. As a 
result, 7 staff members of BDDK, including the president, were subjected to the 
litigation. The accusations included a breach of auditing duty and causing 
embezzlement.
57
 The inspectors of the Prime Ministry Inspection Board found that 
the BDDK, as a board, breached their auditing duty in the Imar Bank scandal and 
waived the short selling of government securities. In addition, it was determined that 
some public auditors engaged in bribery during the Imar Bank investigations.
58
 
Turkish Government officials raised concerns over the findings of this investigation. 
                                                 
51
 Bora Aktan, Omar Masood, and Senem Yilmaz, ‘Financial shenanigans and the failure of ethics in 
banking: a review and synthesis of an unprecedented fraud’ (2009) 4(1) Banks and Banks Systems 30.  
52
 Inquiry on Imar Bank (n 50) p. 27. 
53
 In 2009, the BDDK cancelled the license of the audit firm Gozlem Denetim ve Danismanlik 
Hizmetleri A.S, stating that the audit firm no longer met requirements. See BDDK Decision No. 3051 
12.02.2009.  
54
 Inquiry on Imar Bank (n 50) p. 11. 
55
 Ibid pp.11-2. 
56
 Ibid.  
57
 Cigdem Toker, ‘Imar’da “murakip” skandali’, Hurriyet, 22 January 2004. Court files are constituted 
of 40 files with almost 22 thousand pages and not available online.  
58
 See ibid. 
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“How could auditors not detect these wrongdoings? Apparently, this case will be a 
real problem to the BDDK”59 said then Minister of State (and current) Deputy of 
Prime Minister of Turkey Ali Babacan. The Minister also stated that the Imar Bank 
case showed similarities to the Enron case, where Arthur Andersen lost its reputation 
after big-scale accounting fraud was revealed.
60
 However, the public lawsuit brought 
against the former president of the BDDK and its auditors ended differently. In 2006, 
the 24
th
 Criminal Court of First Instance of Ankara (Ankara 24. Asliye Ceza 
Mahkemesi) convicted the auditors of the BDDK. However, the Supreme Court of 
Appeals (Yargitay) quashed this verdict. Subsequently, in February 2013, the court 
decided that the lawsuit is time-barred since no conclusion can be reached after 7 
years and 6 months.
61
 This result ably illustrates how cumbersome the judicial 
system is in Turkey. The final judgement of the courts also indicates an inefficient 
enforcement mechanism. Arguably, this judgement does not administer justices since 
it does not enact a penalty against auditors, despite their breach of auditing duty.  
The Imar Bank case is a good example of a weak governance structure comprised of 
inefficient internal and external control mechanisms. In terms of supervision, the 
Imar Bank scandal demonstrated how fraud could stay undetected when supervisory 
mechanisms are not working well. In conclusion, the Imar Bank failure showed that 
there were deficiencies at all four levels: internal control, external control, corporate 
governance, and supervision, and how these four levels of control created 
opportunities for fraud and at the same time failed to detect looting.
62
 It should be 
emphasised that controlling shareholders, as perpetrators of the fraud, made it even 
more difficult to detect that fraud. Moreover, out-dated laws, a slow judicial system, 
and the negligence of authorised auditors contributed to the unhindered deception.
63
  
Such failures in governance and supervision mechanisms have been a motivation for 
reforms in Turkey in the fields of banking law, capital markets law and corporate 
governance. Correspondingly, after the Imar Bank scandal, the BDDK took measures 
to strengthen Banking Law No. 5411,
64
 including measures on the audit of banks, 
                                                 
59
 ‘Bakandan Enron misali’ Radikal (online issue), 10 November 2003. 
60
 Ibid. 
61
 ‘Imar Bankasi davasi dustu’ Sabah, 27 February 2013.  
62
 Omurgonulsen and Omurgonulsen (n 30) p. 671.  
63
 Inquiry on Imar Bank Failure (n 50) p. 11. 
64
 Banking Law No. 5411, Official Gazette No. 25983 (01.11.2005). 
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internal audit, internal control, and transparency.
65
 In addition, since 2003, the SPK 
has been introducing specific regulations on the subject of corporate governance, 
independence of auditing, and ethical codes of accounting.
66
 In line with the 
strengthened regulations, the audit profession and external auditing have become 
more significant in Turkey. The next part will further discuss how the financial 
development and EU membership aims of Turkey have contributed to law reforms in 
auditing.  
1.3. Financial Development and EU Membership of Turkey  
1.3.1. Background of the Financial Development of Turkey 
Turkey’s annual economic growth averaged 2.7 per cent between 1994 and 2003.67 
However, the negative effect of the economic crises in both 1999 and 2001 should be 
taken into account when evaluating this rate. Since then, annual economic growth 
has averaged 4.95 per cent and is expected to be 4.4 per cent in 2017.
68
 Growth rates 
averaged 1.15 per cent in the Euro area and 1.96 in the US over the last ten years.
69
 
Despite the negative effects of the 2008 global crisis, Turkey can be considered a 
stable economy, while other European economies (e.g. Greece, Portugal, Ireland etc.) 
have struggled with debt crises. Turkey’s growing economy provides opportunities 
for new investment and this makes Turkey more attractive to direct foreign 
investment. Turkey is one of the fastest-growing emerging economies in Europe and 
its comparatively stable market conditions amongst its neighbours create an investor-
friendly environment set against a liberal-market economy.
70
 In addition, Turkey has 
close relations with European countries in terms of trading. For example, in 2011, 44 
per cent of Turkey’s international trade took place with EU countries.71 
As its economic position in global markets develops and its attractiveness for foreign 
investments improves, Turkey aims to reform its laws and regulations for further 
                                                 
65
 BDDK Working Paper (n 28) p. 18.  
66
 For SPK regulations on auditing. see Sections 2.3 and 3.3. 
67
 IMF World Economic Outlook (n 13) p. 194.  
68
 The growth rate slowed down after the global financial crisis in 2008 but was boosted in 2010 with 
9.8 per cent. See ibid.   
69
 Ibid p. 191.  
70
 In May 2013, Moody’s – a global rating agency - placed Turkey at investment grade with a stable 
outlook. See Daniel Bases, ‘Moody’s lifts Turkey’s credit rating to investment grade (Update-2)’ 
Reuters, 16 May 2013. 
71
 See Turkish Ministry of Economy’s Report (n 2). 
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developments. In fact, reforming laws and regulations came on to Turkey’s agenda in 
the mid-1990s. Although one of the incentives was to catch up with the privatisation 
trend in Europe, the main motivation behind reforms was joining the EU.
72
  
1.3.2. Turkey in the Process of EU Membership 
The long journey of Turkey towards EU membership started in 1987, when Turkey 
applied to join what was then the European Economic Committee (EEC). In 1997, 
the Luxemburg Council declared Turkey eligible to become a EU member. After 
that, the Helsinki European Council granted Turkey the status of ‘candidate country’ 
in 1999.
73
 
Compared with previous enlargements, the Copenhagen criteria for countries seeking 
to join the EU after 1995 introduced stricter rules.
74
 This is because, especially since 
the post-1995 enlargement, candidate countries were smaller and poorer than 
previous candidate countries, e.g. the Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries.
75
 As a result, the Copenhagen criteria were established in the specific 
context of the CEE countries’ enlargement conditions.76 In addition to an expanded 
set of rules for accession, the European Commission brought in a monitoring 
mechanism for compliance with EU acquis.  
According to the Copenhagen criteria, a candidate country has to meet ‘political’ and 
‘economic’ criteria before negotiations can be opened.77 Democracy and the rule of 
law, human rights and protection of minorities are considered as ‘political’ and 
existing of functioning market economy are considered as ‘economic’ criteria. Once 
a candidate country meets the political and economic criteria, it can start accession 
                                                 
72
 TCC General Justification (n 1). 
73
 See European Commission, Enlargement website 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/turkey/index_en.htm accessed 
23/05/2013.  
74
 Greece, Portugal, and Spain became members in the 1980s and none of these countries experienced 
parliamentary democracy nor operated as market economies at the time of application for 
membership. See Stuart Croft, John Redmond, G. Wyn Rees, and Mark Webber, The Enlargement of 
Europe (Manchester University Press, Manchester 1999) p. 57.  
75
 Ibid p. 58.  
76
 Christophe Hillion, ‘Copanhagen Criteria and their Progeny’ in Christophe Hillion (ed), EU 
Enlargement: a legal approach (Hart, Oxford 2004) p. 15.  
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 See European Council, ‘Conclusions of the Presidency’ DOC/93/3, Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993. 
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negotiations.
78
 Throughout negotiations, the Commission monitors the candidate 
country with regards its alignment with the EU acquis.
79
 
Turkey’s accession negotiations opened in 2005. Topics include the conditions of 
candidate’s adoption, implementation, and enforcement the current EU acquis. The 
acquis is referred to as all EU standards and rules, as divided into thirty-five different 
policy chapters.
80
 Each policy chapter is negotiated separately. So far, twelve 
chapters are under negotiation, one chapter is finalised, and negotiations on eight 
chapters were suspended in 2006 because of political conflict with the Republic of 
Cyprus.
81
  
During negotiations, the European Commission monitors the Turkey’s progress in 
applying EU legislation. As part of the monitoring process, the European 
Commission reports annually on Turkey’s progress on alignment of the acquis. In 
May 2012, a positive agenda was launched in order to support and complement the 
accession negotiations.
82
 Negotiations would be finalised once the candidate country 
fully and successfully completed all thirty-five policy chapters.
83
 However, accession 
negotiations are an “open-ended process”84 which means it is not guaranteed that 
Turkey will join the EU even if she fully adopted the EU acquis. There is therefore 
no expected date for EU membership for Turkey, since accession is not certain. 
The average time for a candidate country to gain access to the EU membership is 7 
years.
85
 Croatia, whose started accession negotiations in the same year as Turkey, 
finalised the 35 policy chapters in June 2011 and became an EU member on the 1
st
 
July 2013.
86
 Meanwhile, Turkey has completed only one chapter in these eight years, 
mainly because negotiations have been suspended.  
                                                 
78
 Hillon (n 76) p.20.  
79
 See European Council DOC93/3 (n 77). 
80
  Ibid.  
81
 See European Commission, EU and Turkey website http://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/turkey-the-
eu/accession-negotioations/what-is-the-current-status.html accessed 23/05/2013. 
82
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Enlargement 
Strategy and Main Challenges 2012 - 2013 Brussels 10.10.2012 COM (2012) 600 final, p. 16.  
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86
 EU Enlargement Factsheet, ‘Close-up on Enlargement Countries: Croatia’ 14 May 2013. 
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Although the EU suspended negotiations on eight chapters, the screening process 
continues.
87
 In this respect, in 2012 the Commission issued a progress report to 
assess the country’s level of compliance.88 The European Commission’s progress 
reports are drawn on a great variety of resources, including international and 
domestic non-governmental organisations’ reports, local press, firms and interest 
groups.
89
 The Commission’s progress report considered Turkey as a functioning 
market economy and advanced in the area of company law.
90
 However, in the same 
report, concerns are noted - especially regarding Turkey’s weak progress in meeting 
political criteria (i.e. the Cyprus conflict).
91
 
One could ask whether the EU requires a full compliance with the EU acquis or 
whether there is any flexibility with regards to the adoption of the rules. As stated in 
the 2000 Agenda, candidates should take up the EU acquis as a whole before 
accession.
92
 In other words, the Commission requires full compliance with the EU 
acquis for the post-1995 enlargements.
93
 Applicant countries are expected to adopt 
the EU acquis before accession. However, it is a fact that the EU allows delays of 
application, i.e. transitional periods - but only in exceptional cases.
94
 For instance, 
the Commission recommended the use of transitional periods to help candidates’ 
legal adaptation after accession.
95
 Through the use of transitional arrangements, 
candidates can become members of the EU without fully complying with the entire 
acquis.
96
 However, apart from these exceptional cases, the EU does require full 
adoption of the acquis. 
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Paper, RSC No.12/99, European University Institute, Florence, p. 20.  
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nd
 edn, OUP, Oxford 2008) 
p.180. 
95
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96
 In 2003, such a transitional arrangement was signed between Member States and ten candidate 
countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, and 
Slovak Republic). A year later, in 2004, these countries were admitted to the EU. See Kirstyn Inglis, 
‘The Accession Treaty and its Transitional Arrangements: A Twilight Zone for the New Members of 
Chapter VI: A Critical Analysis of Audit Regulations and Reforms in Turkey 
 
187 
 
The EU acquis includes EU legislation to date, as well as additional standards set by 
the courts and practices developed by the institutions. It is a fact that EU rules and 
standards have been growing substantially. It seems that the level of required 
adaptation is now higher for candidates than for current Member States.
97
  Therefore, 
it is getting more difficult for new candidates to fully adopt the EU acquis.
98
 
Consequently, accession is rather “arduous” and it is getting even more difficult for 
applicant countries.
99
 
Moreover, it is argued that the Commission assessment on the candidate country’s 
readiness is not objective.
100
 Although enlargement is an intergovernmental process 
where negotiations take place in a conference organised between Member States and 
the applicant state, in practice, the Commission’s influence on the process is 
strong.
101
 It is argued that such a monitoring process by the European Commission 
enables the EU to assess the candidate country through an objective process so that 
the political arrangements are not involved in the admission process.
102
 Nevertheless, 
an applicant’s readiness for membership depends heavily upon the Commission’s 
view, and current Member States might have an impact on the process.
103
 
Furthermore, the assessment of the progress of candidates is not entirely objective 
because it is evident that the Commission has previously disregarded full compliance 
with the acquis.
104
  
To conclude, as Arikan stated, the general argument of the EU regarding Turkey’s 
membership of the EU lies in two arguments that balance each other.
105
 On the one 
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hand, according to the first argument, economic, political, and cultural
106
 issues work 
against Turkey’s accession to the Union.107 The second argument views centres on 
security issues, e.g. Turkey’s powerful army forces as a member of NATO work in 
her favour.
108
 As these two main arguments dominate the EU’s view on Turkey’s 
accession to the Union, it is difficult to estimate when Turkey will join the EU. At 
first, Turkey needs to settle political issues with Cyprus so that the negotiations can 
start again. After that the decision heavily relies upon the Commission’s view as to 
whether Turkey fully aligned her legislation with the EU acquis or not. Even after 
that is achieved, it is not certain that Turkey would be granted full membership 
status, as the accession negotiations are ‘open-ended’.  
Regardless of the result of this process, Turkey will not act independently of 
developments in European law. In other words, Turkey sees the EU acquis as a 
benchmark for its law reforms. Reformation efforts in Turkey in terms of aligning 
the law with the acquis can be considered condition to join the EU, but EU 
membership will also be a guarantee for ensuring consistency in the reforms. Before 
beginning a discussion on the reforms in Turkey, it is necessary to show how 
auditing was regulated before the recent reforms.  
2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXTERNAL AUDITING IN TURKISH LAW 
In Turkey, there is no single set of standards or a single standard setting body in the 
field of external auditing. Public companies and banks are subject to different 
regulatory arrangements. For instance, the SPK regulates the audits of publicly held 
companies while the BDDK governs and supervises the audits of banks and 
insurance companies. Regarding oversight mechanisms, oversight of those who are 
excluded in the list of SPK and BDDK is the responsibility of the Public Oversight 
                                                 
106
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Authority of Turkey (KGK)
109
. An audit firm may be subject to double oversight as a 
result of this multi-headed structure.  
Since there is no single audit authority in Turkey, laws on external auditing are 
numerous as well. Listed companies, including public limited and private limited 
companies in Turkey are subject to a number of regulations and codes issued by 
different institutions. As a result, companies are subject to the TCC as the main 
source of Turkish company law, Capital Markets Law (CML) as the second source, 
alongside the regulations and communiqués issued by the SPK, including the 
Corporate Governance Principles. In addition, financial institutions, such as banks, 
are subject to the Banking Code and the supervision of BDDK.
110
 This means that 
financial institution may be subject to the provisions of Capital Markets Law and 
supervision by SPK if it is listed on Borsa Istanbul.
111
 
This section presents an overview of the laws on auditing and briefly discusses them. 
Throughout this section, previous arrangements on external auditing are compared 
with the audit law reforms; however, a general discussion on audit law reforms will 
be given in Section 4.  
2.1. The Profession Act  
Law No. 3568 of 1989 (amended in 2008)
112
 was the very first code that recognized 
accounting and auditing as professions, and hence famous as the ‘Profession Act’. 
The Chamber of Accountants of Turkey (TURMOB) was founded by this Act. 
TURMOB is a non-governmental unified chamber of certified and chartered 
accountants in Turkey and has been a member of the IFAC since 1994. 
TURMOB has the responsibility to issue accounting and auditing standards that are 
compatible with international standards. Later, in 1999, the Turkish Accounting 
Standards Board (TMSK) was authorised to develop accounting standards in Turkey. 
For the development of auditing standards, the Turkish Auditing Standards Board 
                                                 
109
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110
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(TDSK) was created by TURMOB in 2003.
113
 In addition, in 2008, TURMOB issued 
rules and principles for auditors based on honesty, reliability, and independence.
114
  
The Profession Act specifies who should conduct independent audits, although it 
does not govern the conduct of independent auditing. Under the Profession Act, the 
Certified Public Accountants (SMMM) and Sworn-in Certified Public Accountants 
(YMM) are authorized to perform independent audit.
115
 YMM is a sworn-in 
chartered public accountant and SMM is a certified public accountant (CPA). The 
law specifies the conditions to an SMMM or YMM (e.g. having a university or equal 
level, undergone practical training, and passed an examination).
116
 An SMMM could 
be qualified as an YMM if he (or she) passed the exam following ten years’ 
experience in the field.
117
 According to the Profession Act, every accountant must 
register and be a member of the chamber under TURMOB after qualifying as an 
SMMM and/or YMM.
118
 
Back in the days when the ‘Profession Act’ came into force, an auditor mostly 
undertook public auditing (e.g. auditing undertaken by Ministry of Finance, Treasury 
that mostly investigated the tax compliance of public institutions), and was different 
from external auditing. Therefore, at the time the Act came into force, the auditing 
profession had not developed as much as it has today.
119
 The Act only defined 
general conditions to meet to be qualified as an accountant. Issues such as general 
principles, objectives, and the ethics of an audit were not covered by the Act. 
Moreover, auditing was limited to tax auditing that was based on the declaration that 
accounting records are in line with the tax law. Therefore, external auditing carried 
out in Turkey back then was not in accordance with EU standards.
120
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2.2. Capital Markets Codes   
Capital Markets Law No. 2499
121
 came into force in 1981. This law regulated the 
functioning of the financial market and its institutions. In this respect, the SPK was 
created by the Act in the same year. The SPK, in cooperation with TURMOB, was 
authorised to issue regulations regarding the external auditing and publish the list of 
qualified audit firms.
122
 In 2012, the Law was amended with law No. 6362.
123
 An 
important development for external auditing in Turkey, new law No. 6362 assigned 
the role of audit supervision to the Public Oversight Accounting and Auditing 
Standards Authority (KGK), the Turkish public oversight body.
124
 With the 
establishment of the KGK, the role of issuing rules in auditing is no longer applicable 
for the TURMOB, yet the SPK has still its authority in capital markets.  
Independent audit was outlined in Capital Markets Law and communiqués by the 
SPK back in 1996. Although these regulations provided guidance on independent 
auditing, only a limited number of companies (e.g. listed companies) were subject to 
these regulations. As a result of the little attention given to related laws, public 
awareness of external auditing was not well developed, and the concept of 
independent auditing was not entirely understood by the top managers of 
companies.
125
 External auditing did not receive enough attention by the industry until 
2006, when the SPK issued a Communiqué parallel to ISAs: Communiqué Series: X, 
No: 22.
126
  
2.3. SPK Communiqués on External Auditing 
The Capital Markets Law authorized the SPK to issue communiqués and regulations 
on external auditing.
127
 The very first regulation of corporate audits was drafted in 
1982 by a SPK Communiqué that determined general rules and principles regarding 
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the auditing and auditors.
128
 In 1987, the SPK issued a regulation on independent 
external auditing that governs the audits of capital market players in Turkey.
129
 
Thereafter, the regulation and supervision of audits of public companies and their 
auditors have been governed by these communiqués and other regulations issued by 
the SPK.  
SPK regulations and communiqués that start with X are the primary regulatory tools 
with regards external auditing in Turkey. The very first regulation on independent 
auditing governed by a communiqué was the Communiqué Series: X, No: 16 issued 
in 1996.
130
 Corresponding to the Enron scandal, the SPK issued Communiqué Series: 
X, No: 19
131
 in 2002, introducing similar provisions to SOX, especially with respect 
of independence requirements. Accordingly, providing consulting and legal services 
was forbidden for independent auditors (or audit firms) that provided audit services 
at the same time.
132
 The mandatory rotation of audit firms every 5 years,
133
 and the 
requirement to establish an audit committee for listed companies,
134
 were also 
introduced by the same Communiqué.  
The SPK is obliged to set the principles of external auditing in financial markets in 
accordance with international standards. In 2006, the SPK issued Communiqué 
Series: X, No: 22, which governs the general principles of independent auditing, 
detailing institutions that are subject to independent audits, the objectives of an audit, 
the terms of audit engagements, and responsibility of auditors.
135
 It required that 
annual and half-year financial statements of listed firms
136
 be subject to statutory 
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auditing.
137
 In addition, financial statements were henceforth to be subject to external 
auditing in case of merger, take-over, and liquidation.
138
 With 35 sections, the 
Communiqué broadly covers the regulation of independent auditing in capital 
markets. Most importantly, Communiqué Series: X, No: 22 sets a similar outline 
with ISAs. All of the 35 sections outlined in the Communiqué have a purpose and 
objective that match ISA’s.  
Since 2006, Communiqué Series: X, No: 22 has been amended several times, which 
has brought about substantial changes. In 2008, the SPK updated the Communiqué in 
accordance with the Clarification Project of ISAs.
139
 In 2009, the Communiqué 
established a 7-year rule for the engagements with the same audit firm.
140
 In addition, 
the same year, a mandatory audit rotation exemption was introduced for audit firms 
that are institutionalised enough to ensure their independence. For an audit firm to be 
exempt from mandatory audit rotation, it should staff 75 audit partners, 25 of whom 
should be key audit partners and should rotate the audit partners every 7 years.
141
 
2.4. Commercial Codes 
The Commercial Code of 1956
142
 did not regulate external audits of joint stock 
companies’ (anonim şirket). The 1956 Code only issued rules related to internal 
auditing. For the first time, the new Commercial Code No. 6102 of 2012
143
 requires 
all companies (listed or not) be audited by an external independent auditor if they 
meet the requirements set by the cabinet.
144
 Three criteria determine if companies are 
subject to statutory auditing: (i) total assets are 150 million TL or over, (ii) net sales 
revenues are 200 million TL or over, and (iii) staff members are 500 or over.
145
 
Accordingly, a company will be subject to statutory auditing if it meets the two of 
these criteria in two consecutive accounting periods. The new Code No. 6102 has 
broadened the scope of external auditing. This will be discussed further in Section 4.   
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3. THE AUDIT MARKET STRUCTURE IN TURKEY 
3.1. Background of the Audit Profession in Turkey   
The very first financial auditing practices in Turkey took place in the years between 
1926 and 1934.
146
 However, these practices had a limited scope, with mainly tax 
auditing.
147
 During the 1950s, the number of family companies had increased, but 
auditing was not being undertaken by family companies.
148
 Instead, auditing found 
its application in special-purpose audits conducted by state organs.
149
 In the 1960s, 
foreign companies started to make investments in Turkey. Following the rapid 
growth of foreign currency flow, financial auditing emerged as a need for system 
consultancy, especially for tax laws and for the Turkish Commercial Code (TCC).
150
 
Auditors were seen as the persons to do the compulsory work required by the 
Ministry of Finance. Audits used to mainly involve checking whether the accounting 
works complied with the requirements of the component authorities. Financial 
auditing started to develop in the light of the capital market regulations mainly issued 
by the SPK. In 1987, the first rules in terms of financial auditing were issued for 
capital markets to conduct independent audits.
151
 By then, banks and public 
companies started to get audited by registered audit firms.  
As it is the case in Europe, external auditing and its role in capital markets have 
received significant attention during and after the financial crisis in Turkey. 
Previously, Turkish companies paid less attention to external auditing. Due to 
common tradition of unregistered economic transactions, less-developed financial 
markets, and inadequate information regarding the benefits of external auditing, 
companies created a budget for external auditing only when it was necessary (e.g. 
when they are planning to apply for bank loans).
152
 Moreover, the insufficient 
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regulation of auditing was another reason for the lack of attention paid to external 
auditing by Turkish companies. In parallel to the development of financial markets, 
the audit industry also developed in Turkey. It might be useful to examine whether 
the audit market in Turkey shares similarities with the global audit industry.  
3.2. Audit Firms in Turkey  
The LLP organisation structure is common amongst audit firms in Europe, whereas 
in Turkey, audit firms have to be organized as joint-stock companies.
153
 Currently, 
there are 91 auditing firms operating and certified by the SPK.
154
 The practices of 
independent audit firms are subject to surveillance by the SPK in the field of capital 
markets. In addition, the role of setting the establishment requirements and working 
principles of statutory auditors and audit firms is assigned to the KGK by law.
155
 
The very first audit firm established in Turkey was an international audit firm - 
Touch Ross, established in 1967 with Turkish partners. In 1982, international audit 
firm Coopers and Lybrand merged with local audit firm Güven Muhasebe A.S.156 
PwC has been giving service in Turkey since then.
 
The other two largest global audit 
firms (i.e. EY and KPMG) are also actively involved in the Turkish audit market. In 
fact, currently, the Turkish audit market is dominated by branches of the Big Four 
audit firms even though their domination is not substantial as in the EU audit market. 
For the period 2008-2009, more than 50 per cent of companies listed in the ISE, now 
the Borsa Istanbul, were audited by the branches of the Big Four.
157
 Apart from the 
Big Four audit firms, other global audit firms also operate in Turkey, e.g. Grant 
Thornton and BDO International, to name but two. The domination of the big audit 
firms is expected to create a competitive disadvantage for local audit firms. 
However, a study revealed that almost 50 per cent of audit firms in Turkey are local 
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audit firms.
158
 According to the same study, as of 2009, there are 46 local and 48 
international audit firms in Turkey.
159
  
In terms of the size of assets of audited listed firms for the period 2008-2009, the 
biggest local auditing firm in Turkey was Kavram Bagimsiz Denetim A.S., 
established in 1987.
160
 Kavram Bagimsiz Denetim is the only local audit firm 
included in the list of the biggest 10 independent audit firms in Turkey, holding 8
th
 
position in that list.
161
  
Biggest Audit 
Firms 
(world ranking 
by revenues)
162
  
Biggest Audit Firms in Turkey
163
 
 
Audit Firms Branches 
Foundation 
Year
164
 
PwC PwC Basaran Nas 1981 
Deloitte & Touché KPMG  Akis  1982 
KPMG  Deloitte & Touché Drt Bagimsiz Denetim 1986 
Ernst & Young Ernst & Young  Guney  2006 
BDO International Grant Thornton  Engin  1999 
Grant Thornton BDO International Denet 1981 
RSM International BDO International Baylan 1987 
Table 6.1: The biggest audit firms and their branches in Turkey 
As seen, the largest global audit firms are active in the Turkish audit market and they 
audit the majority of listed companies. However, indicators (going concern reporting 
accuracy and detecting fraud and material misstatements in the accounts
165
) 
regarding the quality of their audits are mixed.  
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Before the global financial crisis, between the years 1996 and 2006, there were 33 
distressed firms listed in the ISE.
166
 In the audit reports, a going concern opinion was 
issued for only 5 firms, while there were no going concern opinions, issued for the 
remaining 28 firms.
167
 These findings revealed that firms with financial difficulties 
received audit reports without disclosing going concern uncertainty. 
In 2008, a study found that 37 out of 342 ISE firms were financially distressed.
168
 7 
out of 37 audit reports issued unmodified (clear) opinions and 19 of them stated 
conditions to stay as a going-concern.
169
 However, none of the audit reports issued 
modified or adverse opinions, and 11 audit reports had no statements on going 
concern. In subsequent years, 11 of the 37 firms went bankrupt. 
Another study investigated the audit reports of firms listed on the ISE to identify 
whether they provided misleading or corrupted information in the financial 
statements of listed firms.
170
 The study investigated 344 firms listed on the ISE and 
their audit reports, issued in 2009. It was found that none of the audit reports of 344 
firms issued a modified opinion on the financial statements.
171
 This means that either 
there was no misleading information in the accounts, or auditors failed to detect 
misstatements. The other possibility is that the auditor found a misstatement but did 
not report it. It is rather unrealistic to assume that none of the 344 firms engaged in 
fraudulent financial reporting. It is more likely that auditors were avoiding issuing 
modified reports.  
Auditors are required by law to issue modified reports when financial statements do 
not present a true and fair view, or the auditor is unable obtain sufficient appropriate 
audit evidence to form an audit opinion.
172
 In this respect, an auditor may modify the 
audit report by issuing a ‘qualified opinion’ when there are material misstatements, 
                                                 
166
 Burcu Adiloğlu and Bengü Vuran, ‘A Multicriterion Decision Support Methodology for Audit 
Opinions: The Case of Audit Reports of Distressed Firms in Turkey’ (2011) 10(12) International 
Business and Economics Research Journal 37.  
167
 Ibid.  
168
 Șaban Uzay and Șükran Güngör Tanc, ‘Analyzing the concept of going concern in independent 
audit companies trading on the Istanbul Stock Exchange’ in MODAV 6th Annual International 
Accounting Conference, 3-5 December 2009, Istanbul. 
169
 Ibid. 
170
 Idris Varici, ‘Hileli Finansal Raporlama Acisindan Denetcinin Sorumlulugu: IMKB’de Faaliyet 
Gosteren Isletmelerin Denetim Raporlarinin Incelenmesi’ (2012) 5 Gumushane Universitesi Sosyal 
Bilimler Elektronik Dergisi 122.  
171
 Ibid p. 137.  
172
 SPK Communiqué Series: X, No: 22 (n 20), Section 30, Chapter 3.  
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but ones which are not pervasive to the financial statements; an ‘adverse opinion’ 
when misstatements are both material and pervasive to the financial statements; or a 
‘disclaimer of opinion’ when the auditor is unable to obtain sufficient audit evidence 
to form an audit opinion.
173
  
Qualified audit opinions and disclaimers of opinion can be taken into account when 
questioning the reason behind the auditors’ avoidance of issuing modified reports. 
The study carried out by Varici determined that 38 audit reports were potentially 
involved in fraudulent financial reporting. It was found that 50 per cent (19 of 38) of 
these reports were qualified audit opinions or disclaimers of opinion despite the fact 
that there was sufficient appropriate evidence to issue modified opinions.
174
 These 
findings illustrate that fraudulent financial reporting exists amongst listed firms in 
Turkey. However, external auditors do not have a tendency to issue modified audit 
opinions. These findings may be relied upon as evidence of low-quality audit reports 
in Turkey.  
In response to the global financial crisis, the SPK issued amendments on 
Communiqué Series: X, No: 22. In 2011, and the requirement of establishment of 
quality assurance system for audit firms was introduced.
175
 In this respect, audit 
firms are required to control independent audit activities over certain periods in order 
to increase audit quality. In addition to strengthened regulations on audit quality, 
auditors and audit firms are subject to oversight of the SPK.  
3.3. SPK Monitoring Over Audit Firms  
Although the role of supervision and investigation of audit profession was given to 
the KGK with the enactment of Statutory Decree No. 660,
176
 the SPK can provide 
additional conditions for the approval of audit firms or cancel the approval of the 
licence of audit firms governed by the KGK.
177
 Moreover, the SPK still has statutory 
rights to supervise audit practices and audit firms that operate in capital markets.
178
 
In this respect, the SPK is the responsible body for the supervision and regulation of 
                                                 
173
 Ibid, Article 5 (3)-(4)-(5).  
174
 Varici (n 170) p. 140.  
175
 Communiqué Series: X, No: 27 amending communiqué on independent audit standards in capital 
markets, Official Gazette No. 27886 (26.03.2011), Article 20.  
176
 For the objectives and duties of the KGK, see Section 4.2 below. 
177
 CML No. 6362 (n 111), Article 62(1). 
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 Ibid, Article 62(2). 
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the audits of a number of institutions, including listed firms, rating and credit 
agencies, and investment institutions.
179
 The regulation of auditing practices of listed 
companies, except banks and insurance companies, is the responsibility of the 
SPK.
180
  
The SPK is an independent regulatory authority in capital markets and is empowered 
by law to issue regulations in capital markets as well as to supervise compliance with 
the law and apply administrative sanctions in case of any breach of its rules.
181
 
Within this context, audits of listed companies are subject to inspections of the SPK 
under the quality control reviews. The SPK can launch inspections of audit firms as a 
form of regular routine or as a result of a complaint or a denouncement. The most 
common sanctions are warnings, administrative fines, cancellation of licences, or 
issuing criminal reports to the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office (Cumhuriyet 
Bassavciligi).
182
  
SPK monitoring over audit firms operates under the Distance Data Collection 
(Uzaktan Veri Alim) project. Within this project, the SPK gathers information 
electronically. In accordance with the collected data and reports, the SPK conducts 
quality reviews on specified audit firms. Following inspections, the SPK can issue 
penalties if any violation of SPK legislation is detected.
183
 The list of penalties or any 
other regulatory sanctions is issued annually in the activity report.
184
  
Table 6.2 below presents the administrative fines and other sanctions issued to audit 
firms by the SPK for the period 2008-2011. The data are collected from the annual 
activity reports of SPK between 2008 and 2011.  
 
                                                 
179
 Cabinet Decision No. 2012/4213 (n 145). 
180
 Banks and insurance companies’ regulations regarding their establishment, accounting, auditing, 
and financial tables and reporting standards are subject to specific banking regulations of the BDDK. 
See CML No. 6362 (n 111), Article 50 a(4). 
181
 For SPK’s mission statement and goals and objectives see its website 
http://www.cmb.gov.tr/indexcont.aspx?action=showpage&menuid=0&pid=0&submenuheader=-1 
accessed 08/03/2013. 
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 Gonen and Uzay (n 158).   
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 The quality control reviews used to take place as onsite reviews; however, as of 2010, SPK 
launched a project called Distant Data Collection (Uzaktan Veri Alim Projesi) that enables SPK to 
collect data online.  
184
 SPK’s Annual Activity Reports are available online at 
http://www.spk.gov.tr/indexcont.aspx?action=showpage&menuid=7&pid=5 accessed 03/04/2013.  
Chapter VI: A Critical Analysis of Audit Regulations and Reforms in Turkey 
 
200 
 
Years 
Investigated 
firms 
Legal 
Warning 
Administrative 
fine 
De-
listing 
Total 
administrative 
fine (TL) 
2008 12 out of 94 4 3 4 80.880 
2009 16 out of 95 7 7 3
185
 97.552 
2010 16 out of 92 - 8 1 153.420 
2011 11 out of 91 14
186
 2 - 35.662 
Table 6.2: Quality Control Reviews by SPK for the period 2008-2011 
The sanctions the SPK imposes on audit firms are based on de-listing, administrative 
fines, and legal warnings. All of these sanctions are issued as a result of breach of the 
SPK Communiqués Series: X, No: 22 and Series: VIII, No: 45. However, it is 
questionable how effective the quality control reviews of the SPK are. As can be 
seen from Table 6.2, only 12-15 per cent of audit firms were investigated each 
year.
187
 There is no other information about the rest of the audit firms’ audit quality. 
Moreover, in the SPK Quality Control Reviews, there is no specific information 
regarding sanctions for the Big Four audit firms’ branches in Turkey. Although some 
SPK reports revealed the name of the audit firms who received an administrative fine 
or a legal warning, none of these audit firms was one of the Big Four branches in 
Turkey.  
In 2010, Kavram Bagimsiz Denetim, the eighth biggest audit firm in Turkey, was 
levied with 17,170 TL in administrative fines due to low audit quality.
188
 The SPK 
fined Kavram Bagimsiz Denetim over activities that breached SPK Communiqué 
Series: X, No: 22 Section 1, Article 7; Section 2, Article 14; Section 4, Article 13; 
Section 5, Articles 4, 10, 11, 12; Section 6, Article 3; Section 9, Articles 3, 4; Section 
1, Article 7; and Section 29, Article 4,5,9.
189
 In summary, the fines were levied due 
to a breach of requirements on the calculation of audit risk and on the requirement of 
showing due care when performing an audit. 
                                                 
185
 Four audit firms were applied for de-listing. As a result, 3 of them were de-listed in 2009, and one 
of them was de-listed in 2010. See the SPK Annual Activity Report of 2009, Ankara 2010, p. 73.  
186
 There is an incompatibility between the numbers of investigated audit firms and the number of 
sanctions. For instance, 11 audit firms were investigated in 2011, but there were 14 legal warnings. 
There is no clarification of this issue in the SPK activity reports. The reason for this may be that some 
of the audit firms might have received more than one warning (or fine).  
187
 As table 6.2 illustrates, in 2008, 12%; in 2009, 16%; and over 2010-2011, 17% of audit firms were 
investigated by the SPK. 
188
 SPK Weekly Bulletin 2010/45, 25-28 October 2010.  
189
 Ibid p. 5  
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It can be concluded that the audit market in Turkey shares some similarities with the 
global audit industry. To begin with, auditors and audit firms that audit listed 
companies’ accounts are subject to surveillance by an oversight body, namely the 
SPK. Second, the audit market is dominated by the Big Four audit firms - although 
this domination is not prominent as it is in European markets.
190
 It is possible that the 
SPK’s mandatory rotation rule on audit firms might have positively influenced this 
relatively moderate concentration level in Turkey. Third, as well as examples from 
the US and Europe,
191
 audit firms in Turkey were reluctant to issue modified audit 
reports for financially-distressed companies.   
4. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE REFORMS ON EXTERNAL AUDITING 
4.1. New Turkish Commercial Code of 2012 
According to the General Justification of the new TCC, the Commercial Code of 
1956 provided modern, reliable, and effective solutions to the commercial problems 
of the time. However, it was not able to keep up with the developments that have 
taken place over the last fifty years.
192
 Neither there were major amendments in 
accordance with these financial developments in the Act. Therefore, it was judged 
necessary to create a new law.  
The Turkish Commercial Code Draft (the Draft) was the outcome of 5 years’ work of 
a commission appointed for drafting the new TCC.
193
 The Draft included a detailed 
comparative overview of developments in the commercial law of European 
countries.
194
 It can be said that the provisions of the new Code have been inspired by 
EU jurisdictions.
195
 In addition, the new TCC was created in the context of a number 
of EU regulations, directives, recommendations, and communications in order to be 
in compliance with the EU acquis.
196
  
                                                 
190
 For the Big Four concentration in Europe, see Chapter II, Section 2.4.  
191
 See Chapter II, Section 3.2. 
192
 TCC General Justification (n 1), para.2.  
193
 The members of this commission are agents of the Turkish Ministry of Justice, the Turkish 
Supreme Court, academic members from various universities in Turkey, agents of the SPK, BDDK 
and the Turkish Accounting Standards Board.  
194
 See in general TCC General Justification (n 1). 
195
 Eroglu (n 4) p. 257.  
196
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The Draft examines developments in commercial law in different jurisdictions in 
Europe, because of Turkey’s objective to adopt EU regulations as an official EU 
candidate country. Therefore, the new TCC is a part of the process of embracing 
European law, as Turkey is already required to harmonise its law with the EU 
acquis.
197
 In terms of auditing, it is said that countries that reform their financial 
markets usually need to adopt audit practices from more advanced markets.
198
 The 
new TCC, in this respect, provides similar provisions with EU laws on auditing. In 
addition to provisions to harmonise EU law, the new Code also reflects changes in 
doing business in the 21
st
 century.
199
 For example, the new Code now requires 
companies to have websites,
200
 includes provisions for e-commerce, and enables 
online general assemblies and online board meetings.
201
  
After a number of amendments on the draft version, the new Code was accepted in 
the Turkish parliament in January 2011. The new TCC was issued on 13.01.2011 and 
largely came into force on 01.07.2012; yet, its provisions on external auditing only 
came into force on 01.01.2013. The new Code regulates external auditing in the third 
section with 10 articles: Articles 397-406. Within the context of the new TCC, the 
external auditing reforms were as follows: The auditor shall investigate whether the 
financial statements are in line with Turkish Auditing Standards (TDS).
202
 In 
addition, the auditor shall examine whether the financial reports of the board of 
directors present a true view of the financial situation of the company to its 
shareholders.
203
 Financial statements that were not audited by an independent 
external auditor would be considered as though they were not prepared.
204
  
                                                                                                                                          
the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Modernising Company Law and 
Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union - A Plan to Move Forward, Brussels, COM 
(2003) 284 final (21.5.2003) and Reinforcing the statutory audit in the EU Brussels, COM (2003) 286 
final (21.5.2003). See TCC General Justification (n 1), paras.221, 222, 224, and 225. 
197
 In addition to modernizing of the Commercial Law, the Turkish Civil Code and Criminal Codes 
have been subject to on-going amendments since 2001. 
198
 Joseph P. H. Fan and T. J. Wong, ‘Do External Auditors Perform a Corporate Governance Role in 
Emerging Markets? Evidence from East Asia’, (2005) 43(1) Journal of Accounting Research 35. 
199
 Caleb Lauer, ‘Turkey’s new commercial code to have broad impact on M&A’, Financial Times, 5 
March 2012. 
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 TCC No. 6102 (n 4), Article 1524. 
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 Ibid, Article 1527. 
202
 Ibid, Article 397(1).  
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The main objective of independent external auditing is to examine a company’s 
internal audit system and its financial accounts, and to check compliance with 
Turkish Accounting Standards and the law.
205
 Following the new TCC, auditing in 
Turkey should now develop based on international professional standards. A detailed 
evaluation of these reforms will be given next.  
i. Expanded application for external auditing  
Previously, since the TCC did not regulate external auditing, only listed companies 
were subject to external auditing under CML and SPK regulations. The new TCC 
requires all types of companies
206
 to be audited by an independent auditor (or an 
audit firm).
207
  
The other reform of the new TCC is that all companies subject to external auditing 
are obliged to have a website
208
 displaying important information about the company 
that might affect stock prices, e.g. securing or selling of stock shares that are more 
than 5 per cent of the company shares.
209
 In addition, all financial reports, including 
audit reports, are to be published on the company’s website.210 With respect of this 
new regulation, the intention is to provide easy access for existing shareholders and 
investors to audited financial information.  
ii. Increased qualifications for external auditors  
Previously, auditors worked as members of the company and they were not 
professionals who were specifically qualified to perform the audit work. This 
situation was raising serious doubts about the quality and reliability of audit reports. 
The new TCC regulated who can perform audit work through setting requirements to 
be an independent auditor. These requirements are in line with EU Directive 
2006/43/EC.
211
 According to the new TCC, auditors will no longer work as a 
member of the audited company; instead, an audit firm whose partners are SMMM 
                                                 
205
 Ibid, Article 398.  
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 All companies may be subject to external auditing if they meet the requirements set by the cabinet. 
See Cabinet Decision No. 2012/4213 (n 149). See also Section 2.4 above.  
207
 TCC No. 6102 (n 4), Article 397(1).   
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 Ibid, Article 198. 
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or YMM could be appointed as an independent auditor. For SMEs, one or more 
SMMM or YMM could be appointed as an independent auditor.
212
 Auditors and 
audit firms are to be elected by the general assembly.
213
 Specialised Courts on 
Commercial Law (Asliye Ticaret Mahkemeleri) can remove an auditor at the request 
of the board and shareholders who hold at least 5 per cent of the stocks, based on a 
good reason.
214
 
Furthermore, Statutory Decree No. 660 has to be read together with the Article 400 
of the new TCC, since it sets extra conditions to be an independent auditor. This 
regulation makes a distinction for the first time as to audits of public-interest-entities’ 
(PIEs)
215
 and audits of other firms’. Accordingly, audits of the PIEs must be carried 
out only by audit firms, while other firms’ audits could be carried out either by 
auditors or audit firms.
216
 In addition, the law also states that only audit firms may 
carry out large entities’ audits.217 Accordingly, an SMMM and/or YMM cannot be 
appointed as an independent auditor for PIEs or large-entity audits. Instead, only 
audit firms can carry out large-entity and PIE audits. For audits of PIEs, a minimum 
of 15 years’ professional experience is set as an extra requirement.218 Auditors 
(SMMM or YMM) who have met the 15-year requirement have to take an exam to 
qualify as an independent auditor.
219
  
Another requirement is set for key audit partners. The Statutory Decree makes a 
distinction again to be a key audit partner for the audits of PIEs’ and other firms’. 
Accordingly, to be a key audit partner of PIEs, an SMMM or YMMM has to work as 
an auditor or senior auditor for a minimum of 2 years (1 year for audits of other 
firms), in addition to having 15 years professional experience (10-year professional 
experience for audits of other firms).
220
 Under these requirements, the new TCC 
aimed to construct a well-qualified audit profession in the field.  
                                                 
212
 TC No. 6102 (n 4), Article 400(1).  
213
 Ibid, Article 399(1). 
214
 Ibid, Article 399(4). 
215
 PIEs defined as follows: listed firms, banks, insurance, reassurance and pension firms, factoring 
and financing firms and pension funds. See Statutory Decree No. 660 (n 155), Article 2(i). 
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 Regulation on independent auditing, Official Gazette No.28509 (26.12.2012), Article 11(3). 
217
 TCC No. 6102 (n 4), Article 400.  
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 Regulation No.28509 (n 216), Article 28(1).  
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 Ibid, Article 16. 
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iii. Auditor independence ensured by law 
Article 400 of the new TCC sets the conditions for those who can carry out statutory 
audits. The same article also states circumstances that might jeopardize auditor 
independence. In the presence of any direct or indirect financial, business, 
employment, or other relationship between the auditor and the audited firm, the 
auditor or its partners must not carry out the audit.
221
 In this provision, the new TCC 
sets independence as a requirement for external auditing. In other words, the audit 
work will not be carried out unless the independence requirement is satisfied.  
In addition to the auditor independence, the TCC states that audit partners and other 
persons who work with the auditor are independent and not involved in decision 
taking in the audited company. Any economic dependence on the audited company 
jeopardizes auditor independence. Hence, the TCC states that the auditor shall not 
carry out the audit if 30 per cent of their total revenue in the last 5 years has been 
generated from the audited company, or another company affiliated to the audited 
company with more than 20 per cent shares.
222
 
In summary, the new TCC expanded the application of external auditing through the 
requirement of statutory auditing for all companies who has met the requirements set 
by the law. In addition, the new Code aimed at increasing audit quality level. For this 
purpose, it increased the requirements to qualify as a statutory auditor in line with 
international standards. Thereby, the new TCC requires financial statements to be 
produced by independent, well-qualified, and professional auditors who have 
relevant expertise and experience in the field.    
4.2. The Establishment of Public Oversight Accounting and Auditing Standards 
Authority (KGK) 
EU Directive 2006/43/EC requires Member States to establish a public oversight 
board to supervise auditors and audit firms and implement sanctions in case of any 
violation of related law.
223
 In line with this requirement, in 2011, Turkey established 
its public oversight body: the Public Oversight Accounting and Auditing Standards 
                                                 
221
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Authority (KGK). The KGK is authorised as responsible for the oversight over 
auditors and audit firms.
224
 The KGK was also established in accordance with the 
principles set by Directive 2006/43/EC, i.e. the principles on qualification, expertise, 
and conditions for the approval of auditor.
225
 In this respect, the duties and 
responsibilities of the KGK are to set and issue Turkish accounting standards in 
compliance with international standards, govern the establishment and working 
principles of independent audit firms, certify auditors, supervise compliance to 
standards and regulations by auditors (and audit firms), to suspend or withdraw the 
approval of statutory auditors (and audit firms),
226
 and to issue penalties in case a 
contradictory situation is determined.
227
 
The KGK started its activities as of December 2011. However, its establishment and 
activities in the field have received a mixed reaction from the profession and the 
market. This is because the establishment of the KGK was a major development in 
Turkish audit sector; most of the operational field of the KGK was already regulated 
under existing law, i.e. the Profession Act and SPK regulations. There were also 
other regulatory authorities that existed in the market, i.e. the TURMOB, SPK and 
BDDK. The establishment of the KGK was expected to repeal some existing law and 
limit the role of existing authorities to a degree. These issues will be examined in 
detail.  
i. The regulation on qualifications of auditors 
In financial markets, auditors and audit firms must first be certified by the KGK to 
conduct audits in financial markets.
228
 To be an independent auditor, the KGK 
regulations brought additional conditions. 15 years’ experience in the field was 
required to be an independent auditor’ otherwise, a 3-year period of education 
followed by an exam is required to qualify as an external auditor.
229
   
                                                 
224
 Statutory Decree No. 660 (n 155). 
225
 Directive 2006/43/EC (n 211), Article 32.   
226
 KGK shall consult to the component authorities (e.g. the SKP and BDDK) on the approval of 
independent auditing firms. See Statutory Decree No. 660 (n 155), Article 23(2). 
227
 Ibid, Article 9.  
228
 Communiqué Series: X, No: 28 amending communiqué on independent audit standards in capital 
markets, Official Gazette No. 28691 (28.06.2013), Section 2, Article 3.  
229
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These additional conditions attracted criticism, especially from the accounting and 
auditing profession. Critics felt that this regulation was issued without the approval 
of the accounting and auditing professions.
230
 In addition, the regulation disregarded 
existing law since, at the time, the Profession Act approved SMMM and YMM as 
independent auditors and set the standards for auditors.
231
  
ii. The role of the KGK in standard setting  
The role of issuing standards on accounting and auditing was first given to the boards 
established under TURMOB: TMSK and TDSK.
232
 Now, that role was given to a 
sole authority: the Public Oversight Authority of Turkey (KGK).
233
  
Similar to the Profession Act itself, TURMOB also overlooked recent developments 
in Europe and in the world and failed to guide the profession in the light of these 
developments. It has been suggested that ‘Profession Act’ be revised in accordance 
with the new TCC;
234
 however, this is not necessary, since the primary rules on 
auditing are now issued by the new TCC and other details are set by KGK 
regulations. TURMOB and its management body highly criticised the establishment 
of the KGK because of the extensive authority given to the KGK in terms of issuing 
accounting and auditing standards. The reason for this strong objection is the fact 
that the establishment of the KGK has now abolished the role of TURMOB in 
standard setting. 
iii. The role of the KGK in supervision over profession 
In terms of monitoring over audit firms, KGK regulations set requirements for the 
quality assurance system and investigations into audit firms.
235
 These provisions 
were in line with EU Directive 2006/43/EC.
236
 Accordingly, investigations into audit 
firms that audit PIEs are to take place every 3 years, while the oversight of other 
                                                 
230
 TURMOB, ‘Turk Ticaret Kanunu Merkezinden Oynatildi Amacindan Uzaklasti’, Press Release 
No. 01BB 05.01.2013.  
231
 Profession Act (n 112); TCC No. 6102 (n 4), Article 2. See also Section 2.1 above.  
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audit firms will take place every 6 years.
237
 Since the new TCC requires all PIEs to 
have external audits, the oversight of supervision of the audits should be expanded 
too. Through the establishment of the KGK, the supervision of audits that fall outside 
of the authority of SPK and BDDK is obtained. 
iv. The KGK and its relationship with other authorities   
Before the establishment of the KGK, the supervision of audit firms had a multi-
headed structure. The SPK used to govern audit firms that audited firms listed on the 
Borsa Istanbul,
238
 the BDDK used to govern firms that audited banks and financial 
institutions,
239
 and the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EPDK) used to govern 
audit firms and their conduct regarding firms in the energy market.
240
 The 
supervision of an audit firm who was registered with SPK used to required 
registration to other authorities if they performed audits of banks and other financial 
institutions. For instance, an audit firm used to have to register to the BDDK as well 
if it performed an audit of a bank.
241
  
This multi-headed regulatory structure resulted in inefficiencies in monitoring 
mechanisms of auditing. Also, coordination between regulatory agencies was not 
efficient at all times in terms of the supervision of audit practices. Thus, this multi-
headed regulatory structure was desired to be terminated through establishment of a 
Turkish public oversight authority: the KGK, a single body that would govern audit 
practices. Figure 6.1 illustrates the role of the KGK and its relationship with other 
component authorities.  
                                                 
237
 Statutory Decree No. 660 (n 155), Article 25(1). 
238
 CML No. 2499 (n 121), Article 22/I-d, e. 
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 Banking Law No. 5411 (n 64), Articles 15, 33, and 36; Insurance Law No. 5684, Article 18/II. 
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25248. 
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Chapter VI: A Critical Analysis of Audit Regulations and Reforms in Turkey 
 
209 
 
 
Figure 6.1: The role of the KGK and its relationship with other regulatory 
authorities 
As Figure 6.1 shows, while the SPK and the BDDK govern audits in their subject 
areas (i.e. respectively financial markets, and banking sector), the KGK governs the 
audit firms and auditors that fall outside of the scope of SPK and BDDK (e.g. the 
audits of non-listed firms). Yet, the SPK has the right to withdraw approval of an 
audit firm approved by the KGK.
242
 So, the KGK carries out its duty in coordination 
with the SPK and the BDDK. In terms of standard-setting, the role of issuing the 
TMS and TDS was first assigned to the TURMOB.
243
 However, this role was granted 
to the KGK after its establishment in 2011.  
As regards the certification of auditors, since 2013, auditors and audit firms are 
required to be certified by the KGK initially, in order to perform audits in financial 
markets.
244
 It seems that the KGK has been given primary responsible authority in 
the auditing field. However, the KGK receives opinions from the SPK and the 
                                                 
242
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244
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BDDK on the approval of audit firms that audit PIEs.
245
 This provision reserves the 
rights of the SPK and the BDDK as to external audits of PIEs in the sectors that they 
are authorised to regulate and supervise.  
The establishment of a single regulatory and supervisory authority in the audit 
market is important in a number of ways. First, the establishment of such a public 
authority is in compliance with EU Directive 2006/43/EC. This is a significant 
development in the progress of harmonisation with the acquis. Second, the 
establishment of the KGK is especially important for audit firms who have 
international licence agreements anywhere other than Turkey. If there were no 
component authority in the home country, audit firms who have international licence 
agreements and sought to perform audits internationally would be subject to the 
examination of national oversight bodies (e.g. PCAOB in the US).
246
 Therefore, the 
establishment of a public oversight authority in Turkey would prevent double 
oversight over audit firms. Third, the establishment of the KGK is critical for audit 
quality and transparency. Annual examinations of the KGK over audit firms will be 
followed by evaluation reports that would be available online.
247
 It is expected that 
the establishment of the KGK would increase audit quality through enhanced 
transparency. Nevertheless, the establishment of the KGK has not terminated the 
multi-headed regulatory structure entirely, since the SPK and BDDK still have 
supervisory rights over audits in their regulatory area. Therefore, it is necessary for 
these authorities to work in close co-operation and prevent any regulatory chaos that 
might be created over the legislative tangle.   
4.3. Auditor Liability in Turkish Law 
No specific legislation exists regarding auditor liability in Turkey. Because Turkey is 
a civil law country, court decisions do not have wide application, as is the case in 
common law countries, such as the UK.
248
 Instead, auditor liability might arise from 
related provisions under TCC No. 6102 and CML No. 6362. Turkey’s public 
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 Also, the Capital Markets Law and Banking Law provisions with respect of the regulation of 
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oversight authority, the KGK also provides rules related to auditor liability under 
Statutory Decree No. 660. In addition, in line with ISA 240, SPK Communiqué 
Series: X, No: 22 governed the responsibility of auditors with respect of fraud and 
material misstatement detection in financial accounts. 
4.3.1. Auditor Liability in the Turkish Commercial Code 
Elements of auditor liability are constituted by auditors’ statutory duties as outlined 
in the new TCC. Accordingly, auditors are responsible for checking whether the 
financial statements of companies are prepared in accordance with Turkish 
Accounting Standards (TMS) and TCC.
249
 Auditors are also responsible for reporting 
to the board of directors regarding risks that the company may encounter and 
whether a mechanism is installed in the company to detect those risks.
250
 Therefore, 
external auditors could be held liable if they found faulty when performing their 
statutory duties and subsequently cause a financial loss.
251
 The law also requires 
auditors and audit firms to conclude a liability insurance arrangement.
252
 The SPK 
Communiqué set the minimum level of this liability insurance arrangement at 
200,000 TL.
253
 
i. Auditor liability arising from the responsibility to keep a secret  
Section 3 of the new TCC states that auditors are responsible for acting in an honest 
and unbiased manner to keep private those facts and documents seen during the audit 
which relate to the business and business secrets.
254
 The liability specified by the law 
is liability to the company itself. The law sets a maximum threshold for liability to 
the company. Accordingly, auditors could be charged to pay compensation up to 
300,000 TL.
255
 Also, the persons who suffered losses can make a claim under 
criminal law provisions.
256
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250
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256
 Ibid, Article 402(6).  
Chapter VI: A Critical Analysis of Audit Regulations and Reforms in Turkey 
 
212 
 
ii. Civil liability of auditors 
The TCC regulates the civil liability of auditors in Section 11. Accordingly, with the 
burden of proof on the claimant, auditors are liable to the company itself, company 
shareholders, and creditors (only in the case of insolvency
257
) if found faulty
258
 when 
performing statutory audits.
259
 It is important that the new Code enables each 
shareholder to make a claim. However, shareholders can only request compensation 
is paid to the company.
260
 Article 554 does not state any liability limitation on 
auditors, while Article 404 sets an upper limit for compensation to be paid by 
auditors arising from their responsibility to keep a secret. In other words, the new 
TCC introduced a liability limitation for auditors with a limited scope. 
iii. Liability rules under Statutory Decree No. 660 
In addition to the provisions of the TCC, KGK regulations provide rules regarding 
auditor liability. Accordingly, auditors and audit firms are liable for the damages 
resulting from wrong, incomplete, or misleading information in financial 
statements.
261
 However, Statutory Decree No. 660 does not state to whom auditors 
are liable. Therefore, Statutory Decree No. 660 and the TCC provisions should be 
read together when determining the conditions of auditor liability.  
As the TCC requires, there must be ‘wrongful acts’262 for a successful liability claim 
against auditors for damages caused by wrong, incomplete, or misleading 
information in financial statements. Under the TCC, the company itself, company 
shareholders, and creditors (only in case of insolvency) can seek compensation for 
damages.
263
 However, claimants must prove the auditors were negligent.  
Nevertheless, the provisions of Statutory Decree No. 660, even if read with the TCC, 
are not comprehensive enough to cover all the issues regarding auditor liability. It is 
                                                 
257
 Ibid, Article 556. 
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because the law does not impose any liability on auditors to third parties (e.g. a 
person apart from shareholders) for the economic loss caused by wrongful acts.  
4.3.2. Auditor Liability in Capital Markets Law  
Auditor liability to third parties is regulated under CML No. 6362. Similar to UK 
regulations,
264
 liability rules for prospectuses and other disclosure requirements are 
outlined separately, within the same code but under different articles. 
i. Liability for prospectuses   
Similar to the UK, any shares in Turkey must have a prospectus that contains 
information about securities.
265
 In this respect, the CML requires prospectuses be 
issued before securities are promoted to investors.
266
 In addition, as a new condition, 
prospectuses must be approved by the SPK before they offered to the public.
267
  
The SPK issues regulations for listed companies regarding disclosure requirements in 
financial markets.
268
 If the issuer fails to meet obligations set by the regulations, the 
SPK may impose sanctions or cancel the listing of securities. In case of any wrong or 
misleading information in the prospectuses, investors may sue the responsible 
persons and institutions under the CML.
269
 The law explicitly states audit firms as 
responsible for wrong or misleading information included in the prospectuses.
270
   
ii. Liability for other disclosure requirements 
CML No. 6362 introduces requirements for disclosing other public disclosure 
statements for the first time.
271
 Accordingly, issuers are liable for any wrong, 
misleading, or incomplete information in the periodic disclosure statements. The 
periodic disclosure statements are annual reports, financial reports, and other 
disclosure reports including information on mergers and takeovers.
272
 Again, the law 
explicitly imposes liability on auditors (together with other issuers) who are involved 
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in presentation of wrong, misleading, or incomplete disclosures of reports.
273
 In this 
respect, audit firms and auditors are liable for damages to the persons who purchased 
or sold securities after the reports (consisting of wrong, incomplete, or misleading 
information) disclosed to the markets.
274
 Compensation claims would be rejected if 
the claimant knew the reports were wrong, incomplete, or misleading.
275
  
As is the case in the UK,
276
 a fraudulent act or gross negligence is necessary to make 
a claim under this provision. Therefore, the auditor could not be held liable if he (or 
she) did not know that the statements were untrue. However, the burden of proof is 
on the auditor. If the auditor proves that there was no gross negligence or fraudulent 
intention involved in the wrong (or misleading, or incomplete) information stated in 
the reports, he (or she) can escape liability.
277
 
Moreover, the CML states that the SPK can issue additional requirements for 
auditors and audit firms. In this context, audit firms would be liable for economic 
loss caused by the audits of financial statements that were not audited in accordance 
with the SPK rules.
278
  
iii. Auditors’ responsibility under Communiqué Series: X, No: 22  
The SPK governs the responsibility of auditors with respect of the detection of fraud 
and material misstatement in financial accounts. SPK provisions on auditors’ 
responsibilities to detect fraud and material misstatements in accounts are in line 
with ISAs’ approach to this issue.279 In this respect, like ISAs, SPK communiqués do 
not place a direct responsibility on auditors but they provide a guidance to build an 
audit mechanism for effective fraud detection.  
According to Communiqué Series: X, No: 22, auditors should evaluate “fraud risk 
factors” and provide “reasonable” assurances on financial reports that financial 
statements are free from material misstatement and fraud.
280
 Fraud risk factors 
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include pressure, incentives and opportunities for fraud. Therefore, auditors should 
assess fraud risk factors even if there is no actual fraud.
281
 Due to inherit limitations 
in the nature of auditing (e.g. sampling methods; time pressure on auditors),
282
 
auditors are expected to provide only ‘reasonable’ assurance though their 
professional opinion keeping with professional scepticism.
 283
 Hence, the liability of 
auditors in detecting fraud and material misstatement in financial reports is limited to 
‘reasonable assurance’, which means that, despite assurances by auditors, there may 
still be some unavoidable risks.   
In addition to the civil liability rules outlined in the CML, auditors are also liable for 
any criminal actions, such as providing audit services without the approval of the 
KGK or SPK, or issuing false or misleading audit reports with intention or without 
taking reasonable care. The SPK is authorised to issue a number of sanctions on 
these audit firms, such as administrative (or judicial) fines and cancellation of 
licences.
284
  
Furthermore, following a complaint, the SPK can launch an investigation into these 
audit firms and can issue a criminal report to the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office 
(Cumhuriyet Savciligi). Cumhuriyet Savciligi then commences a public prosecution. 
In 2011, the SPK issued 21 criminal reports to Cumhuriyet Savciligi with regards 
insider dealing and manipulation activities in financial markets.
285
 However, none of 
these public prosecutions have yet concluded.
286
  
Conclusion on auditor liability rules in Turkey  
Previously, the external auditing and liability of auditors did not find their 
applications under the TCC of 1956. Following these law reforms, Turkish law 
regulates auditor liability both to the company and to third parties under the TCC and 
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CML in general. Also, the KGK and SPK issue additional rules regarding misleading 
information in accounts and responsibility to detect fraud. 
It can be said that law reforms under the new TCC and CML are significant for 
external auditing in Turkey. As submitted, liability rules in Turkish law are in line 
with the general context of UK law. Nevertheless, private litigation, in terms of 
auditor liability in Turkey, has not been applied as it has been in the UK.
287
 
Sufficient liability rules and effective compensation mechanisms are necessary for 
investor trust and confidence in markets. There has been reluctance on shareholders’ 
and other investors’ parts to make a claim for their losses caused by wrongful acts of 
auditors. The reason behind this might be a lack of sufficient attention by the 
previous TCC on this issue. With the liability rules under the new TCC and CML, a 
system of compensation being paid by auditors can operate in Turkey. Therefore, 
companies and investors are encouraged to redress their losses caused by any 
negligence by auditors under the new set of rules. Nevertheless, time may be 
required for these rules to find their application in the field. Similarly, time will tell 
as to whether these liability rules are efficient in Turkish financial markets.  
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has submitted that audit reforms in Turkey are motivated by the 
objective of achieving EU membership and the aim of preventing major audit 
scandals, such as were experienced in the Imar Bank case. Previously, laws on 
auditing in Turkey were insufficient in a number of ways. First, the previous 
Commercial Code did not address external auditing, in particular auditor liability. 
Second, supervision of auditors and audit firms was limited to listed firms. The 
reforms have covered these issues under the new TCC and respective provisions 
under CML. Since Turkey aspires to be a part of the world economy and to become a 
full member of the EU, Turkish companies’ financial statements must provide clear, 
understandable, transparent and reliable information in order to operate in an 
efficient, reliable, and competitive way in international financial markets.
288
 Reforms 
are important in this respect, as the new TCC and CML have changed the audit 
                                                 
287
 An internet-based search, including journal and case databases (e.g. Westlaw and Heinonline) is 
made, however no civil litigation case in Turkey found in this area. 
288
 TCC General Justification (n 1) para.5.  
Chapter VI: A Critical Analysis of Audit Regulations and Reforms in Turkey 
 
217 
 
system to be compatible with EU laws on auditing
289
 and have expanded its 
application. With reforms on auditing, external auditing has turned into a more 
transparent, quality system of auditing carried out by qualified experts who perform 
under internationally compatible standards and are supervised by a public authority 
under the KGK. 
Nevertheless, there are drawbacks to the reforms in a number of areas and thus 
further amendments may be needed. First, private litigation mechanisms for damages 
caused by the wrongful acts of auditors should be introduced in Turkey. For this 
purpose, as the European Commission has suggested, the capacity of commercial 
courts has to be increased.
290
 Second, there is no regulatory strategy stated by law-
makers regarding concentration in the audit market. The concentration level can be 
considered as moderate today. However, as financial markets continue to develop in 
Turkey, the need for independent audit will grow as well. In the light of these 
considerations, regulatory action should be taken before the concentration level rises 
further. Third, there is a multi-headed regulatory structure in Turkey. Even the 
establishment of the KGK has not eliminated this structure completely. In contrast, 
the establishment of a new public oversight authority (i.e. the KGK) is likely to 
introduce new issues with respect of existing authorities, and might therefore result 
in regulatory tangle. In order to prevent regulatory conflict, the KGK should take a 
primary role in the field and be actively involved in the regulatory arena in the 
external auditing field.  
This chapter examined Turkish law reforms in the field of auditing. It is submitted 
that Turkish law reforms on auditing are in line with EU laws. The analyses in this 
chapter provide background information for the next chapter. In that chapter, the 
audit reforms of Turkey will be further examined with respect of approximation with 
EU laws on auditing. 
                                                 
289
 See also Chapter VII for a comparative analysis of Turkish and EU laws in auditing.   
290
 European Commission Staff Working Document Turkey 2012 Progress Report accompanying the 
document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-2013 Brussels 10.10.2012 SWD(2012) 336 final, p. 
50.  
 218 
 
CHAPTER VII: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EU 
AND TURKISH LAWS ON AUDITING IN TERMS OF 
CONVERGENCE 
INTRODUCTION 
So far, this thesis tried to answer the following questions: why auditing has an 
important role in corporate governance,
1
 how it actually works today,
2
 why it need to 
be regulated,
3
 how, in particular, the EU governs statutory audit rules and practices 
in the EU,
4
 and how the liability of auditors is governed by law.
5
 As previous 
chapters have shown, EU laws on auditing are diverse among Member States.
6
  
The aim of this chapter is to identify whether there is a convergence of auditing 
between Turkey and the EU.
7
 The main research question in this chapter is as 
follows: to what extent is Turkey successful in terms of adopting EU laws as a 
candidate country? In addition, this chapter will discuss whether there is an 
approximation on legal systems and how this affects laws on auditing internationally.   
This chapter is structured as follows: the first section looks at the debates on legal 
systems differences
8
 and questions whether traditional grouping on legal systems
9
 
are valid for laws on external auditing. The second section examines Turkey as a 
case study and sets the framework for a possible convergence of auditing between 
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2
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3
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Turkey and the EU. In this respect, the forces for convergence, and the methods and 
feasibility of convergence will be questioned. 
1. DIFFERENT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND EXTERNAL AUDITING 
1.1. Do Legal Differences Matter?   
Traditionally, the world’s legal systems are grouped under common (Anglo-Saxon) 
and civil (Romanic-German) law families.
10
 According to the theory of legal 
families, broadly, the US and UK belong to the common-law family group while 
Germany and France belong to the civil-law family group. Based on this theory, a 
number of studies carried out by La Porta et al controversially argued that 
differences in legal systems have influenced the economic development of these 
countries and their governance functions.
11
 In short, La Porta et al established a 
general distinction of family groups arguing that capital markets in countries that 
belong to the civil law legal systems are less developed because of their weak legal 
protection of minority shareholders,
12
 whereas common law legal systems offer more 
protection of minority shareholders, and therefore the legal environment is more 
suitable for market growth in these countries.
13
 
However, such general categorizations are questionable, as legal systems change 
through time and not all areas of law share the same patterns within a particular legal 
family. To be sure, there are differences in legal systems in different parts of the 
world; these differences might be derived from geographical, social, economic, 
traditional, historical, or other differences that might have affected the course of a 
country’s history and the way its legal system works. This could be war, revolution, 
                                                 
10
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colonisation, or other factors originating from religion, ethics, or the influence of the 
interest groups and parties.
14
 Although there might be a direct impact of these factors 
on the characteristics of a country’s legal system, sharing a particular historical or 
geographical element does not automatically suggest parity between two countries’ 
legal systems. In other words, the fact that two countries belong to the same 
geographic region or to the same religion does not automatically mean that both 
would have identical legal systems. Generalisations such as ‘European countries on 
continental Europe belong to the European law family
15’ or ‘Arabic countries in the 
Arabian Peninsula follow Islamic law traditions’ are also not very helpful. Some 
geographical taxonomy might be true in terms of a shared cultural history. However, 
social, political, and economic developments through time might have different 
influences on countries that share the same geography. Therefore, their legal systems 
might remain distinct (or, alternatively, come closer over time).  
Moreover, a kind of taxonomy based on geographical or regional similarities does 
not necessarily apply to different areas of law within a particular legal system. For 
example, Arabic countries belong to Islamic law tradition with respect of family law; 
however there is a great influence from European jurisdictions, namely France and 
Italy, in terms of commercial law due to their colonial history in Arabic countries
16
 
(i.e. Algeria; Tunisia). Furthermore, apart from geographical, religious, or colonial 
influences, there might be a voluntarily reception of foreign law, as it is the case in 
Turkish legal system. For instance, at the beginning of the 20
th
 century, with the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic, Turkey voluntarily adopted Swiss civil law 
under the reformist package of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, and abandoned Islamic law. 
The legal system in Turkey can be categorised as a hybrid (mixed) system where 
both legal and socio-cultural transmission is still on-going.
17
 Ogus approached this 
transition of Turkey from a legal and economic perspective, explaining that Turkey 
needed to import legal cultures from abroad to provide a more “sophisticated legal 
input” for industrialisation and commercial development.18  More recently, in the 
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pursuit of full membership of the EU, Turkey has begun harmonising its law with the 
EU acquis.
19
 In this respect, Turkey is in the process of modernisation in improving 
its legal system. It is likely that the process of the EU membership will also have an 
impact on legal transmission in Turkey. To conclude, legal systems cannot be 
categorised under solely geographical, religion or cultural since each country has its 
own legal development influenced by a number of variations.   
The above examples may suggest that one should not rely solely on the classic ‘legal 
family’ categorizations.20 Örücü sees all legal systems as mixed and overlapping, 
meaning that all legal systems are combinations of various legal sources.
21
 Moreover, 
in the current conditions of the 21
th
 century, with worldwide globalisation of systems 
occurring, categorising legal systems into strict groups is not valid anymore. 
Although reasons and intentions can differ, the “legal systems are crosses”.22 An 
approximation of legal systems can be seen, especially in commercial law due to 
internationalisation of economy around the world.
23
 Next, whether similar 
approximations are possible in terms of external auditing will be examined.  
1.2. Do Legal Differences in the Law of Auditing Matter?  
The governance function of external auditing is closely linked to the ownership 
structures of firms.
24
 Before going into detail, it might be useful to review the 
literature on the different legal systems and the use of external auditing. 
La Porta et al found that common law countries offer better protection for investors 
than code (civil) law countries.
25
 According to La Porta et al, concentrated systems 
are associated with weak legal environment (e.g. a lack of sufficient legal rules and 
enforcement mechanisms).
26
 Based on these findings, Francis et al suggested that 
countries with stronger investor protection are more likely to have higher quality 
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auditing, while countries with weak investor protection have a lower demand for 
external audits.
27
  
However, this conclusion cannot be fully accepted for a number of reasons. First, the 
relevance of legal families has been challenged. For example, it is argued that the 
UK law on shareholder protection is closer to the Continental European legal system 
than it is to US law.
28
 Second, such categorization of dispersed and concentrated 
ownership structures with strong and weak legal systems is misleading, since 
controlling shareholders may exist in countries with good laws (e.g. Sweden).
29
 
Third, the effects of legal systems on the quality of accounting might not be that 
clear. Instead of a common versus civil law distinction, other factors (e.g. language, 
ownership concentration, management powers and incentives, auditor quality, 
regulation, enforcement, and other institutional factors) may have a greater effect on 
accounting quality.
30
 Moreover, cultural factors might also have an influence on 
accounting standards and practices.
31
 Fourth, the distinction between common and 
civil law is becoming less relevant after increased regulatory scrutiny over auditing 
(and securities) regulation and harmonisation forces, in particular at EU level. Lastly, 
developments in the international economy might eventually lead to a convergence 
between legal systems,
32
 including in auditing.  
Nevertheless, the role of external auditing might still vary in different market 
systems. In market-based governance systems, such as in the US and UK, high-
quality public financial disclosures and reporting are much more developed because 
public disclosure plays a more central role in outsider systems.
33
 In contrast, in civil 
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law legal regimes, where political influences are greater, financial reporting is much 
more focused on taxation.
34
 Chapter I already discussed and examined the 
differences in terms of the use of external auditing in different ownership structures. 
It is submitted that external auditing functions as a monitoring device and can help to 
reduce information asymmetry in dispersed systems.
35
 In concentrated systems, 
where the other monitoring mechanisms and the legal protection of investors are 
relatively weak, firms tend to use external auditing as an assurance of the credibility 
of the information in the financial reports and subsequently gaining public 
confidence to attract small investors.
36
 
However, these findings do not suggest that different corporate governance systems 
cannot approximate in terms of laws in auditing. In addition to a common- or civil-
law origin, political, economic and social developments are also likely to influence 
the accounting and auditing infrastructure in a country. Moreover, one should also 
consider developments at the global level that might have an effect on a country’s 
legal development in terms of auditing. The effects of international developments on 
accounting and auditing are enormous because of their growing importance in 
international markets. Public financial reporting (audited accounting information) is 
crucial for global markets in terms of ensuring trust in the markets via ensuring the 
accuracy of financial information.
37
 For a country that seeks to be a part of the global 
investment area it is essential to keep up with international developments and 
provide a secure and trustworthy investment environment for foreign investors. 
Regardless of its legal origin, a country might like to voluntarily adopt laws on 
auditing in line with the highest standards, as in the US and UK. How successful this 
adoption depends on a number of factors related to the country’s economic 
adaptability, reception of legal rules, and historical and cultural elements. This 
chapter takes Turkey as a case example in the adoption of laws in auditing with the 
EU acquis. In this respect, this chapter will investigate the obstacles for a successful 
adoption of these rules, and will illustrate the limitations of and forces for 
convergence in the law of auditing between Turkey and the EU.  
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2. CONVERGENCE OF AUDITING BETWEEN EU AND TURKISH LAW 
There are a number of justifications for the convergence of auditing in Turkey with 
EU laws. These are the EU membership aspiration, globalisation and capital market 
integration, and the reformation of commercial and capital markets laws. These in 
fact are closely linked to each other. This section will discuss drivers and obstacles 
for convergence in auditing between Turkish and EU law. The theoretical 
underpinnings of this discussion will be based on Hansmann and Kraakman’s 
explanation of important economic forces for convergence with respect to the drivers 
of convergence, as well as Bebchuk and Roe’s path dependency theory with respect 
to obstacles for convergence. Berkowitz et al’s ‘transplant effect’ theory will also be 
applied to explain whether legal families could be obstacle for auditing convergence.  
This section will first examine the forces for the convergence of auditing. Second, 
methods that may secure convergence will be examined. In addition to the theoretical 
discussion of auditing convergence, the third section will question whether 
convergence between EU and Turkish laws on auditing is actually possible. Lastly, 
the results of the analyses will be evaluated to provide a conclusion.  
2.1. Forces for Convergence  
This section will adopt Hansmann and Kraakman’s38 explanation of important 
economic forces on convergence to auditing convergence with respect to Turkish and 
EU laws. Within this context, this paper will try to give the theoretical underpinnings 
of a possible convergence of auditing between Turkish and the EU law. Apart from 
the important economic forces, this paper submits harmonisation with the EU law as 
another force for auditing convergence in Turkey. These two principal forces for 
auditing convergence will be explained respectively. 
 
 
                                                 
38
 They also noted (i) failure of alternative models and (ii) the rise of shareholder group as the other 
drivers for convergence. See Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘The End of History for 
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i. Important economic forces 
International mergers, foreign investors, and cross-listings prompt 
internationalisation of the economy, and therefore result in more integrated financial 
markets. On the one hand, the integration of financial markets results in legal 
similarities, in particular in securities regulation and corporate governance regimes.
39
 
In case of cross-border mergers and acquisitions, the home country’s securities 
regulation and governance structures can affect the governance practices of an 
acquired firm or, alternatively, new models may be imported from other systems and 
two models may co-exist. Therefore, convergence through cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions is possible.
40
  
On the other hand, global capital markets prompt firms and jurisdictions to adopt 
more efficient governance mechanisms. For example, most of advanced economies 
require listed firms to make regular financial disclosure and to have audit 
committees. In global capital markets, to compete with other jurisdictions, 
lawmakers may choose to demand less in order to make the law easier for businesses 
and to attract new investors. This may lead to a “race to the bottom”.41 In terms of 
disclosure and best practice (e.g. effective protection of shareholder rights
42
), it 
seems that regulatory competition leads in the opposite direction.
43
 It is said that if 
domestic law or domestic firms fail to sustain the application of the best governance 
mechanism, investment capital can flow to other jurisdictions that can offer better 
standards.
44
 
A similar justification can also apply to auditing. Investors would not invest in a 
company whose external audit mechanism does not assure investors in terms of 
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40
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reliability of the financial statements. In such case, investors would choose other 
companies in an alternative country who offer better disclosure standards. As a 
result, public companies that seek to attract investors would voluntarily adapt the 
highest auditing standards in their home country. Alternatively, public companies 
may voluntarily choose to bind themselves to comply with the highest standards by 
listing on a foreign exchange.
45
 Firms choose to list on foreign stock exchanges 
because of the expectation of the so-called ‘bonding effect’: it is believed that listing 
abroad increases the share value of the firm.
46
 The other reasons for listing abroad 
might be to reach a broader range of investors, to easily acquire foreign firms, and/or 
to increase the prestige of firms.
47
 Thus, public companies that seek to be listed on 
foreign exchanges and seek to raise external capital have to improve their 
governance and disclosure practices to gain advantages in the global market. 
Similarly, jurisdictions that seek to attract foreign direct investment would promote 
the best governance mechanisms, including the adoption of the highest auditing 
standards.  
The other force for convergence is the advantages of having a single set of standards 
in global capital markets. Having a single set of standards would reduce companies’ 
transactions costs and offer them the advantage of comparability.
48
 International 
investors who seek to reduce transaction costs and benefit from comparability 
advantage might prefer to invest in countries that have adapted accepted professional 
standards (e.g. ISAs). Listing on a foreign market with higher standards would 
increase the reliability of audited financial reports, and investors would therefore be 
ensured that their investments were secure.  
These economic factors may force firms and jurisdictions whose auditing standards 
and regulations are weaker to make their standards and regulations similar with 
advanced governance mechanisms. In short, internationalisation of the economy can 
lead to the integration of capital markets. This can be via cross-listing and/or 
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acquisitions and mergers. Both prompt the use of uniform auditing standards and 
regulations. This may suggest that integrated markets facilitate the use of uniform 
standards that can lead to convergence in auditing. 
These theoretical underpinnings can be applied to auditing convergence between 
Turkish and EU law, explaining the economic forces for Turkey to adopt similar 
rules with EU laws in terms of auditing. Turkey is an emerging country with 
increasing annual economic growth rates.
49
 If Turkey wants to use its growing 
market advantage and to be an attractive venue for foreign direct investment, she 
should use an international language that anybody who is interested to invest can 
understand for business in Turkey. Today, major states in the world, including EU 
Member States, have adopted ISAs.
50
 Uniform accounting and auditing standards are 
advantageous for all major economies in terms of comparability, but they are much 
more crucial for emerging economies, such as Turkey. Through the adoption of 
international standards, investors in Turkey will benefit from the same standards as 
are applied in other major countries. Moreover, the use of improved laws on auditing 
would be a signal for foreign direct investment, as it will increase the reliability of 
financial reports.  
In addition to the important economic forces, internationalisation of professional 
intermediaries, such as the Big Four audit firms, has also played a role for auditing 
convergence. As the previous chapters have shown, the Big Four audit firms 
dominate the audits of largest listed firms globally, as well as in Turkey.
51
 Moreover, 
as a result of this market control they have gained power both financially and 
politically. They use this power in the audit standard setting process. This has been 
discussed elsewhere in this thesis.
52
 This influence of the Big Four may also be 
relevant in terms of convergence. For instance, the influence of the Big Four audit 
firms in societies which they provide services has a significant importance. Their 
global networks help the Big Four to have considerable influence on the identity of 
accountants, participation in standard setting and involvement in the expansion of 
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globalisation around the world.
53
 The pressure of these international firms and other 
interest groups (e.g. via lobbying) can contribute to the convergence of laws.
54
 To 
provide an example, it is possible that international auditing standards accepted by a 
global network can help in the diffusion of ISAs among the audit firms that 
competing with the Big Four and public firms who are willing to be audited by the 
Big Four.
55
  
ii. Harmonisation with EU law 
Harmonisation with EU law, such as the adoption of Directive 2006/43/EC, and also 
of some recommendations (e.g. auditor independence and liability limitation) can 
also be a driver for convergence.
56
 Member States (and candidate countries) are 
obliged to comply with EU law. As a candidate EU member, Turkey is obliged to 
adopt the EU acquis. Approximation of the laws on auditing will help Turkey to 
move its law closer to the EU acquis and may help to adopt other areas of law more 
easily.  
Turkey aspires to be a part of the world economic, investment, and trade 
communities. Full EU membership for Turkey is an important pillar in the pursuit of 
this objective.
57
 In this respect, the new Commercial Code
58
 came into force in July 
2012 with more harmonised provisions with EU law, especially in auditing and 
financial reporting fields. In short, the new Code expands the application of external 
auditing, authorising the Turkish public oversight body KGK to oversight the audit 
profession, requiring the use of Turkish Financial Reporting Standards (TMS) in the 
financial reports of listed companies and to have audited those reports by an 
independent external auditor (SMMM or YMM)
59
 in accordance with ISAs.
60
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One could question the efficiency of a possible convergence of Turkish laws in 
auditing with the EU acquis. There are a number of advantages of approximation 
with the EU acquis. First, it is believed that harmonisation of disclosure standards 
would mitigate transaction costs while providing a comparability advantage. Second, 
an improved legal environment would provide greater protection for minority 
shareholders and other investors, while the risk of expropriation by insiders would be 
reduced.
61
 This is particularly important for Turkey, where controlling shareholders 
are dominant and can potentially use company assets for private benefits.
62
 Due to 
the lack of legal protections for minority shareholders, investors would depend on 
relationships, not law. As a consequence, the governance of companies would be 
based on relationships that would discourage new investors.
63
 Therefore, advanced 
auditing laws are crucial, especially for the protection of (minority) shareholders and 
investors.  
The combination of these forces may result in a market-driven convergence. 
However, it needs to be examined whether Turkish laws on auditing have actually 
converged with the EU law. The evidence of this will be detailed in Section 2.4 
below. Before that, the methods of convergence will be discussed next.  
2.2. Methods for Convergence  
In Turkey, harmonisation with EU laws on auditing has been through the adoption of 
international accounting and auditing standards and recent law reforms issued in the 
field of company and capital markets law.  
The SPK, the regulatory authority in capital markets in Turkey, issued a regulation 
requiring public companies in Turkey to prepare financial statements in accordance 
with IFRS as of 2005.
64
 Since 2005, public companies are required to report 
according to SPK’s IFRS-compatible accounting standards.65 Also, the TCC now 
requires every merchant to report in accordance with Turkish Accounting Standards 
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(TMS).
66
 In terms of auditing standards, for the first time in 2006, the SPK 
introduced ISAs to Turkish capital markets by the Communiqué Series: X, No: 22.67 
Also, the new TCC requires audits of financial reports to be conducted in accordance 
with Turkish Auditing Standards (TDS): the Turkish translation of ISAs.
68
 Before the 
TDS was introduced to the capital markets in 2006, there had been no uniform 
standard in external auditing. This situation was especially difficult for international 
audit firms who were not familiar with the accounting system in Turkey. TDS are 
compatible with ISAs, and therefore both international audit firms and international 
users of the audit reports can take advantage of that compatibility - not only the 
foreign and/or multinational firms who aspire to invest in Turkey, but also Turkish 
companies, who will benefit from the use of those uniform standards. Therefore, the 
adoption of international standards through TMS and TDS can be considered an 
effective tool for convergence.  
In light of the objective to achieve full EU membership, Turkey has sought to reform 
its Commercial Code and Capital Markets Law in accordance with EU law. These 
reforms also have important applications for audit regulation in Turkey.
69
 In this 
respect, the new TCC No. 6102 and CML No. 6362 can be seen as regulatory tools 
for convergence with EU law. The new reforms have brought a number of 
improvements into the area of auditing in Turkey. To begin with, according to the 
TCC, statutory audits can only be assigned to professional and independent auditors 
whose requirements are set by law.
70
 In this respect, the public oversight auditory 
body of Turkey, the KGK, sets specific requirements for the audits of PIEs.
71
 
Second, the independence requirements were strengthened. A maximum 7-year 
period for auditors performing audits for the same client was introduced.
72
 These 
requirements for statutory auditors under law reforms are in line with EU law.  
Also, as EU law requires, auditors are subject to a public oversight mechanism in 
Turkey under the KGK. The establishment of the public oversight body of Turkey 
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can also be considered as tools for convergence, since the KGK was established in 
accordance with the principles set by EU Directive 2006/43/EC, in terms of 
principles on qualification, expertise, and conditions for the approval of auditor.
73
 In 
this respect, the European Commission considered the establishment of the KGK as a 
good progress for Turkey as regards complying with the EU acquis.
74
 According to 
the Commission, the establishment of the KGK improved the legal and institutional 
framework in auditing.
75
 
2.3. The Feasibility of Convergence 
Previous sections submitted that auditing convergence is necessary for Turkey 
especially regarding its EU membership objective and the aim to be a part of global 
financial markets.
76
 The latest law reforms under TCC No. 6102 and CML No. 6362 
are the methods using for auditing convergence.
77
 Despite these reforms and formal 
approximation of laws and regulations on auditing, actual convergence may still not 
be possible.  
This section will explain the feasibility of auditing convergence between Turkish and 
the EU law in accordance to the path dependency theory of Bebchuk and Roe
78
 and 
the transplant effect theory of Berkowitz et al
79
. Within this context, this section will 
question Turkey’s adoption of EU law on auditing with respect to first, its path 
dependencies (reasons arising from the initial conditions with which countries 
started) and second, its institutional capacity to receive the imported law.  
To begin with, Turkey and the countries of the EU are at different levels of economic 
development. The adoption of EU law may be hindered due to institutional 
differences resulted from unequal economic development. Less developed 
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institutional infrastructure, such as insufficient capacity of economic institutions, e.g. 
deficient budget and expertise, can be seen in less economically developed countries.  
Ineffective institutional frameworks can also be found in other countries than 
Turkey. Pistor et al found that the failure of the former Soviet Union countries’ legal 
reform on the protection of shareholder and creditor rights was caused by the absence 
of effective legal institutions.
80
 Despite the fact that these countries have adopted 
advanced laws on the protection of shareholder and creditor rights, ineffective legal 
institutions failed to enforce these laws.
81
  
Political incentives as well as the incentives of interest groups also play a role in 
understanding a country’s legal development. As public choice theory notes, 
politicians, namely governments and bureaucrats, do not often pursue to increase the 
social welfare when law-making.
82
 Instead, politicians are self-interested and pursue, 
for example, political power, re-election, and rent-seeking.
83
 In addition, other 
interest groups, for example, lawyers and auditors, may have political influence in 
the law-making process through lobbying.
84
 There might also be other influential 
actors, such as the EU that might have role in the law-making process, as in the case 
in Turkey.  
Institutional transformation is considered as one of the issues that challenged most 
the political economy of Turkey in terms of forming the country’s institutional 
structure.
85
 Institutional reform in Turkey has mainly started following the crisis of 
2000 to 2001; only the Capital Markets Board of Turkey (the SPK) was already 
established in 1981. International influence through the IMF and World Bank has 
also encouraged Turkey to reform its economic institutions.
86
 The main principle of 
institutionalising in Turkey is isolating the regulatory process from political 
influence.
87
 To achieve this, independent regulatory authorities are established to 
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operate in respective sectors, such as banking, finance, energy, and 
telecommunications.
88
 A rule on independence ensures that these agencies are given 
financial autonomy and their decisions cannot be overturned by the ministries, but 
are subject to appeal mechanism undertaken by the Council of State (Danistay).
89
 
In line with the institutional independence policy, in the field of auditing, the public 
oversight body of Turkey (the KGK) was established as an independent body that is 
free from political pressure. However, it has been argued that political intervention 
on the regulatory authorities has been the case in Turkey.
90
 Politicians and 
bureaucrats have been involved in the control of the regulatory agencies, for 
example, through the appointment of the board members of these bodies as these 
agencies are ‘affiliated’ to the respective ministries,91 e.g. KGK, as well as SPK and 
BDDK, are affiliated to Prime Ministry of Turkey. This arrangement may suggest 
that operations of these institutions cannot be separated from the incentives and 
politics of the politicians and bureaucrats since there is a link between these 
institutions and the political institutions, i.e. ministries. 
In addition to the independence issue, the fragmented institutional structure is the 
other shortcoming in auditing sector in Turkey. As this thesis already stated, having 
more than one regulatory in the field of auditing, may cause obstruction, in particular 
with respect to the application of the standards and investigations over audit firms.
92
 
The Turkish Government aimed to end the existence of different authorities in the 
auditing field by the establishment of the KGK. This was also in with the EU law on 
auditing,
93
 so the Government has chosen to establish such body despite the 
oppositions from the members of the Chamber of Accountants in Turkey.
94
 Yet, the 
fragmented institutional structure has not been removed since other institutional 
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bodies, such as SPK and BDDK have still regulatory powers in their fields.
95
 One 
should take into account that it would be politically and economically difficult to 
abolish the roles of the other institutions. This would make existing institutional and 
professional infrastructure ill fitting and clearly would require new investments. 
Overall, the government has chosen to avoid these costs however, in turn; this has 
resulted in a fragmented supervisory framework in the field of auditing. 
Furthermore, Turkey is not yet a member of the EU. In terms of the implementation 
and enforcement of the rules, Turkey therefore does not have the same options and 
choices as current Member States. For instance, other areas of law show that 
differences and institutional infrastructure of other institutions are not at the same 
level as in the EU Member States.
96
 Furthermore, practices and relations prevailing 
in the business environment might be another reason for differences that still persist 
after the adoption of the EU law. 
So far, this section argued that the insufficient institutional structure in Turkey could 
be the basis for differences that still persist. One could also question the reasons for 
these institutional impediments. Turkey is a transplant country and the current legal 
system of Turkey has been shaped by different European legal sources, mainly 
German, Swiss, French and Italian
97
 over the period 1850-1927.
98
 For instance, the 
Commercial Code of 1926, the first modern commercial code of Turkey, was based 
on the German Code of 1897.
99
 It is difficult, however, to put the Turkish legal 
system into a general legal system group, such as the German legal system.
100
  
Berkowitz et al acknowledged that there would be social, economic, and institutional 
differences between an origin and the transplant country. To reduce the effects of 
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these differences in the adoption of the new law, a transplant country has to meet 
with familiarity and/or adaptability. In their explanation, they claimed that countries 
with familiarity  (who share a legal history or belong to the same legal family) and/or 
adaptation would have more effective institutions compared those who do not share a 
common legal history with the transplanted concepts or have not made necessary 
modifications to adapt its initial conditions with the origin country.
101
 If the 
necessary modifications were not made to adapt the local conditions, there would be 
“a substantial mismatch between pre-existing and the imported legal order” causing 
the “transplant effect”.102 The ‘transplant effect’ would cause the malfunction of the 
imported legal order and legal intermediaries (e.g. judges, lawyers, politicians) 
would also be affected negatively in terms of reception of the new law.
103
 These 
findings may suggest that the transplant effect theory can be used to explain the 
ineffective institutions in a transplant country.  
In terms of Turkey’s adoption of the EU law, it is necessary for Turkey to make the 
appropriate modifications. To give an example, the EU requirement for the 
establishment of a public oversight body should not be attributed only to the mere 
establishment of such body. Adequate resource allocation, including an adequate 
budget for inspections, and the employment of sufficient number of experts for these 
inspections, and the continuing training of the member staff are important pillars for 
the efficient functioning of such body. They are also crucial for serving the ultimate 
objective to form such body, i.e. increased audit quality and improve investor 
protection.  
Another example is the rule on private litigation in terms of auditor liability. 
Although, the law on auditor liability has now been improved with the enactment of 
the new TCC and Capital Markets Law, there have not yet been any published cases 
on auditor liability.
104
 It is said that for imported rules to be functional, there should 
be a demand for it in the first place and legal intermediaries should understand the 
real meaning of the law.
105
 Accordingly, the private litigation on auditor liability to 
be functional in Turkey, first, there should be a demand for it second, investors 
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should be informed with the new rule, and third both the investors and the legal 
intermediaries should be able to understand the meaning of the private litigation on 
auditor liability and its relevance with the cases in capital markets. If necessary, 
lawyers could be trained in the application of the private litigation. If the real 
meanings of the auditor liability rules were not understood properly, there is a risk 
that these rules would not be applied or could be applied in a way that is against its 
principal intention.
106
 Nevertheless, before drawing a direct conclusion, it should also 
be acknowledged that some time might be required after the enactment of the new 
laws for the society in Turkey to understand and to observe their meaning and to 
apply them when necessary.  
From another perspective, it may be also questionable to what extent Turkey is 
subject to the transplant effect. Berkowitz et al categorised Turkey as an 
“unreceptive” transplant.107 However, they made this categorization based on the 
findings from data collected during 1980-1995. This is the period when Turkey was 
in the process of transmission, and had therefore not completed its economic and 
legal development. After this period, Turkey’s legal environment developed rapidly 
and shifted to another era, the so-called ‘Europeanisation period’ that helped Turkey 
make breakthroughs in economic and political developments. After the Customs 
Union agreement between Turkey and the EU in 1995, the European Council granted 
Turkey EU candidacy status in 1999.
108
 Since then, Turkey has issued major reforms 
and adopted a number of adjustment packages under the National Programme for the 
Adoption of the EU acquis.
109
 The regulatory measures in the fields of business law 
and financial markets under the Europeanisation process have helped Turkey to 
move its legal system closer to EU law. Thus, a categorization that places Turkey as 
‘unreceptive’ cannot be applied today after Turkey’s on-going financial and legal 
development since then are taken into account.  
In terms of auditing convergence, the ‘transplant effect’ might be less valid for 
auditing convergence between the EU and Turkish laws because auditing 
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convergence is mostly market-driven (e.g. international auditing standards, 
internationalised audit firms, integrated audit market). It can be expected that the 
audit and business society would be eager to support and also to adapt the reforms on 
auditing in the expectations of positive economic outcomes of integration of financial 
markets. Yet, it should be highlighted that necessary adaptations will still be required 
for the law and institutions to be operated effectively.   
2.4. A Conceptual Framework for the Convergence between the EU and 
Turkish Laws on Auditing  
Turkey has made good progress in the areas of company law and financial markets 
over the last twenty years in terms of increasing the level of its law and regulations to 
world standards.
110
 In this respect, the alignment of company law regulations with 
the EU acquis is almost complete, as the European Commission has stated that 
Turkey is “advanced” in the company law area with “significant progress in 
auditing”.111 It appears that Turkey made distinctive changes in its laws in auditing 
similar to EU Directive 2006/43/EC.
112
 This could probably result in formal 
convergence that requires a political support and a change in legal infrastructure. 
Siems called convergence through international or regional organisations (i.e. here, 
the EU Audit Directive) as “convergence from above”.113  
In the previous section, three factors, namely the EU membership aspiration, the 
objective of the integration of capital markets, and the need for improvement of laws 
were discussed in justifying the need for convergence.
114
 These three factors can also 
be considered as drivers for convergence between EU and Turkish laws on auditing. 
Nevertheless, there could still be differences in terms of legal mentalities in national 
preferences. For instance, a weak legal environment, a multi-headed supervision 
mechanism, and functional dissimilarities (e.g. not being an EU member country)
115
 
may stand in the way of actual convergence. As Table 7.1 details, there are four 
dimensions of audit convergence that need to be considered when evaluating 
convergence between Turkish and EU laws on auditing. The following will show that 
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there are reasons that support each of those four dimensions; thus, overall, it will be 
concluded that the Turkish situation is a mixed one. 
 Convergence in law 
Yes  No 
C
o
n
v
er
g
en
ce
 i
n
 p
ra
c
ti
c
e
 
Y
es
 
Level 1 
Harmonisation with the EU acquis, 
e.g. adoption of ISAs, and aim to 
integrate markets  
Level 2 
Path dependencies of law (including 
case law), e.g., reflecting differences 
in the role of courts  
N
o
 
Level 3 
Differences in practice, e.g., due to 
’multi-headed supervision’, 
ineffective monitoring mechanisms 
and cultural factors 
Level 4 
Functional dissimilarities: Turkey 
being a candidate country and having 
a less developed capital market, as 
well as costs of harmonisation 
Table 7.1: Dimensions of auditing convergence between EU and Turkish laws  
At level 1, harmonisation attempts are carried out through two general factors: the 
EU membership process and the integration of markets. Turkish law is being 
harmonising with the EU acquis as a requirement for EU membership. Also, the 
integration of markets forced Turkey to adopt international professional standards in 
accounting and auditing. At this level, the influence of EU membership and 
internationalisation of the economy on convergence is very high. Nevertheless, the 
rules and their functions may still be different due to cultural, legal, and institutional 
differences in the legal order, as the following will explain.  
At level 2, path dependencies may stand in the way of legal convergence despite 
harmonisation attempts, in particular as regards the relevance of ‘case law’. To begin 
with, Turkey is a transplant country whose legal order is based on a civil law legal 
system. Therefore, there might be differences in the application of laws and rules. 
For instance, in the field of auditing, laws are applied mainly through statutory laws 
and regulations, e.g. the provisions of the TCC, CML, and KGK regulations, and 
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SPK communiqués. Although the effects of this may not directly obstruct the 
convergence of auditing rules, this may generate institutional and legislative issues 
that may indirectly result in differences in rules or its application. For instance, due 
to institutional and legislative differences, private litigation practice has not 
developed well in Turkey. Although the law issued liability on auditors to third 
parties under CML No. 6362, there is currently no common practice in redressing 
auditor liability.
116
 
As in other countries, in Turkey courts deal with commercial disputes. Even though 
their application is rare, alternative dispute resolution methods, such as arbitration 
and mediation are also available in Turkey. For instance, the Union of Chambers and 
Commodity Exchanges of Turkey offers arbitration services under the Arbitration 
Council (TOBB Tahkim Kurulu) to ensure the settlement of economic, commercial 
and industrial disputes among the firms.
117
 Mediation is another alternative 
method.
118
 However, so far, these methods are not seen as popular practices in 
Turkey compared to court litigation.
119
  
The new TCC assigns commercial courts, e.g. Commercial Courts (Asliye Ticaret 
Mahkemeleri) to deal with auditor liability claims. As the European Commission 
noted, the capacity of these courts is not sufficient to handle this task.
120
 There are 
113 commercial courts in Turkey – 18 of them were put in operation in 2011.121  The 
average number of judges per 100.000 persons in Turkey was 8.30 in 2010.
122
 This is 
below to the average rates in European countries.
123
 In 2011, the number of cases per 
judge was 1136
124
 and most of these trials lasted more than a year.
125
 The workload 
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of the courts results in long trials and lengthy procedures in the courts and 
subsequently creates a cumbersome judicial system in Turkey.
126
 
In addition to the capacity of the courts, court fees and the duration of the trials are 
the main obstacles that might hinder the wide application of private litigation in 
Turkey. A claimant has to pay 25, 20 TL (approximately £ 7, 10) for filling an action 
in Commercial Courts (Asliye Ticaret Mahkemeleri) and 6.831 per cent relative fee 
of the dispute value for written judicial decree. Another 123, 60 TL (approximately £ 
35) has to be paid to file an appeal in Supreme Court of Appeals (Yargitay).
127
 There 
will be attorney fees and other expenses during the court proceedings as well, such as 
expert fees and other charges that the claimant needs to pay.
128
 This can create a 
burden on investors who seeks justice. As a result, they may choose not to sue.  
To conclude, inadequacies in institutional setting of Turkish judiciary system, for 
example the number of judges, the structure of courts, the cost of litigation, and long 
trials and lengthy procedures could be the factors that affect the low litigation rates in 
Turkey. In addition, the reason for the non-application of auditor liability rules in 
Turkey could be the lack of understanding of the law by the lawyers and investors.
129
  
Differences in practice are seen at level 3. Some of these differences are related to 
the failure of the Turkish law-maker to consider the practicality of news laws. For 
instance, prior to the adoption of the new TCC no regulatory impact analysis was 
carried out in order to foresee the effects of the rules and predict the outcomes.
130
 If 
carried out, such assessment would have been beneficial in order to understand 
whether the rules are appropriate in the present institutional framework. Lack of such 
prior assessment may result in non-application of the rules, or rules that are applied 
differently than intended. Instead of carrying out such regulatory impact analysis, the 
law-makers set different dates for the enactment of the law and for their application. 
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For instance, the new TCC was issued in January 2011 while rules on external 
auditing were only applicable as of January 2013. The law-makers made an 
assumption that 2 years would be enough for adjustments of the existence institutions 
(e.g. commercial courts) and establishment of new institutions (e.g. the public 
oversight body: the KGK) and the adaptation of the rules (e.g. including the 
education of accountants and auditors
131
). However, these assumptions were not 
conclusive as they were only predictions and therefore, it should not be a surprise 
that institutional transformation may not be achieved during this period.
132
 As a 
result, although the law seems to have converged, practices may still differ during 
this adaptation period. This could be the reason of differences in practice even after 
the adoption. It is therefore necessary before drawing a conclusion, to take into 
account this adaptation process and their results on differences in practice.  
In line with EU Directive 2006/43/EC,
133
 a public oversight authority on statutory 
audit practices in Turkey was created: the KGK. As this paper already explained, the 
establishment of the KGK has not exterminated the existence of more than one 
regulatory authority in the field. In addition to the supervision of the KGK, other 
regulatory authorities in the field also have supervision powers in their subject 
areas.
134
 The existence of more than one regulatory authority in the field may cause 
obstruction and create a cumbersome enforcement mechanism.
135
 In fact, the 
enforcement mechanism in Turkey is already weak and unwieldy. For instance, SPK 
monitoring over audit firms seems to be ineffective in terms of the number of 
investigations and sanctions issued to audit firms.
136
 This situation is a drawback for 
the law in action. In such circumstances, the function of the law would be hindered 
by an inefficient enforcement mechanism. Therefore, at level 2, differences in 
practice are likely to obstruct an actual convergence.  
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Last but not least, cultural differences may stand in the way of convergence in 
practice. Coffee remarked that cultural norms might help managers to refrain from 
the expropriation of minority shareholders’ interests.137 This influence is said to be 
more relevant where the legal rules on minority shareholder protection are weaker.
138
 
As Coffee claims, in civil law regimes where the law is weaker, the influence of 
cultural norms can be more relevant than legal rules on the business.
139
 It is because 
in common law countries where legal rules provide more protection for minority 
shareholders
140
 cultural norms become less important.
141
 Similarly to Coffee, 
Hofstede suggested that cultural values might influence managers’ decisions and 
behaviours.
142
 To give an example from Turkey, in the Imar Bank case the family 
connections and government contacts played a great role in the bank’s businesses. 
The Uzan family members had a great control over the managers and they had close 
relations with the political actors of that time.
143
 They expected that having close 
relations with the powerful bureaucrats at that time would provide them a greater 
comfort for their illegal transactions.
144
 The family members had the absolute control 
over the bank’s management and had no incentives to disclose business information 
to the public or government’s officials, including the BDDK auditors. It seems clear 
that the cultural values that play a role in business relations could influence 
managers’ behaviours. One could also question the relation between cultural values 
and auditors’ behaviours. To put as a question, did cultural factors affect the work of 
the auditors,
145
 for instance in Imar Bank case? 
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The quality of the audit work highly depends on auditors’ professional judgement 
that should be exercised with a questioning mind. As important as the professional 
expertise, it is important that auditors adopt an independent attitude when performing 
the audit work.
146
 Auditors’ ability to exercise their individual and independent 
professional judgement depends on the development of the accounting profession in 
a country. Gray identified that accounting values in a country can be related to the 
professionalism dimension of the society in question.
147
 Accordingly, in societies 
with high professionalism there is more emphasis on independence in individual 
decisions.
148
 For instance, countries such as the UK, adopt a principle-based 
accounting regulation and the concept of ‘a true and fair view’ heavily depends on 
auditors’ judgement on the financial accounts.149 In addition, the role of the 
professional associations in standard setting also helped the development of 
accountancy as a profession in the UK.
150
  
As far as the period of the Imar Bank case in Turkey is considered, contrary to the 
UK standards, neither professional associations nor accountancy as a profession were 
highly developed. Instead, audit work used to be concerned primarily with the 
implementation of prescriptive legal requirements in terms of, for example tax 
compliance.
151
 This audit work definition did not allow auditors to use freely their 
professional judgement in any case. Furthermore, as Gray suggested, secrecy (or 
confidentiality) in business relations also influence the accounting values.
152
 
According to Gray,
153
 managers in less secretive societies (i.e. more transparent 
ones) tend to disclose information whereas they tend to be more confidential in 
secretive environments and share business information only to those who are closely 
linked to the management.
154
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In the Imar Bank case, as required by law, auditors checked the company’s financial 
accounts whether they were prepared and presented in accordance to the law. 
Auditors however, did not critically question the accuracy of the financial accounts. 
Instead they completely relied on the information presented by the management who 
in fact designed the internal control system to ensure that the bank was run in 
accordance to the major shareholders’ interests. The auditors’ verification of the 
financial reports without critically questioning their accuracy may be related to lack 
of professionalism in the auditing society in Turkey at that time. Professionalism 
requires independence and expertise. However, in Turkey, auditors were involved as 
an organ within the companies during the time, thus not able to conduct an 
independent audit but worked as an employee of the management.
155
 Auditors in the 
Imar Bank case also did not ask for more information from the management because 
of the likely influence of the cultural value of secrecy on auditors’ work. The 
management’s reluctance to disclose adequate financial information was not seen 
inappropriate by the auditors, as they perceived non-disclosure as normal.  
Gray observes that professional judgement will find its acceptance in societies where 
there are few rules (instead of prescriptive detailed rules)
156
 and individual decisions 
are more easily tolerated.
157
 According to Gray’s concept of accounting values 
defined by cultural values of professionalism and secrecy, accounting values in 
Turkey found consistent with high secrecy (low level of transparency and less 
incentive to disclose information) and low level of professionalism and less 
flexibility in rules.
158
 As suggested, societal factors might explain differences in 
accounting values in different countries.
159
 The accounting system of a country is 
shaped by its economic, historical and technological development as well as its legal 
system, capital market development and education.
160
 The list is not exhaustive. It 
has shown that cultural values also have a say on the development of accounting 
profession in a country. Thus, even if the law is formally converged, cultural values 
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may still be effective on the business relations and practices, and thus might result in 
differences in practice.  
The Imar Bank case was important in terms of illustrating a large scale of accounting 
fraud, audit and corporate governance failure. However, it happened more than a 
decade ago. Reforms, especially in the banking sector were enacted shortly after the 
case was revealed.
161
 Moreover, since the last decade, there has been significant 
development on rules and regulations on auditing also since then auditing as a 
profession has developed with the adoption of international auditing standards.
162
 
Furthermore, the influence of national cultural factors is likely to be less relevant for 
international firms.
163
 As Turkey keeps following an international route in audit 
regulation – including the adoption of international standards and EU law on auditing 
– and promoting the interaction between its capital markets and international 
markets, it is therefore suggested that the influence of national cultural values on 
auditing is likely to decrease.  
At level 4, the degree of functional dissimilarities is high. At this level, the costs of 
harmonisation should be considered. With the enactment of new laws, the number of 
regulations on auditing has expanded gradually in Turkey. For the following reasons 
compliance costs are likely to be substantial: first, Turkey is not currently a member 
country of the EU. Its laws and rules may differ in certain areas. Moreover, currently, 
there is no cooperation with the European Council in terms of law making.
164
 This 
may create a disadvantage for Turkey compared to the EU Member State countries, 
both in terms of law making and in the application processes. Second, an effective 
system of capital markets is necessary for the successful adoption of laws in the audit 
practice. Yet, the Turkish capital market is less developed and the economy is 
relatively fragile when compared with European countries. To reduce the negative 
effects of functional dissimilarities in convergence, it might be necessary to issue 
new laws in other areas as well. However, this is likely to increase compliance costs. 
Thus, functional dissimilarities can be seen to be a major impediment to convergence 
between EU and Turkish laws on auditing.  
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CONCLUSION  
Financial markets become more integrated every day. This integration has increased 
the number of cross-listed firms and international (and multinational) investments 
between countries. On the one hand, investors rely on auditing and assurance 
services for their investments to achieve the most return on their investments. In 
addition, companies use auditing services to provide a true picture of their financial 
situation. On the other hand, countries try to provide a secure and attractive 
investment environment for investors in their capital markets. An effective audit 
market can contribute to the stability and efficient operations of financial markets.
165
 
As a result, the importance of external auditing has grown, not only for corporate 
governance in companies, but also in ensuring trust and confidence in financial 
markets. 
The global need for auditing services has led to the creation of international 
professional standards in auditing.
166
 Ultimately, countries that aspire to benefit from 
a comparability advantage and to attract foreign investment have adopted this 
uniformity,
167
 not only in professional standards, but also in global form under the 
Big Four audit firms.
168
 As this chapter has submitted, this kind of approximation is a 
kind of convergence through ‘congruence’.169 In addition to this natural convergence, 
there is also convergence of form through the adoption of EU laws on auditing that 
can be seen as convergence through ‘pressure’.170  
This chapter has submitted that a current globalised world makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, to categorise systems into legal families. As worldwide globalisation and 
market integration increases, the trend will be for a convergence of laws on auditing 
between EU and Turkish laws. In Turkey, the effects of globalisation (i.e. adoption 
of ISAs) and EU membership process (i.e. harmonisation with EU Directive 
2006/43/EC) have had a direct impact on the laws on auditing and will continue to do 
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 See Chapter I, Section 2.3.  
166
 See Chapter III, Section 3.2.  
167
 For the case of Turkey, see Chapter VI.  
168
 See Chapter II, Section 2.4.  
169
 The term ‘convergence through congruence’ is borrowed from Siems. See Siems (n 9) pp. 250-96. 
170
 For ‘convergence through pressure’, see ibid pp. 314-17.  
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so.
171
 However, the approximation of laws in this form does not necessarily result in 
actual convergence, suggesting that differences may still persist.
172
  
The main conclusions of this chapter are as follows: If external auditing does not 
play a central and critical role in concentrated ownership structures,
173
 the enactment 
of audit reforms in Turkey can be read as the pressure of globalisation and 
worldwide integration of financial markets and the political and economic pressure 
of the EU membership process.
174
  This means that Turkey has succeeded in 
reforming its company and capital markets law in compliance with the EU Directive 
2006/43/EC.
175
 Also, the positive effects of globalisation are likely to prompt the 
application of international auditing standards in businesses in Turkey. Nevertheless, 
despite harmonisation attempts, there are a number of impediments to the 
convergence of auditing between EU and Turkish laws. It is due to the institutional 
and legislative differences in the audit market in Turkey. As a result, actual 
convergence may not be easily achieved, although there seems to be convergence in 
form as a result of the adoption of EU acquis.  
This chapter noted the appearance of an ineffective institutional framework in the 
auditing industry in Turkey as an impediment to auditing convergence in practice. In 
particular, it proposed that the multi-headed structure of the audit oversight 
mechanism in Turkey should be terminated. In order to achieve this, the 
independence and institutional capacity of the KGK needs to be strengthened in the 
field of auditing both in terms of supervision and rule making. In addition, the 
cooperation and coordination with the other regulatory bodies operate in the auditing 
field need further enhancement.  
Actual convergence cannot be achieved by approximation of laws alone, but requires 
institutional transformation as well. Institutional modification would make the 
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 For the critical analysis of the laws on auditing in Turkey, see Chapter VI in general.  
172
 There is no common practice on auditor liability rules among Member States. See Chapter V. 
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 For the role of auditing in concentrated systems, see Chapter I, Section 3.  
174
 For the EU membership process of Turkey as a motivation for the law reforms, see Chapter VI, 
Section 1.3.   
175
 Heribert Hirte, ‘The Corporate Governance of the Turkish Joint Stock Companies and 
Harmonization with European Union Acquis’ Seminar für Handeles-, Schiffahrts-und 
Wirtschaftsrecht, Universität Hamburg Sommersemester 2011 (von Talha Barut) p. 37. See also 
Commission Progress Report (n 74) p. 50. 
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adoption of imported law more successful.
176
 There is a strong correlation between 
institutional structure in a country and the successful application of imported rules. In 
other words, the effectiveness of law is linked to the institutional set-up of economic 
institutions through, for example the enforcement force of these institutions. Without 
sufficient institutional set-up, the approximation of law alone is less likely to bring 
successful implementation. Institutions must operate efficiently for the law to be 
making sense to the society. This should be understood as institutions work to 
familiarise the imported rules not only to the society (for the application of laws) but 
also to courts and other regulators (for the enforcement of laws). Unless these 
conditions are met it is unlikely that the imported law serve its purpose. If the society 
could not establish a familiarity with the imported law there will be no 
implementation or the law will be implied in contradiction to its initial purpose.
177
 
This is the case in the application of private litigation practice in Turkey. Institutional 
modification might be necessary to familiarize the private litigation system for 
investors in Turkey. In order to operate the system of paying compensation in 
Turkey, the capacity of courts must be improved to meet the demand for private 
litigation. To create such demand, it is necessary that the users understand the true 
meaning of the law. This could be achieved through increasing the public awareness 
on the legal remedies available within the judicial system in Turkey. 
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 Berkowitz et al (n 2003a) (n 79) pp. 180-1.  
177
 See also Section 2.3 above pp. 238-9. 
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CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSIONS 
 “In the world of audit, the status quo is not an option”.1 
In today’s financial markets, there is an increased demand for financial auditing. This 
demand has assigned external auditing and auditors an important role in financial 
markets, and external auditing has become an important pillar of financial markets. 
An increased demand for, and expanded role of, auditing in financial markets have 
emerged in re-regulation of auditing rules. As a result, audit regulation has regularly 
been subject to modifications and reforms not only in the EU but also in Turkey. As 
long as there is a demand for auditing in financial markets, it is likely that 
modifications and reforms will also be needed in the future. This thesis explored to 
what extent these reforms lead to convergence and identified the forces for and 
obstacles of convergence between the EU and Turkish laws on auditing.  
This chapter provides a general conclusion to the thesis. It starts with a review of the 
thesis from Section 1. The second section presents the main conclusion of the thesis. 
Finally, the third section concludes with some suggestions and recommendations for 
further research. 
1. REVIEW OF THE THESIS 
This thesis started by exploring the role of auditing in different corporate governance 
systems. It was submitted that, in dispersed systems, external auditing functions as a 
monitoring mechanism to reduce agency costs. External auditing also has a 
governance function in concentrated systems. In such systems, agency problem 
exists as an exploitation of minority shareholders: thus, external auditing is used to 
reduce the information asymmetry between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders through the use of high quality audits to give assurance to investors that 
the scope for controlling shareholders’ opportunistic behaviours is limited. Also as 
submitted, in addition to its governance function, external auditing plays an 
                                                 
1
 Jonathan Faull, General for Internal Market and Services, European Commission, 10 February 2011.  
Chapter VIII: Conclusions 
250 
 
important role in ensuring trust and confidence in financial markets. An increasing 
number of cross-listings and international investments have resulted in a greater 
demand for auditing. As a result, external auditing has become an indispensable 
element in financial markets.  
The second chapter explored the role of auditors and submitted that external auditing 
today has moved beyond its traditional monitoring governance function to a wider 
business approach. Under the new form of external auditing, auditors have become 
more dependent on advisory services, with their independence likely to be 
jeopardized under this framework. In addition, the users of audit reports expect 
auditors not only to check on accounts, but also to provide assurances regarding the 
financial stability of the company. However, a statutory auditor’s duty is not to 
provide comfort regarding the financial health of the company. The wrong 
perception regarding the role of auditors has resulted in an expectations gap. This 
issue has long been debated since Enron until now, and reached a peak during the 
global financial crisis, where it remains. The Big Four audit firms serve as a good 
example in the audit market as they provide audit services around the world under a 
global network and their role was heavily debated during and after the global 
financial crisis. This chapter explored their role in the crisis in terms of reporting 
going concern accuracy and audit quality. The discussions in this chapter contributed 
to the debate by identifying structural (i.e. appointment and remuneration of auditors 
by the audit client) and functional (i.e. auditor independence; expectations gap) 
problems with auditing. The main conclusion of Chapter II was that the expectations 
gap is derived from the ill-defined role of auditors and the public’s wrong 
perceptions regarding that role. The global financial crisis represents a good example 
on this issue. As this chapter submitted, although there were certain audit failures, a 
general conclusion regarding the failure of auditors in the global financial crisis to 
issue going concern opinions would not be justified. 
For this purpose of thesis, an examination of the pillars of audit regulation was 
necessary to provide a legal perspective. In this respect, Chapter III contributed to 
existing external auditing literature by providing an analysis of audit regulations and 
laws. This chapter made a number of contributions to the understanding of audit 
regulation. To begin with, the justifications and motivations of regulation are implied 
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in audit regulation. This chapter submitted that audit regulation is needed in order to 
deal with the expectations gap, the aftermaths of audit failures, information 
asymmetries, and the risk of distortion of competition in the market. On the one 
hand, the state is mainly involved in audit regulation through the regulation of 
financial markets law, company law, and competition law. On the other hand, private 
regulators also set principles for the audit profession where political influences (i.e. 
IMF, World Bank, European Commission) and/or commercial aspirations (i.e. 
through lobbying by the Big Four) are likely to be involved at this stage. This chapter 
presented that the current audit regulation does not have a traditional form of 
industry self-regulation since state and private actors influence audit regulation at 
national, regional, and international levels. It is likely that the different regulatory 
motives of state and private regulators might hinder the primary public interest role 
of audit regulation. 
One of the main themes of this thesis is convergence. Chapter III submitted that audit 
regulation follows an international route (e.g. the adoption of ISAs). In this context, 
this thesis further examined EU laws on auditing in terms of convergence, in Chapter 
IV. In addition, this chapter critically analysed the EU’s existing laws and law 
proposals in terms of preliminary issues on auditing. At the EU level, external 
auditing is regulated by Directive 2006/43/EC. Although Directive 2006/43/EC has 
set a benchmark for statutory audit practices in the EU, there were problems in the 
current structure of the EU audit market. Thus, the European Commission aims to re-
regulate external auditing to change the status quo in the EU audit market. This 
chapter explored EU audit policy and laws and identified how corporate scandals, 
financial crises, and the single market objective of the EU have had shaped this 
policy and laws. The main contribution of this chapter is the critical analysis of the 
EU’s law proposals on statutory auditing: the proposal for a Directive amending 
Directive 2006/43/EC
2
 and the proposal for a Regulation on the statutory audit of 
PIEs.
3
 This chapter showed that Directive 2006/43/EC has helped little in the 
harmonisation of auditing rules in the EU, as Member States implemented the 
                                                 
2
 European Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts 
Brussels, 30.11.2011 COM(2011) 778 final (Draft Directive). 
3
 European Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
specific requirements regarding statutory audit of public-interest entities Brussels, 30.11.2011 
COM(2011) 779 final (Draft Regulation). 
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Directive differently. This chapter also supplements Chapter II by providing a legal 
perspective on the preliminary issues in auditing, namely the expectations gap, 
auditor independence, and high concentration. In this respect, the reform proposals of 
the EU were critically evaluated in light of these issues in the EU audit market. It is 
submitted that, although the European Commission has proposed some radical 
proposals in the draft Regulation (e.g. prohibiting the provision of certain type of 
non-audit services and requirement of mandatory rotation of audit firms), it can be 
expected that Regulation is likely to increase the harmonisation level in the EU. Yet, 
it remains to be seen what the EU proposal will bring to the audit market and how it 
will change the current structure.  
As external auditing becomes an important element in financial markets, the number 
of users of audit reports has increased. One of the questions that arise at this point is 
to what extend auditors should be liable to the users of the audited reports for the 
misleading and false information in the audited accounts. Chapter V explored the 
elements and conditions of auditor liability under international auditing standards 
(ISAs), EU law, and UK law separately. This chapter showed that ISAs do not 
impose any liability on auditors. Nor has the EU established a common auditor 
liability regime for Member States. However, to provide an example on the role of 
auditors and their legal responsibility in financial markets, this chapter explored the 
UK auditor liability regime under both common law and statute. As UK common law 
established, auditors owe a duty of care to the company based on contractual 
relationship; therefore, auditors can be held liable if they breach their contractual 
duty. Chapter V submitted that the scope of auditor liability rules has expanded in 
line with the changing role of auditors. However, the question of ‘to what extent 
should the scope of auditors’ liability be extended?’ still raises concerns. Increased 
liability rules may be necessary for the efficient function of markets to ensure trust 
and confidence wherein investors can be compensated for damages caused by 
auditors’ misconduct. However, under the current audit market structure, where there 
are only a few large audit firms, a major liability claim might have serious 
consequences. It is likely that the concentration level will increase as a result of a 
successful major liability claim. Also, because audit reports are publicly available, an 
unlimited liability regime would place auditors liable to the public at large. Due to 
these concerns, UK law established that auditors could be held liable to third parties 
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in terms of untrue or misleading statements in or omissions from prospectuses unless 
they disprove their negligence over that misleading information.
4
 The discussions in 
this chapter are important to understand the duties and liability of auditors in 
financial markets. The analyses in this chapter also complement discussions in 
previous chapters, especially Chapters I and II.    
This thesis so far had explored the concept of external auditing, including its role, 
function, and regulation, and the liability rules that the law imposes on auditors. 
Chapter IV and Chapter V explored EU laws on auditing with a limited scope in 
terms of convergence. To broaden the scope of the convergence discussion, the 
findings of this thesis were analysed further in Chapter VII in terms of convergence. 
Moreover, in order to enlarge discussions, Turkish laws on auditing as detailed in 
Chapter VI were added to the discussions in Chapter VII as well.  
This thesis took Turkey as a case study because of Turkey’s candidate EU 
membership status. The EU membership status of Turkey calls for a discussion on 
the ability of Turkey’s to adopt EU laws. The results of this discussion were also 
used for the convergence analysis in Chapter VII. In Chapter VI, analyses of Turkey 
were based on socio-political and economic factors. The socio-political perspective 
considered Turkey’s EU membership aims as a motivation for the law reforms. As 
the other motivation for the law reforms, the economic perspective considered 
Turkey’s objective to become an active player in international financial markets - 
with an increased legal environment and strengthened governance structure of firms. 
Chapter VI showed that Turkey has achieved reform in its commercial law and 
capital markets laws, in order to become a member of the EU and to be an active 
player in the international financial markets. This chapter submitted that, through 
these law reforms, Turkish laws on auditing have become closer to EU law, 
especially in the areas of public oversight and the professional requirements for 
auditors to perform audits of PIEs. The findings of this chapter are further examined 
in terms of convergence with EU laws in Chapter VII.  
Chapter VII examined the need, methods, and feasibility of convergence of auditing 
between the EU and Turkish laws. The findings of the previous chapters were 
applied to the question about the feasibility of convergence. Therefore, this chapter 
                                                 
4
 See FSMA, s. 90. See also Chapter V, Section 3.2.2. 
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provided a general conclusion on the findings of the thesis in terms of convergence. 
This chapter contributed to the convergence debate. The main conclusions of this 
chapter are as follows: On the one hand, through the adoption of ISAs and the 
implementation of Directive 2006/43/EC, laws on auditing might become more 
similar between the EU and Turkish laws. However, differences may still persist. 
This is due to legislative and institutional differences. Hence, this approximation can 
only lead to formal convergence. On the other hand, through the effects of 
globalisation and the integration of markets, the trend will follow a convergence of 
laws on auditing. Actual convergence is more likely under this kind of convergence.  
2. THESIS CONCLUSION AND MAIN FINDINGS 
This thesis made a number of contributions. To start with, it contributed to existing 
corporate governance literature in discussing the role of auditors in corporate 
governance (in a narrow context) and in financial markets (in a broader context).
5
 
This thesis also submitted a relatively comprehensive analysis on audit regulation.
 
This is because audit regulation was examined from a number of perspectives, 
including the need of audit regulation, the current regulatory structure of auditing, 
and state and private actors that have play a role in audit regulation.
6
 Thereof, this 
thesis contributed to the auditing regulation literature by providing a law perspective. 
A further contribution of this research is the comparative analysis of Turkish laws 
and EU laws on auditing.
7
 The findings of this comparative analysis contributed to 
convergence debates in providing a discussion on the convergence of auditing 
between EU and Turkish laws. 
The aim of this thesis was to examine auditing and shed fresh light on its regulation 
in the EU and in Turkey by questioning the possibility and feasibility of 
convergence. The result was a number of conclusions that are submitted across 
different chapters. The main conclusions of this thesis are as follows. The role of 
auditing in corporate governance and in financial markets has a growing importance. 
Greater attention received by auditing at international and EU levels, following the 
recent global financial crisis, can be seen as evidence. This thesis explained that there 
                                                 
5
 See Chapters I and II. 
6
 See Chapter III.  
7
 See Chapter VII. 
Chapter VIII: Conclusions 
255 
 
is a wrong perception amongst the public regarding the role of auditors, which results 
in an expectations gap. This expectations gap is widened during a time of crisis. This 
thesis submitted that a general conclusion on auditors’ failure during the financial 
crisis would not be justified. However, as shown, there are structural and functional 
problems in auditing today. Times of crisis give opportunities to lawmakers to issue 
new laws. In this respect, this thesis submitted that audit regulation is motivated to 
change in the aftermath of audit failures. As this thesis established, audit regulation is 
also needed in dealing with the expectations gap, information asymmetries and the 
risk of distortion of competition in the market.  
The regulation of auditor liability is a sensitive issue. To be sure, increased liability 
rules are necessary for the protection of investors from false and misleading 
information. This thesis expressed that, on the one hand, increased liability rules 
might encourage auditors to provide quality audits, and therefore mitigate 
information asymmetries in the market. On the other hand, due to the current market 
structure, the scope of liability cannot be determined without taking into account a 
risk of the disappearance of one of the large audit firms after a major liability claim. 
Nevertheless, this must not suggest that auditors should not be held liable for their 
negligent acts. Instead, regulators should act in the best interests of investor 
protection for the efficiency of financial markets and should take action to provide 
the most appropriate market conditions where auditors are not allowed to escape 
liability just because of concerns for litigation risk and effects on concentration.  
One of the main messages of this thesis was that auditing, both in terms of its 
profession and regulation, follows an international route. For instance, the Big Four 
audit firms contribute to the internationalisation of auditing through their global 
networks. Similarly, ISAs are adopted in more than a hundred jurisdictions in the 
world. At the EU level, EU Directive 2006/43/EC has set a benchmark for statutory 
audit practices and rules between Member States. These attempts may suggest that 
there is an approximation in the laws of auditing. However, as shown, there is 
diverse implementation of EU laws. The form of the laws of EU Member States 
shows similarity after the transposition of Directive 2006/43/EC whereas the 
implementation of the Directive is diverse amongst Member States. This thesis has 
submitted that this is due to ineffective harmonisation methods used by the European 
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Commission. In conclusion, despite the drivers of convergence, such as the 
integrating of financial markets and harmonisation attempts of the EU, the actual 
convergence of auditing in the EU has not yet been achieved.  
Similar results were found for Turkey. The globalisation and integration of financial 
markets and EU candidate membership has motivated Turkey to harmonise its laws 
on auditing with EU law. As a result, Turkey has succeeded in harmonising its law 
on auditing with the EU acquis. It has been found that the form of the law shows 
similarities, but that implementation of the rules may differ due to functional 
dissimilarities and legislative differences in Turkey. This thesis has submitted that 
the EU membership process and internationalisation of the economy is likely has led 
to formal convergence between EU and Turkish laws on auditing, yet, this is not 
likely to result in actual convergence. For more effective implementation of the laws 
in practice, modifications can be made, especially at institutional level, e.g. 
increasing the capacity of the commercial courts and giving a more active role to the 
KGK, the Turkish public oversight board in the audit sector.  
3. FURTHER RESEARCH 
At the time of writing, the EU proposals on the Directive
8
 and the Regulation
9
 for 
statutory audits of PIEs are in the process of discussion in the EU Parliament and 
Council, and a date of adoption has not been set. This thesis critically discussed the 
draft versions of these law reforms.
10
 Therefore, the analyses in this thesis could not 
be applied to changes made (if there will be any) by these proposals.  
With regards reforms, it will take years until they have been implemented in the 
EU.
11
 More time is required in order to discover and evaluate their effects on the 
laws of EU Member States and also on the audit market structure. For instance, the 
EU proposes an audit supervision mechanism under ESMA;
12
 time will tell what 
                                                 
8
 Draft Directive (n 2).  
9
 Draft Regulation (n 3).  
10
 See Chapter IV, for a critical discussion on EU law proposals.  
11
 The reforms are published in the Official Journal on 27 May 2014 and shall apply from 17 June 
2016. With respect to Regulation No. 537/2014 there are some transitional provisions in terms of audit 
firm rotation.  
12
 See ibid.   
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further reflections will be - e.g., whether EU-wide audit supervision is favourable to 
the EU audit market or not.  
The financial markets are subject to constant changes and developments (e.g. 
political and economic). There are possible effects of these changes and 
developments on the application of laws (also on the creation of new laws). Further 
studies may consider such effects on the application of EU laws by Member States as 
well as the effects on Turkey’s adoption. For instance, future studies can examine 
current financially distressed Member States (e.g. Greece, Portugal, and Spain) and 
also candidate countries, which are smaller and at a lower economic level than 
current countries in the EU (e.g. Serbia, Iceland) and how their political and 
economic situations effect the implementation of EU law. In this respect, empirical 
research could be conducted to improve the understanding of the primary differences 
and similarities of Member States as well as between Member States and other 
candidate countries in terms of the implementation of the laws. 
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